Diplomacy: The flotilla as metaphor
06/14/2012 23:11
State comptroller's report of gov't national security policy chronicles haphazard decision-making process.
Mavi Marmara Photo: Stringer Turkey / Reuters
Among the most telling aspects of the state comptroller’s report, published
Wednesday, which chronicles a slapdash decision-making process inside the Prime
Minister’s Office in general, and with regard to the Mavi Marmara incident in
particular, was Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu’s official response to
it.
In the final analysis, Netanyahu said in a statement issued by his
office, “Israel’s citizens are enjoying a level of security that they have not
known for years.”
In other words, forget all State Comptroller Micha
Lindenstrauss’s carping about shoddy preparation, about a decision-making
process dominated by the defense establishment, about the lack of input from the
security cabinet on key and vital issues; The only thing that really matters are
the results. And the overall result of the last three years is a security
situation for Israelis that is better than it has been in recent
memory.
This good security situation didn’t just appear out of the blue,
the PMO response continued. Rather, “this security is the direct result of
responsible management and determined policy. The security discussions that have
been held over the past three years have been unprecedented in their scope and
depth, as attested to by those who have participated in them.”
That last
line has been the PMO and the Defense Ministry’s mantra whenever they are
criticized about how decisions are made – whether the criticism comes from the
comptroller, the former head of the Mossad or the former head of the Shin
Bet.
But the comptroller’s report showed that not all the participants in
these discussions were thrilled about how they were handled. In fact, some of
those who participated in discussions over the Mavi Marmara – like Strategic
Affairs Minister Moshe Ya’alon, for instance – were less than impressed by their
scope and depth, and instead complained to the comptroller that these meetings
were not exhaustive at all.
The report that Lindenstrauss released
Wednesday – dealing with the implementation (or lack of implementation) of the
2008 National Security Council Act that established the National Security
Council; the decision-making process that preceded the boarding of the Mavi
Marmara; and the public diplomacy handling of the incident – is not an easy
read, and not only because it extends over 153 pages of dry, repetitive,
bureaucratic prose.
It is an uncomfortable read because, as the nation
sits on the cusp of critical decisions that will need to be taken regarding
Iran, this report paints a picture of a national security and foreign policy
apparatus very much in the grips of the defense establishment, where preparatory
work is not properly carried out, where orderly meetings are not conducted on a
regular basis, and where information is compartmentalized and concentrated –
again – in the hands of the defense establishment.
Have you ever heard of
Yohanan Locker? You should have, because if the comptroller is correct, this man
– who serves as Netanyahu’s military liaison – is one of the most influential
men in the country.
Despite the National Security Council Act of 2008
that legislated that the head of the National Security Council would be the
prime minister’s chief national security adviser, in practice it is the military
liaison.
The problem with this arrangement is twofold. First because the
military liaison does not have the proper staff or expertise to coordinate the
prime minister’s meetings on national security issues, and secondly because he
is part of the defense establishment. If the military liaison is the one
preparing key national security meetings, raising the issues to be brought to
those meetings and both providing the intelligence information and determining
who can see it, then one perspective has a leg up on all the competition – that
of the defense establishment.
This arrangement, Lindenstrauss concluded
in his report, is not healthy, and in fact runs contrary to the National
Security Council law. Yet Netanyahu, he said, has not stepped in and foisted the
National Security Council on the decision-making process, as he should have
done.
Netanyahu’s response to this, as contained in the 200-word response
on this matter issued by his office, was simple: The proof is in the pudding,
and the pudding – at least the security aspect of the pudding – tastes
good.
Except that when it came to the Mavi Marmara, the pudding was not
good; It was bitter indeed.
To which the PMO replied that the Mavi
Marmara was a different case, and that even the comptroller himself had written
in the report that he was not convinced that had the decision-making process
been different leading up to the May 2010 flotilla, the results would have been
different.
In other words, the PMO is saying that even had they followed
all the rules and regulations laid down in the National Security Council act of
2008, which regulates the bureaucratic processes that needs to go into making
weighty decisions, there was no guarantee that the results would have been any
different.
While that indeed may be true, it misses a key point that the
comptroller was stressing: process, method and procedure are
vital.
High-quality process, proper procedure and good method in
decision-making do not guarantee success, but they may increase the chances of
success and limit the probability of failure. Of course results are important,
but good process leads to a greater likelihood of good results.
And what
Lindenstrauss pointed out was that the process before the Mavi Marmara was
faulty.
True, that’s is not why nine Turks who clashed with IDF
soldiers on a ship hell-bent on provoking Israel and bashing the
blockade of
Gaza were killed in May 2010 and that’s not why key strategic relations
with
Turkey have gone down the drain. But a better decisionmaking process –
bringing
everyone into the picture together and in an orderly, systematic fashion
– might
have enabled Israel to deal with the flotilla better.
And, as
Lindenstrauss pointed out, the flotilla is a metaphor; a metaphor for a type of
decision-making process that, while improving, is not what it should be –
especially considering the life-and-death decisions that those at the top of
Israel’s pyramid are entrusted to make.
One central theme emerged
throughout the report: process matters, because process shapes
substance.
If you plan as necessary, and in this case as determined by
the National Security Council law of 2008; if you involve everyone who has to
contribute; if you do the necessary staff work that includes objectively
comparing and evaluating all the options; if you are systematic in preparatory
work that goes into high-level meetings; if you work on an inter-agency level;
if the staff-work is done by the best and the brightest and the product produced
is rigorous and exhaustive; then the likelihood of error because of insufficient
planning, or not taking something into consideration, is
lessened.
Procedure can’t guarantee success, but – at least according to
the comptroller – it is a necessary condition for it. Proper process is not
sufficient for success and ultimately resolves on the wisdom of those who make
the decisions and implement them, but proper procedure can ensure that the
leaders are equipped with everything they need when approaching those
decisions.
And that, Lindenstrauss made clear, was not the case in the
run-up to the Mavi Marmara, and it is systemically not the case at the highest
level.
Wednesday's report did not come in a vacuum.
Indeed, it
should be seen as an extension of various committees of inquiry and comptroller
documents stretching back numerous years.
One of the frustrating things
about reading the report was that it contained so many echoes of the Winograd
Commission report from 2008 that criticized the decision-making process in the
run-up to and during the Second Lebanon War, and the subsequent Lipkin-Shahak
committee report that was mandated with providing recommendations for
implementing the Winograd Commission findings. One of the Lipkin-Shahak
committee’s key recommendations was to strengthen the National Security
Council.
To say that nothing has changed would be unfair. Things have
changed. For instance, the National Security Council, the body now empowered by
law with being the prime minister’s main advisory body on national security
issues, is much more active than it was during the Second Lebanon War, or when
Netanyahu and his then-foreign policy adviser Uzi Arad pushed the idea in
1999.
Indeed, Arad – who was fired from his position as head of the
National Security Council in 2011 amid allegations that he leaked sensitive
information – has reason today to feel doubly vindicated.
His first
vindication, a personal one, came in March, when then-deputy attorney-general
Raz Nizri said in a Knesset committee meeting that Arad had not leaked sensitive
material.
And his second vindication, a professional one, came with
Wednesday’s publication of the comptroller’s report, since his twoyear tenure
inside the PMO was marked by a fierce turf battle with the prime minister’s
military liaison. The comptroller sided with Arad, saying with no equivocation
that the National Security Council, not the military liaison, is the prime
foreign policy advisory body inside the PMO and should be the body in charge of
coordinating, preparing and taking part in the key meetings on national security
issues.
For years that was not the case; for years the defense
establishment held sway, and it is only natural that it will not relinquish that
prerogative readily. Nevertheless, Lindenstrauss concluded that it must do so
for the sake of proper procedure and process.
And if it does not do so
willingly, he wrote, then the prime minister must force it to do
so.
Otherwise? Well, otherwise – as Lindenstrauss wrote in a phrase that
summed up his whole report – “the flotilla is a metaphor.”