Burmese politics post-NLD’s electoral victory

In recent years, the Burmese government’s political objective has been to convince the international community to believe in its seven-step road map toward democracy,

By NEHGINPAO KIPGEN
Aung San Suu Kyi in Myanmar election 370 (photo credit: REUTERS/Damir Sagolj )
Aung San Suu Kyi in Myanmar election 370
(photo credit: REUTERS/Damir Sagolj )
On April 1, 2012, Burma had its second election in less than two years. Numerically, the by-election result was substantially insignificant compared to the general election conducted on November 7, 2010. The by-election was held in 45 parliamentary constituencies, vacated by members of parliament who assumed different ministerial positions in the government.
The National League for Democracy (NLD) secured an overwhelming victory, winning 43 out of the 44 parliamentary seats it contested, which is over 95 percent of the total 45 available seats. Although in a lesser number of constituencies, the NLD performed better than the 1990 general election in which it won over 80%. The military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) secured only one seat, in a constituency where the NLD candidate was disqualified.
There have been high hopes and optimism about the progress of democratization. The by-election was significant for several reasons.
Firstly, the NLD, which boycotted the 2010 general election, participated in the electoral process. Secondly, the election itself was one important benchmark for the Western nations to review their sanctions policy.
Thirdly, the Burmese government wanted to improve its legitimacy and credibility.
If one looks at the poll result, it is undoubtedly an absolute victory for the NLD party. Does that mean a political defeat for USDP and the military? What does the USDP-led government gain from the election? The more interesting question is understanding which direction the Burmese politics is headed in.
In recent years, the Burmese government’s political objective has been to convince the international community to believe in its sevenstep road map toward democracy.
The government’s goal was to achieve its objective without sacrificing the dominant role of military in politics.
While the Western sanctions played important role in pressuring the Burmese government toward democratic reforms, the authoritarian regime came under immense pressure following the “Arab Spring,” especially in Egypt and Libya in 2011, where mass uprising successfully forced the demise of two powerful dictatorial regimes.
The top leadership in the Burmese military hierarchy was also gravely concerned about the possibility of instituting an international commission of inquiry into suspected war crimes and crimes against humanity, which was recommended by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on human rights in Burma, Tomás Ojea Quintana, in 2010, and supported by the United States and 15 other nations.
The government’s desire to chair the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was one other important reason why the military leadership forced itself to improve in the areas of human rights and other democratic reforms. All these political developments happened after the 2008 constitution was ratified in a referendum, which entrenched the military as the ultimate power.
IT IS important to understand that the by-election result is also the success of the military’s carefully orchestrated political strategy. The NLD’s participation in the by-election means that the party has officially abandoned its long-time fundamental demand for the recognition of the 1990 general election result. By participating in the election, the NLD has also boosted the military’s attempts to legitimize its power.
Some may call this a political compromise.
With just over 6% of parliamentary seats, the NLD falls far short of making a significant impact on balance of power in the parliament. However, the NLD can utilize its presence in the parliament as a foundation to prepare for the next general election.
Currently, both the parliament and the government are indirectly controlled by the military through the country’s constitution, which automatically reserves 25% of parliamentary seats for the military without any election.
Moreover, for any constitutional amendment, the approval of more than 75% of parliamentary votes is required. One major challenge to democratic values is the provision that empowers the military to assume power at times of national emergency. It is unclear as to whether the military would abuse its constitutionally guaranteed power to suppress the voice of the opposition.
With the NLD’s overwhelming electoral victory, the Western nations would feel obligated to review their sanctions policy. In light of the ongoing developments, the Western governments will gradually ease and eventually lift sanctions, provided the current pattern of reforms continues.
Foreign policy change has begun with the United States, one of Burma’s long-time fiercest critics, announcement of easing some restrictions on investments and the nomination of Derek J. Mitchell, Special Representative and Policy Coordinator for Burma, as its new ambassador.
A major political debate will evolve in the parliament on several key issues, including the principles of the 2008 constitution. The NLD and other like-minded parties will be vocal about the necessity to amend some basic principles of the constitution.
However, many in the USDP and the military leadership will be hesitant to compromise on the subject, at least in the near future.
The pace of democratization process still largely remains in the hands of the military. Currently, one of the biggest lingering concerns for the former military generals is their own security. There is a chance of political reconciliation in the coming years if the military is convinced that a civilian government would not initiate punitive actions to revenge the past actions of successive military regimes.
More importantly, the success of the ongoing democratic reforms would greatly depend on the progress of government’s peace initiatives with the country’s ethnic minorities. Cease-fire agreements with armed groups by themselves are inconclusive. Some sort of political autonomy is essential to establish mutual trust between the central government and ethnic minority groups. The provisions of such political arrangement must be guaranteed in the constitution, by identifying state and union subjects.
While restoring ties with the Burmese government, the international community must understand the root of Burma’s decades-old conflicts.
It is neither the confrontation between the military and the NLD, nor a power struggle between retired General Than Shwe and Aung San Suu Kyi. It is because of lack of mutual trust and denial of equality of rights to all citizens.
Both Prime Minister Thein Sein’s government and the opposition led by Aung San Suu Kyi must continue to take steps to address the root cause of the country’s myriad problems.
Simultaneously, the ethnic minorities must demonstrate sincerity and seriousness to the process, while not surrendering its core demand for autonomy and equality of rights.
Democratization without reconciliation with ethnic minorities will not bring lasting peace and stability to Burma.
The writer is a researcher on the rise of political conflicts in modern Burma/Myanmar and general secretary of the US-based Kuki International Forum. He has written numerous academic (peer-reviewed) and non-academic analytical articles on the politics of Burma and Asia that have been widely published in five continents – Asia, Africa, Australia, Europe and North America.


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