Gaza Boat 311.
(photo credit: ASSOCIATED PRESS)
The investigative committee into the events of May 31, announced Sunday by the Prime Minister’s Office, is meant to deflect international diplomatic pressure from Israel over its handling of the Gaza flotilla affair. While it is important that the committee investigate the circumstances of the interception, Turkey’s involvement, the legality of the Gaza blockade and all other relevant legal questions surrounding the affair, what the committee will not investigate is why Israel’s leadership seems always to be surprised by countries and groups that consistently manage to be one step ahead of Jerusalem.
Despite the impressive gravitas of its members, the “internal” committee has only been given a mandate to look outward. It will not investigate why the National Security Council was not properly involved in deliberations ahead of the flotilla. It will not question members of the Foreign Ministry’s political research division over what they knew about the diplomatic atmosphere at the time the flotilla was announced. Why was Turkey’s diplomatic shift not spotted earlier, and why were efforts not made to counter that shift earlier? The committee will not question the National Information Directorate about what plans it made or didn’t make to present Israel’s case ahead of the flotilla. In short, this will not be a Winograd committee, and Israelis will just have to remain used to their government being led from one diplomatic disaster to another.
From US Vice President Joe Biden’s surprise in Ramat Shlomo, to Mahmoud al-Mabhouh’s demise in Dubai, from the NPT conference in NY, to the flotilla fiasco in Gaza, the Israeli government has stumbled into one hole after another, and the pace seems to be accelerating.
It is now clear that if it weren’t for the Free Gaza flotilla, nobody official in Israel would now be talking about ways to ease the blockade on Gaza. If it weren’t for the massive attention that flotilla received, the EU would not be proposing a joint monitoring mechanism in Cyprus, or to have other international actors inspect Gaza-bound ships for weapons. The government of Turkey, the Islamist IHH, hundreds of individual activists – some armed with knives and clubs, others with cameras and Twitter accounts – a handful of back-bench members of parliament and one Nobel Prize-winner have managed to effectively bring Israeli policy over the Gaza Strip to an end. In the absence of forward-looking Israeli action, there is only damage control.
Nobody official will say this on the record, but the ban on non-military goods entering Gaza was a lever Israel used to pressure Gaza’s citizens to lean on Hamas to cough up Gilad Schalit. Banning coriander and pasta from Gaza is collective punishment and can’t be defended in international legal proceedings. Israel is in a state of armed conflict with the sovereign entity ruling the Gaza Strip, so a naval blockade to stop Hamas from arming itself is a legally defensible position. Now that we’ve been forced, due to external events, to reexamine policy on the Gaza blockade, that lever on Hamas to release Schalit will evaporate. Why has the Justice Ministry, or the MFA’s legal department, not proposed some formula to wage international legal war over Hamas’s holding of Schalit without visits by the Red Cross?
Now that Israel has been strong-armed into allowing almost all non-military goods to enter Gaza, it begs the question of what other policies our adversaries can bring their activism to. Nuclear ambiguity? The recent NPT conference in NY singled out Israel, not Iran, for censure. How did that happen? Did Israel take it for granted that America would vote down that resolution? Was the possible diplomatic fallout from an assassination in Dubai using passports from friendly countries taken into account? While Mabhouh was a valid target, will the booting of Mossad representatives out of England, Ireland and Australia have a debilitating effect on Israel’s external intelligence operations? And now the arrest of an alleged agent in Poland who may have been oblivious to the fact that German prosecutors had issued a Europe-wide warrant for his arrest.
If it weren’t for the way the government and army handled the Freedom Flotilla, Israel would have retained its (already wobbly) image as a regional superpower, a country that can clandestinely take out nuclear sites and assassinate terror masterminds at will. Instead, it now looks like the picture of one of its naval commandos held on the Mavi Marmara
: bloodied, bewildered and alone, surrounded by enemies; and like that gutsy teenager in Los Angeles, protected by American cops from a crowd of angry protesters. Netanyahu is right when he says there is hypocrisy in the world, but his government is playing into it, time after time.
It is clear that our navy and intelligence brass failed to properly
prepare to stop the flotilla. Instead of a shock-and-awe operation by
(Flotilla 13), a unit we’re accustomed
to never hearing about, the IDF launched a predictable assault that
rapidly got out of control. This will be investigated by former
National Security Council head Giora Eiland’s committee. These things
happen in military operations, and hopefully the lessons will be
But with at least two months’ advance knowledge that the flotilla was
coming, a forward-looking government could have tried to take the wind
out of the its sails by initiating a discussion about an international
monitoring system for boats sailing to Gaza. Even if this were just
talk, the mere possibility, raised by Israel, to establish an
international, cooperative monitoring system would already have painted
the Free Gaza flotilla in a different light. Perhaps if Israel had
asked Dutch and German UNIFIL vessels to join its interception of the
flotilla, things would have worked out differently. If Israeli leaders
knew, as they did, that both Egypt and the Palestinian Authority were
both secretly dead-set against lifting the blockade on Gaza, why did
Jerusalem not find ways to leverage this?
Unfortunately this kind of forethought and strategic planning is not
common in these parts. This constantly repeating theme of failing to
think ahead, and to involve friendly countries – just as important, if
not more so, than the legal, intelligence and logistical facets of the
interception – should also be the focus of an independent
investigation. The committee, if it wanted to get serious, should shine
a harsh light on the Foreign Ministry’s political research division,
the septet, the National Security Council and other planning bodies. It
is these departments that are tasked with looking at global trends
Israel needs to defend itself from or find opportunity in.