Everything is a matter of balance, Maj.-Gen. (res.) Doron Almog said on Monday.
Maj.-Gen. Doron Almog (center)
Photo: IDF
We were sitting in his back garden, and the major-general, who held overall responsibility for Gaza as OC Southern Command from 2000 to 2003, was pronouncing himself generally satisfied with the range of actions Israel was taking in its efforts to bring home Cpl. Gilad Shalit and to put a stop to the Kassam fire on Sderot and Ashkelon.
"It may be that we should have moved to more aggressive action to thwart the Kassams before the Kerem Shalom attack [in which Shalit was kidnapped and two soldiers were killed]," Almog said. "But the government decided on a more moderate course of action. And there's no point in talking about 'if only.'
"Now, the fact that a soldier is being held complicates the dilemma. If the government doesn't act firmly, there is the danger that stems from it being perceived as weak. But if it uses a lot of force, there is the danger that those who are holding Shalit will kill him."
Overall, though, Almog said he felt the crisis was being handled properly, with the prime minister finding the right balance between the numerous options - military, economic, diplomatic, etc. - at his disposal.
That was on Monday.
On Wednesday afternoon, as Israeli ground forces punched into Lebanon in search of the two kidnapped soldiers, and before word of the killings of eight others had been cleared for publication by the military censor, I spoke to Almog a second time, by telephone. "Yes, David," he said, unsurprised, when he heard my voice. "You want to complete the interview?"
"Or start it over," I suggested.
AT FIRST glance, Almog is a typical IDF high-flier - squat, sharp, straight-talking, with a career that includes starring roles in the Entebbe rescue and a host of clandestine anti-terror operations, and an extraordinary unblemished record of having overseen the prevention of every single effort by Palestinian bombers to infiltrate into Israel from Gaza during his period as Southern Command chief.
First glances are misleading, however.
He has said in the past that having a son, Eran, who is autistic and mentally disabled, "made me a better human being." It has certainly colored many of his actions, including in the military sphere.
As Leora Eren Frucht reported in The Jerusalem Post last year, it prompted Almog, for instance, to devote unprecedented attention to the welfare of the Negev's most needy population sectors - starting a trend by employing mildly disabled men and women from a Negev home as volunteers for maintenance work at army bases; dispatching troops to clean up old-age homes; boosting educational opportunities for Negev Beduin, sending food to local soup kitchens, even launching a navigation competition for the blind.
The needs of his own son also saw Almog becoming ever more involved with a nonprofit group, Aleh, which cares for hundreds of physically and mentally disabled children nationwide. It was, ironically, when embarking on a fund-raising trip to London for Aleh last September that Almog was advised by the local Israeli military attach to stay on his El Al plane because a warrant for his arrest for war crimes - relating to the demolition of homes in Gaza in 2002 - was waiting for him if he disembarked. (He firmly rejects the allegations, insisting both that the "homes" in question, in Rafah, were not permanent structures and that concern for saving lives was the paramount consideration, and justified in international law.)
His challenges at home have also probably contributed to Almog's general temperance as a military analyst - his disinclination to unleash savage critiques or drastic calls for policy changes. Such moderation was amply evidenced in our long interview on Monday, when he couched concerns about the process by which Israel had left Gaza last summer in generally restrained language. When we spoke, more briefly, on Wednesday, however, he was far more strident. "This a whole new situation," he said of the aftermath of the Hizbullah attack, "and it requires us to change the rules of the game."
Below are excerpts of the two conversations:
What do you mean by "changing the rules of the game?"
Hizbullah is seeking to seize upon the momentum gained by Hamas. It has opened a second front, and exploited an Israeli vulnerability. Negotiating with Hizbullah over the kidnapped soldiers, in the way we had begun to do with Hamas, would be a mistake. First and foremost, we have to strike a heavy blow, a very heavy blow, to Hizbullah - from the very top of its leadership, all the way down to the field, to the infrastructure, the force they've built up. There is no escaping our need to do this.
The other side needs to understand that we will not accept years of attrition, where they determine the nature of the war. If, in a week or two from now, Hizbullah is left with only 10 percent of its forces, it will understand that. It needs to be thrown completely off balance.
Target Hizbullah, and not the sovereign government, the Lebanese government that allows it freedom of action?
The government in Beirut is weak. If we start hitting the generators in Beirut, we'll lose international support and the government there will just say it is helpless to act. This [Hizbullah attack] was a brutal action. Hizbullah is very extreme and very dominant in Lebanon. We need to strike Hizbullah - from the air, the sea, and with ground forces - over a matter of days, maximum weeks. Not months.
We are absolutely capable of taking the right military steps on both fronts - the north and Gaza - simultaneously. But the priority now is Lebanon. The priority now is Hizbullah.
Obviously, there is a very clear connection between what's been happening in Gaza and what's going on in the North. Hizbullah and Hamas are connected. They are sharing information. They share a non-reconciliation to the fact of Israel's existence.
In Gaza, the soldier [Shalit] isn't the only hostage. We have two whole towns held hostage - Sderot and Ashkelon. We have to put an end to that.
