The battle of the nuclear numbers

THE ISLAMIC Republic of Iran renewed its nuclear program a quarter of a century ago at the end of its bloody war with Iraq in the late 1980s. One of the conclusions reached in the wake of that war by Iran's generals and strategists was that their country needed strategic tools for deterrence and retaliation. Hence, they launched a chemical weapons program (Iran was a victim of Saddam Hussein's chemical arsenal); renewed the country's nuclear program, which had originally begun during the reign of the Shah; and complemented it with an extensive missile program to be used for delivery systems. But did Iran have at the time – 25 years, 20 years or even a decade ago – a grand strategy, a well developed, premeditated scheme to build nuclear weapons? Did they or do they have a large cohesive program, a “Manhattan Project,” to design and manufacture a deliverable nuclear weapon in a short period of time? The answer according to Finnish nuclear scientist Olli Heinonen is no. “They probably didn't have such a plan,” he says. Rather, he believes that Iran wanted to develop a nuclear option – to master the full process – to have the know-how, manpower, facilities, technology and materials that would position it close to this capability. “Iran's strategy was step by step, one bridge at a time,” Dr. Heinonen, considered one of the leading experts on Iran's nuclear program, tells The Jerusalem Report . According to his interpretation, Iranian leaders and strategists moved slowly and cautiously to achieve their goal, hoping not to be detected or stopped. But fearing the ramifications and consequences of their lies, cheating, evasive games and secret work, they also have always had an exit plan. In other words, they told themselves “let's keep moving to the next stage, to the next bridge and see if we can cross it. But if we are caught red-handed by the international community, let's pause and, if unavoidable, let's roll back.” Time, the Iranians have told themselves, is not essential because they are patient. So far, it seems that Iran has cleverly navigated itself between international sanctions, sabotage of its equipment, assassinations of its scientists and military threats to a position in which it is already a nuclear threshold state. It has a very advanced nuclear research program. It knows how to enrich uranium. It has more than a sufficient number of centrifuges to do so; it has a big stockpile of low enriched uranium (3.5 percent); it built a nuclear reactor that in the future could produce plutonium; and it conducted a series of secret tests to learn how to weaponize a nuclear bomb and build nuclear warheads ( see A Guide to the Negotiations, Page 27 ). Still, Iran doesn't have the bomb and, as far as the intelligence communities of Israel, the US, Western Europe, Russia, and others know, doesn't possess the fissile materials (93 percent enriched uranium or plutonium) needed for a nuclear device. Heinonen is currently a Senior Fellow at the Belfer Center for Sci - ence and International affairs at Harvard University. Until a few years ago, he served for more than 20 years at the UN Vienna-based Inter - national Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), including as deputy director general and head of its safeguards (and verification) department. In this and other capacities, he visited and inspected Iran's nuclear facil - ities many times and met with its leaders. I have known Heinonen for more than a decade. From time to time, I have asked for his views and THE JERUSALEM REPORT MARCH 23, 2015 26 interviewed him on numerous occasions. Heinonen's assumption about Iran's atti - tude and nuclear history is supplemented by one important fact. All five countries that have developed nuclear weapons since the 1960s completed their programs from incep - tion and initiation to assembling bombs in a matter of five to seven years. These countries are Israel (according to foreign reports), In - dia, Pakistan, South Africa (later to disman - tle it), and North Korea. Iran, with good standards of higher educa - tion, talented mathematicians, physicists and engineers, is no less developed in the nuclear field than Pakistan or North Korea. And yet, after 25 years of work on its nuclear program it has neither produced the bomb nor the fissile materials needed to do so. Therefore, the logical conclusion must be: Iran doesn't have the bomb because it has decided not to have it. Yet, this doesn't mean Iran would not change its mind in the near or foreseeable future and produce a bomb. So, how should and can the international community deal with Iran? This brings us to the negotiations that have been taking place for the past decade between Iran and the P5+1 group (the five permanent members of the UN Security Council – the US, UK, France, China, and Russia – plus Germany) as well as to inter - national efforts to curb Tehran's nuclear program and its capability to produce weapons, while acknowledging its “legitimate” right to enrich uranium for civilian purposes such as industry, agriculture and medicine. “What we now have is a bizarre bazaar of numbers floating around,” says Heinonen. “A good comprehensive agreement, which meets Iran's modest enrichment needs, should consist of operation of 2,000- 4,000 [old] IR-1 centrifuges,” he explains. “It should maintain nuclear material stock below one metric ton of enriched uranium up to 5 percent. These numbers would pro - vide adequate detection and reaction time – about one year – for the international community in the case of non-compliance.” I ask Heinonen what else is needed to have a reasonable deal. “The remainder of the currently installed centrifuges, around 19,000, should be dismantled and stored under IAEA monitoring,” he asserts. “In addition, the IAEA has to verify the completeness of Iran's declarations with regard to its holdings of nuclear material and nuclear facilities. It goes without saying that Iran also has to address the IAEA concerns regarding the possible military dimensions of Iran's nuclear program in a verifiable manner.” In that sense, the former senior IAEA official is closer to the Israeli prime minister's position than to that of the administration in Washington. But at stake is more than a mere question of whether the deal in the making will be “bad” as Benjamin Net - anyahu argues or “reasonable” as some American, Western and even Israeli experts hope and believe. What is even more important is how Netanyahu is waging the battle against the deal – probably any deal will be bad in his eyes – and how it is affecting Israel-US relations. Former Mossad chief Meir Dagan has declared publicly that “Netanyahu has caused grievous strategic damage to the [Iran] issue.” For a few years, Netanyahu, former defense minister Ehud Barak and Dagan, who was in charge of Israeli covert (intelligence and diplomatic) efforts to disrupt Iran's nuclear program, called upon the world to impose international sanctions on Iran or else Israel would bomb it. They argued that only sanctions would prevent a military attack and force Iran to rethink its program and the ramifications on its economy and international posture. Indeed, they were right. Fearing an economic disaster that could lead to public dis content and even the end of the regime, Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei changed his course, or at least pretended to do so. He allowed the election of a relatively moderate cabinet led by President Hassan Rouhani, and green-lighted the signing of an interim agreement to limit his country's nuclear program. The interim agreement brought about sev - eral achievements for Israel and the world powers – the construction of the Arak nu - clear reactor was halted; the new generations of centrifuges are inactive; the Fordow enrichment site is not spinning centrifuges; 20 percent enriched uranium has been diluted and can't be reused as materials for further enrichment; and the number of Iran's oper - ational centrifuges was cut significantly. All these factors have reduced the need for a military attack on Iran either by Israel or the US. Israeli leaders, Netanyahu included, took credit for these developments. Minister of In - telligence Yuval Steinitz told me on several occasions, “We persuaded the 5+1 group to insert in the interim agreement some important amendments to our benefit.” But, then, Netanyahu reversed course. He began opposing negotiations no matter the outcome, saying they would result in a “bad deal.” It seems now that for Netanyahu any deal is a bad deal. Then the prime minister embarked on the tricky and dangerous road of confrontation with US President Barack Obama, which was set to reach a climax on March 3, when the prime minister was scheduled to address Congress, further chal - lenging the administration. What will Netanyahu achieve? Very little. The speech will neither stop the desire of the sides to reach a comprehensive agreement nor influence the talks. On the contrary, because of the contentious position adopted by Netanyahu, Israel lost its levers and influence on the 5+1 group. The speech has further angered Democratic senators and congressmen who otherwise might have supported notions of additional sanctions. It also further deteri - orated relations between Israel and the US. The only consolation for Netanyahu might be that by addressing Congress he may improve his chances of winning the upcoming Israeli elections in two weeks' time. Maybe this was his strategy from the outset. And, after all, the deal may not be signed at all. It mainly depends on Iran, or to be more precise, whether the republic's 75-year-old supreme leader agrees to its terms. If a deal is sealed and Iran violates it, Netanyahu can always resort to a military option and order the Israel Air Force to strike Iran, though most Israeli political and military observers think he doesn't have the guts to do so. ■ Yossi Melman is an Israeli security commentator and co-author of 'Spies Against Armageddon.' He blogs at www.israelspy.com and tweets at yossi_melman

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