The next US head of state will be a wartime president. Developments in the Middle East almost guarantee that either John McCain or Barack Obama will have to manage one or more wars involving the US or its allies in the region.
A US soldier on patrol near Baghdad (illustrative).
Photo: AP [file]
The challenges posed by the Middle East are legion: "fragile and reversible" security in Iraq; military fallout from a possible IDF strike on Iran's nuclear program; the destabilizing consequences of a nuclear breakout by the Islamic Republic; a new round of violence between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority - this time in the West Bank; an Israeli military intervention in Gaza to halt renewed rocket attacks, preempt a Hamas military buildup, or crush the nascent Hamas government there; and the possibility of a second Hizbullah-Israeli war.
Given these realities, the US must engage the region to an unprecedented extent to avert or deter those wars that are avoidable, and to prevail (or ensure the success of its allies) in those that prove inescapable.
The next administration's key challenge in Iraq will be to preserve and expand the security gains of the 2007 US military "surge," and to translate those gains into enduring political achievements through relatively free and fair elections in 2009.
Accomplishing this and preserving US influence, while gradually drawing down forces to deal with a resurgent Taliban in Afghanistan, pose major challenges.
For the next few years, the potential for renewed violence in Iraq is high due to a number of unsettled issues: resentment from Sons of Iraq militias due to their exclusion from the country's security forces; the eventual return of Muqtada al-Sadr's Shi'ite Mahdi Army special groups from abroad; the lifting of the Mahdi Army's freeze on military operations; and tensions between Kurds and Arabs in Mosul, Kirkuk and Diyala provinces.
Preventing resurgent violence will require continued American engagement at the local, regional and national levels, and the use of available US leverage to forestall or contain outbreaks of violence.
This will not depend entirely on the size of the American military presence. In fact, the US will gain leverage through its ability to maintain working relations with all major political currents and parties in Iraq, including Sadrists; the credibility of threats to withhold military support at vital junctures in order to secure key US objectives; a willingness and ability to publicize credible evidence of Iranian interference in Iraq and of collaboration between Iran and prominent Iraqi politicians; and assisting emerging political forces, particularly those supportive of a continued US role in Iraq, such as the Awakening Councils, to secure a formal role in the Iraqi political system in forthcoming elections.
The last point could provide the basis for a blocking coalition in the Iraqi parliament involving the Awakening Councils, secular nationalists such as former interim prime minister Ayad Allawi, independents and perhaps under certain circumstances even the major Kurdish parties. This coalition could check Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's growing power or provide Maliki with the foundation for a new governing coalition if he desires to free himself of his dependence on the Islamic Supreme Council in Iraq.
Iran: Two minutes to midnight?
At the current reported rate of processing, Iran might have enough low enriched uranium by late 2009 for its first bomb (although the uranium would require further enrichment and would have to go through several additional steps before it could be turned into a weapon).
Given its concerns about the threat and doubts about diplomacy, Israel might order a preventive strike before then on Teheran's nuclear installations. The next US administration must consider the possibility that Israel might act contrary to Washington's apparent wishes by striking at Iran's nuclear infrastructure, just as it did when it bombed Syria's nuclear reactor at al-Kibar in September 2007.
Accordingly, the next administration should prepare a public response that neither explicitly disavows nor identifies itself with the Israeli action. Washington should also be prepared to take measures to contain a violent Iranian response and to deter retaliatory strikes against US interests.
Iran's progress toward acquiring nuclear weapon capabilities is already transforming the regional security environment in ways inimical to US interests. Egypt, Jordan, Turkey and the Gulf Cooperative Council states have all indicated that they are considering building up their civilian nuclear infrastructure, a possible first step toward developing a weapons capability.
And Iran's acquisition of "the bomb," which could well occur during the tenure of the next American president, could profoundly destabilize the region, enhancing the potential for miscalculation and conflict.
The next administration should therefore exploit the "presidential honeymoon" and the favorable conditions created by lower oil prices (which are putting pressure on the Iranian economy) to place the highest priority on multilateral diplomatic efforts to resolve the standoff.
Although time is of the essence, the US should avoid public advances toward Iran prior to the country's June 2009 presidential elections because Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad might claim credit for any diplomatic progress, thus increasing his electoral prospects.
As such, Washington should quietly approach intermediaries to sound out Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, prior to the Islamic Republic's presidential elections to determine if there is any basis for serious, public contacts or negotiations in the immediate aftermath of the elections, and if Teheran would be willing to suspend enrichment for the duration of these talks.
Meanwhile, the US should once again try to marshal a broader coalition and wield bigger carrots and sticks in support of a new diplomatic initiative or, if diplomacy fails, to further ratchet up the pressure on Iran. Finally, if diplomacy fails, Washington needs to revisit its own military options and review plans for containing the political and military fallout from an Israeli preventive strike.
