Israel is the focus of the cover story on this week’s
The Economist, the
prestigious British newsweekly, that is extremely influential in elite circles
in the US as well. There is a picture of President Barak Obama leaning his head
on his right hand, looking deep in thought, while in the background is a picture
of a Merkava tank. On top is a headline reading: “Please, not again,” which only
becomes understandable after looking at sub-headline that follows in red: “The
threat of war in the Middle East.”
Picking up on this theme, the
magazine’s main editorial puts forward the thesis that unless Obama takes bold
diplomatic moves in the peace process, there is a real risk of war.
What
has suddenly changed that causes
The Economist to sound the alarm? Its editorial
notes that the wars of 2006 and 2009 were only limited ones. But since that time
Iran has provided Hizbullah with 50,000 missiles and rockets, and so “for the
first time a radical non-state actor has the power to kill thousands of
civilians in Israel’s cities more or less at the press of a button.” This
massive attack could be the result of a skirmish along the borders with Lebanon
or with Gaza.
The scenario that
The Economist then paints is that under
such circumstances, Israel will retaliate with “double force.” It then suggests
that this kind of war “could easily draw in Syria, and perhaps Iran.” After
describing the causes of a future regional war, it offers a solution: “All of
this should give new urgency to Arab- Israeli peacemaking.”
What is the
connection between reaching an agreement with Palestinian Authority President
Mahmoud Abbas and the rocket forces of Hizbullah? Without much explanation, the
editorial simply suggests: “Give the Palestinians a state on the West Bank and
it will become much harder to justify going to war.”
Blaming US policy
for the failure to reach a political solution to the conflict through direct
peace talks (there is no Palestinian responsibility),
The Economist then
concludes that Obama, along with the rest of the world, must change his tactics
and impose a solution on the parties.
The editorial cannot be shrugged
off. It is important because it reflects how many European foreign policy
experts view the Middle East. Nonetheless, it is deeply flawed in two basic
ways. First, and most fundamentally, it confuses the main source of potential
escalation and war, Iran, with the diplomatic target of the peace initiative it
recommends, the Palestinians.
Dealing with the latter will not alter the
hostile intentions of the former.
HISTORICALLY, RELATIONS with the
Palestinians and tensions with Iran’s proxies, Hizbullah and Hamas, have been on
two completely separate tracks. In April 1996, while prime minister Shimon Peres
was negotiating with the Palestinians, the Israeli-Lebanese border deteriorated
and Israel was forced to launch Operation Grapes of Wrath against
Hizbullah.
Again in 2008, when prime minister Ehud Olmert was in advanced
negotiations with both Abbas and the Syrians (through the Turks), there was a
massive escalation of rocket fire by Hamas that resulted in Operation Cast
Lead.
There was simply no correlation between Israeli-Palestinian
diplomacy and the military escalation with organizations supported by
Iran.
In fact, from the Iranian perspective if there was a link between
the two, it was based on a logic which was the exact opposite of what The
Economist proposed: Iran often sought to promote terrorism to prevent Israel and
the Arabs from coming to any agreement. Thus, the more diplomacy progressed, the
greater the motivation of Iran had to disrupt it.
The remedy of
The
Economist is as unrealistic as its analysis. It proposes new muscular American
diplomacy based on the idea that by drawing a map as “a new starting point,” the
parties can be pressured to finish the rest of the details. But what motivation
will the Palestinians have to concede anything on security or refugees if they
receive their territorial goals of the pre-1967 line on a silver platter? Israel
will have lost all its territorial assets and have nothing to trade for
concessions.
Finally, The Economist uses the worn argument that the
outlines of an agreement are known: namely, the Clinton parameters, which were
proposed after the failure of the Camp David and Taba negotiations. They were
never signed and certainly cannot bind subsequent Israeli
governments.
Moreover, many responsible Israelis had serious reservations
about what Clinton proposed at the time: Shaul Mofaz, chief of General Staff in
December 2000, was reported to have told the cabinet in the name of the entire
General Staff: “The Clinton bridging proposal is not compatible with Israel’s
security needs and if it is accepted, it will threaten the security of the
state.”
This frank analysis was not a secret at the time, but rather was
leaked and splashed across the headlines of a Friday
Yediot Aharonot. The
Clinton proposal, it should be recalled not only divided Jerusalem, but also
pulled the IDF out of the Jordan Valley, replacing it with international forces
that were supposed to become responsible for Israel’s defense.
The
Economist wants this solution imposed nonetheless, even if it plainly leaves
Israel more vulnerable. It does not consider how regional conditions have
changed since that time. For example, in 2000, Iran was not getting close to
nuclear weapons. It did not dominate Iraq and was not in the process of turning
it into a satellite state that it could use against Israel and the Sunni Arab
states in the region.
The Economist pretends it is calling for pressure
on “both sides,” but it is clear that it is talking about leaning mainly on
Israel, to push it back to the 1967 lines and denying its right to defensible
borders.
Progress in the relations with the Palestinians has a value in
its own right, but it will not fundamentally alter what appears to be Iran’s
determination to move the Middle East down the road of greater escalation.
The
Economist makes a determination that too many people in the Middle East see
America as “weak” and they believe that “its power is waning.” It is a
fundamental error to believe that American power is declining, given that no
other state can compete with its global reach, if it decides to use
it.
Nevertheless, if Washington seeks to alter the impressions that
The
Economist describes, the way forward is to correctly identify the main factor
threatening war in the Middle East, Iran, effectively deterring its
destabilizing activities, and not by bullying Israel, which the British
newsweekly clearly prefers.
The writer is president of the Jerusalem
Center for Public Affairs and a former ambassador to the UN.