Why attacking Iran is becoming more likely

Israel must exercise grave caution while contemplating a potential attack on Iran.

By ALON BEN-MEIR
Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu pounding fists 300 (photo credit: Emil Salman / Pool / Haaretz)
Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu pounding fists 300
(photo credit: Emil Salman / Pool / Haaretz)
The recent negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program have produced nothing more than a diplomatic dance in the face of persistent Iranian ploys for time, coupled with intransigence on key issues.
In failing to reach a negotiated agreement, the conflict with Tehran is inching closer and closer to war. Israel may soon decide that the circumstances warrant a unilateral attack against Iran’s nuclear facilities.
Chief among the several scenarios which would warrant an Israeli attack is Israel’s fear that Iran is close to reaching what Israel’s Defense Minister Ehud Barak terms, “a zone of immunity.” Under such circumstances, Iran would be in a position to store much of its previous enriched uranium — as well as its high quality centrifuges — deep inside the mountain base of Fordow, thus becoming completely immune from aerial assault.
This objective, which Tehran is hard at work in trying to achieve, limits how much time Israel would have before it acts. These concerns make the Obama administration's diplomatic efforts coupled with sanctions unviable and extremely risky options to pursue. The Netanyahu government is convinced that Iran will continue to play for time while advancing its nuclear program as it has over the past several years.
Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Barak are not persuaded that any future talks will persuade Iran to give up its uranium enrichment program. Time has therefore become Israel’s worst enemy as Iran races to shield its main nuclear facilities, making them impenetrable to air attacks.
Aside from a “zone of immunity"— which Israelis believe Tehran could achieve within a few months — other possible attack scenarios include: Iran mustering up the technology to produce nuclear weapons and the inability of cyber-attacks to slow Iran's nuclear program.
Although a consensus exists among the Israeli defense and security establishment that an attack would at best delay Iran’s nuclear program by two to three years and might even push Iran to even more vigorously pursue nuclear capabilities, it should not be assumed that Iran would simply resume its nuclear activity following such an attack.
Some Israeli officials argue that the changing regional and domestic political dynamics may force Tehran to rethink its nuclear weapons program. Moreover, as Barak speculated a couple of months ago, Iran’s potential retaliatory attacks against Israel or its allies, specifically the US, would have limited impact. The catastrophic regional repercussions many Western observers suggest would not necessarily come to pass.
No one who understands the internal dynamics of Iran expects any breakthrough in the next Moscow-based meeting between the P5+1 (US, China, Russia, France, Britain, and Germany) and Iran. As a result, feverish diplomatic maneuverings, along with a tightening of the current sanctions are sure to follow.
Additionally, the US and Israel's quiet military preparations for striking Iran may well enter a new phase of readiness — albeit with differences regarding if or when to strike.Undoubtedly, there is extensive cooperation between the US and Israel concerning Iran’s nuclear program, including intelligence sharing and the coordination of cyber-attacks, all the while keeping Israel informed about the progress (or the lack thereof) of the negotiations with Iran.
In recent weeks, a number of former and current American officials have visited to assure Israel of the US’ stanch commitment to preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon.
The Obama administration insists that Iran is at least two years away from reaching the so-called “point of no return.” This assertion provides the administration with more time for diplomacy and allows the crippling sanctions to succeed. Moreover, having just concluded the war in Iraq and with the ongoing war in Afghanistan, there is little American appetite to start new military operations—which could ignite regional conflagration. Additionally, being that this is an election year, the president does not want to risk a military operation, especially when there is time to find new alternatives.
Finally, US collective intelligence agencies assure that neither the US nor Israel, face direct, imminent or immediate danger from Iran.
The Netanyahu government sees the Iranian threat from a different perspective. Israel maintains, with some justifications, that the Iranian leadership has repeatedly threatened Israel existentially. Add to this the fact that even if Iran does not use a nuclear weapon against Israel, it poses far more dangerous regional ramifications than the potential consequences of an Israeli attack. A nuclear Iran would increase nuclear proliferation (the Saudi government has already threatened to develop its own nuclear weapons), heighten the likelihood of extremist groups obtaining nuclear materials, and encourage Iran to throw its weight around in the region.
That said, former Israeli officials argue that Iran knows only too well that Israel maintains second strike capabilities that could cause catastrophic damage to Iran and the Iranian leadership is not so irrational as to commit suicide. Nevertheless, Netanyahu insists that Israel’s national security concerns cannot be taken lightly and however remote the Iranian threat may be, Israel cannot afford to take the risk.
The Israeli position is further strengthened by the argument that the on and off negotiations between the P5+1 and Iran two years ago have produced nothing of substance. This problem was compounded by the recent presumed agreement between the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Iran to allow inspectors to access the controversial Parchin military base, which has failed to take place thus far. Moreover, recent evidence showed that a cleanup operation has taken place at the military site, which has heightened the suspicions of IAEA, the US, and Israel.
Finally, Iran continues to refuse unfettered IAEA access at its suspected nuclear sites, with the intent of obfuscating its true nuclear goals. Tehran has been pursuing this pattern of obstinacy while defying not only the IAEA, but also four UNSC resolutions demanding a complete suspension of its enrichment program.
For Israel, time is of the essence. Should Iran come closer to reaching the “zone of immunity," Israel will have to strike. However, before Israel contemplates such an attack, Israeli intelligence must provide clear and unequivocal evidence for the whole world to see. A premature Israeli attack could not only have catastrophic regional consequences but could also subject Israel to world–wide condemnation, potentially crippling sanctions, and retaliatory attacks by Iran and its surrogates.
The United States is not oblivious to Iran’s intentions or to Israel’s legitimate concerns. Regardless of the differing assessments between Israel and the US, Israel would be well advised to fully collaborate and act in unison with the American administration to avoid any potential miscalculations that could cost Israel dearly.
The writer is a professor of International Relations and Middle Eastern Studies at the Center for Global Affairs at New York University and is also a Senior Fellow and the Middle East Project Director at the World Policy Institute.