It's worth looking at the wider picture [with the Palestinians]. Our goal is to achieve calm - an end to the Kassams; no terror - some kind of long-term truce. But there are limitations to what can be achieved by force. Our army's strength can achieve a lot, but what we have today cannot completely halt the Kassam fire.
Maj.-Gen. Doron Almog (center)
Photo: IDF
Even if we used immense force, even if we were to push the populations of northern Gaza south and clear the ground, even then there'd be no guarantee of a complete end to the Kassams. They could extend the range of the rockets. (They certainly will extend the range of the Kassams anyway.) And there would still be areas in which the Kassam crews could hide.
We have a constant air presence and surveillance. We have a range of ultra-sophisticated electro-optic networks along the whole Gaza perimeter fence, but still there are limitations - weather, topography, the frequency with which those monitoring the networks can sweep across each area. They can dig tunnels. There are houses...
When I was in charge of Gaza I decided on a buffer zone extending one kilometer into Gaza. But there are places, like at Kerem Shalom, where some of the buildings - homes and hothouses - are closer and we did not take them down.
Because of petitions to the Supreme Court?
Lots of reasons - including the Supreme Court. I appeared at the Supreme Court almost 200 times.
The tunnel used at Kerem Shalom, in your opinion, was begun in one of the buildings in that buffer zone?
Yes, in my opinion, they dug from inside a house. It was a major operation that took months. They managed to distribute tons of earth without the people in the area noticing. There are only three families in Gaza capable of having done it. It involves special digging equipment, lighting, phones...
Tell us a little more about the anatomy of a tunnel.
This one, I believe, was about 60-70 centimeters wide and a meter high. They go along it on a board with wheels or on tracks. It was probably about six or seven meters underground, to avoid detection and collapse. We've seen them 30 meters deep. They put "waiting rooms" along the route, and air pipes out to the surface which they camouflage with plants. It's real expertise.
I imagine there are more being dug right now.
To prevent them, you'd say Israel needs to completely clear the 1 km. buffer zone?
Absolutely. They won't agree, of course. They'll say "it's our land." But we need to make clear that they have to stay out or they'll be arrested or fired on, not to kill.
After a 1-km. zone was cleared, your successors would say, "the other side has adapted," and seek to clear a deeper zone.
Yes, the other side will always "design around."
In my time as OC Southern Command, they made 400 efforts to get out of Gaza and into Israel [to carry out attacks]. All the efforts to get through the fence failed. Because they kept getting stopped at the fence, they started developing the rockets. That's the nature of war - "designing around" to reshape the battlefield. If they can't get over a fence, they tunnel beneath it. If not tunnels, hang gliders...
So Israel needs to do what?
Israel needs good intelligence and the capacity to act upon it.
Israel is always confronting three major threats: One, the long-range missiles and non-conventional threat from Iran. Two, conventional armies and threats - from Syria, Hizbullah, even Egypt, where there's peace, but if the regime changes... Three, terror - which is taking a heavy price, impacting daily life and the economy, and distracting the army from the other two challenges.
Specifically, how can Israel stop the Kassams?
We need missiles that can stop them. We have a certain ability relating to long-range missiles - the Arrow and so on - but that's only one answer. The technical challenge is to find a 100% answer. That's what you need against the nuclear threat.
It sounds almost impossible.
We are making progress. It's an immense challenge for the defense of the world, and certainly for us.
In the absence of a 100% answer to the Kassams, we need an envelope of solutions. We need intelligence on those carrying out the attacks, a means to hit the preparations for launch, a means to hit the launch. The heat released by the launch gives that ability - we can detect the heat, and connect that to a weapon that can directly hit the person doing the launching within seconds. But you have to be sure that you're hitting them and not others.
And you need deterrence - so it won't be worth firing. The problem is who you are trying to deter, and that's a matter of rationality of leadership.
Is a suicide bomber rational, susceptible to deterrence? Is his dispatcher? These are questions without absolute answers. But there is an assumption that the leaders are rational and have something to lose and thus are susceptible...
What does Ismail Haniyeh have to lose?
His government could lose power. Some pretty clear signals have been sent: We've arrested many of his ministers; some of his friends have been killed - [Hamas leaders Abdel Aziz] Rantisi and [Sheikh] Yassin. He knows we can get to him, so he could be killed.
Does he really think he might lose power? The Palestinian public just voted Hamas into office.
The Palestinian street is divided. I think it's an issue for him, that possibility. There's a closure on Gaza; he's not getting money.
But he places all the blame for that on Israel, breeding hostility to Israel.
Yes, every escalation will always have them blaming us. But he still has to pay salaries to tens of thousands of people in the administration. They can revolt tomorrow morning and go elsewhere - to Jihad, to Fatah. There are no vacuums. They might not stay with him. He has the danger of losing the street. And he has a responsibility as prime minister to provide answers. He doesn't want to recognize Israel but he wants to give his people a better reality. How long can he hold onto the armed struggle, blood and fire? Until when? His people need food and education and health care.
