The rise of the Shabiha

Assad's vicious militia has no interest in a peaceful end to the Syrian uprising.

Syria 370 (photo credit: REUTERS)
Syria 370
(photo credit: REUTERS)
In late May, Alawite men reportedly swarmed the Sunni villages of Taldou and al-Shoumarieh following heavy shelling from the Syrian military. Going house by house into the night, the men killed and pillaged everything in their path.  By dawn, over a hundred, mostly women and children, had been killed.
Some of the dead were reportedly stabbed or shot to death, while others, including children, had their throats slit or skulls smashed. While both the Syrian government and opposition traded blame, there was only one group responsible for the massacre: the Shabiha.
As Syria's civil war drags on, rising death tolls, organized massacres, and the growing enlistment of Alawites into local militias indicate Assad’s increasing use of the Shabiha.
The Shabiha, meaning “ghosts” or “thugs” in Arabic slang, are militias comprised primarily of Alawite men hailing from the same obscure religious offshoot of Shi'ite Islam as the Assad dynasty. Defined by their camouflage trousers, white sneakers, and unquestionable willingness to viciously protect the Assad regime, their influence has grown to challenge even the Syrian military.
The Shabiha trace their roots back to the 1970's – when they functioned primarily as an Alawite mafia. Operating under the auspices of Rifaat Ali Al Assad, the uncle of the current president, they smuggled contraband while earning a reputation of relentless violence.
Following the outbreak of the Sunni-led uprising in 2011, the Shabiha took on a different role.
In mixed cities, they formed groups of “neighborhood watchmen,” acting to break up protests while protecting Alawite areas from Sunni attacks. At the time, their role was secondary to Syria’s well-stocked military. However, persistent warfare and sectarianism have allowed the Shabiha to assume a more active role in the uprising.
Strategically, Damascus is aware that strategies involving the military have not succeeded in quelling the unrest; however, they are still relying on a strategy of attrition warfare to defeat rebel forces. Although it is hard to believe, the regime says it has yet to deploy its heaviest firepower. Nonetheless, continued guerrilla attacks have drastically weakened the Syrian military - one of Assad's key pillars of survival.
Persistently hounded by defections, thousands of casualties, and fatigue – Syria’s military is bleeding. But the military has not bled to death; it remains a potent fighting force.
Heavy combat continues to call forth more loyal and elite units within the Syrian military. Chiefly, the feared 4th Armored Division – commanded by the president's brother Maher al-Assad – continues to leapfrog from city to city, crushing rebel bastions wherever they surface.
These units bear a heavy burden. Many soldiers within Assad’s military, mainly Sunni conscripts, remain hesitant to assault fellow Sunni strongholds. This mentality ultimately delegates many Syrian soldiers to roles of long-range shelling and other, less personal, combatant situations.
The same cannot be said for the Shabiha.
With the Syrian military's inability to end the uprising, a more isolated and embattled Assad is increasingly looking to his fellow Alawites and the new Shabiha to end the uprising once and for all.
With their new role, the Shabiha no longer consists of outcasts and gangsters. Claiming the militia – not the army – as their primary protector, Alawites from all walks of life are joining Shabiha ranks. These changes separate the Shabiha from other regime-loyalist militias throughout the region, like Iran’s Basig militia - used to crush the Green Movement in 2009. Unlike the Basig, the Shabiha perceive their fight as one not only to preserve an embattled regime, but also the broader Alawite community. However, one thing has not changed: the Shabiha's ability to inflict horrific violence.
With their ranks swollen, Homs, the epicenter of anti-Assad activism, is said to be swarming with Shabiha men from the Alawite neighborhood of Zahra. From there, they set up checkpoints and carry out military raids against anti-regime rebels elsewhere in the city. On the streets, they are proving their superiority.
On the other hand, their new found strength has deteriorated relations between the Shabiha and the military. The army is wary – likely jealous of the Shabiha's preferred treatment and combat successes.
The Shabiha are beginning to perceive the army as disloyal and incapable of winning such a war. One Shabiha commander went so far as to refer to army commanders as “rats.”
Yes, cooperation still exists. However, many Alawites no longer trust the military. This is further highlighted by the recent defection of former leading General Manaf Tlas – one of the few Sunnis in Assad’s inner circle.
As the uprising deteriorates into an intractable sectarian war, Shabiha militias will take a central role in hostilities. Their merciless methods emphasize the brutal nature of the Syrian conflict. The Shabiha is not concerned with winning over hearts and minds. This reality will lead to further atrocities which will make any future Sunni-Alawite reconciliation in Syria especially difficult – whether Assad remains in power or not.
The author is an Intelligence Analyst with Max-Security Solutions, a geopolitical risk consulting firm in the Middle East.