To stand any real chance of success, every insurgent or terrorist movement needs
a safe haven – one that is beyond the control of the state being targeted and
preferably in a land free from interference by the target state or its allies,
whether due to geography or the protection of a friendly regime.
Vietnam conflict was a classic example. More recently, in the Iraq campaign,
Sunni extremists had a safe haven in Syria, which was their main logistic
support base and a pipeline for suicide bombers flowing into Iraq. They also
used extensive support networks in Iran, which provided a safe haven for Shi’ite
insurgents attacking coalition forces, as well as through the Iranian
Revolutionary Guards and Hizbullah, which provided training, organization,
munitions and direction.
Today the Afghan Taliban’s safe haven and
support base is in Pakistan, although the second- largest extremist group
engaged in Afghanistan, Hizb-i- Islami, has its main base in Iran.
March, Gen. David Petraeus, head of US Central Command, in testimony to the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, revealed that Teheran is letting al-Qaida
leaders travel freely between Pakistan and Afghanistan, effectively using
Iranian territory as a safe haven, while also permitting them to hold meetings
in Iran to plan terrorist attacks against Western targets.
Israel has had
more than a taste of what it can mean to leave hostile groups in control of
lands adjacent to its own borders – in southern Lebanon and in Gaza. Any similar
move to cede control of the West Bank or a part of Jerusalem may have
considerable attraction for any peace process, and that is certainly the view of
many in the international community. But both prospects would carry immense risk
from the perspective of asymmetrical activities against Israel.
might argue that a modern hi-tech state can monitor hostile activities outside
its borders. Yet we’ve seen many failures of intelligence in relation to
offensive activities by conventional forces and war plans by nation-states,
which are generally relatively easy to identify and monitor. Surveillance and
intelligence collection against a deeply embedded, secretive, extremist network
operating within a dense civilian population is the most difficult, and no
national intelligence organization can be confident that it will have a high
success rate against such a target.
Despite many spectacular successes,
including the killing in Pakistan of al-Qaida’s number three, Mustafa Abu
al-Yazid, the unrivalled technological supremacy of the US military has failed
to effectively dent the Taliban’s ability to smuggle munitions and infiltrate
large groups of fighters across the Afghan border. I do not for a moment
underestimate the difficulties this entails.
Jordan’s support or
effectiveness in countering extremist activity directed at Israel from the West
Bank could not be counted upon, and extremists would also seek to destabilize
Jordan, an important stepping stone to the destruction of Israel.
look again at Pakistan and Afghanistan to get an insight here. NATO puts in a
significant effort to coordinate cross-border security measures with the
government of Pakistan.
Some of this is successful some of the time. Some
elements of the Pakistani government have different agendas, supporting the
Taliban when it suits them or at least turning a blind eye, but Pakistan itself
is suffering a very serious, dangerous and worsening insurgency from its own
Taliban. Despite the contrary views of some, its own Taliban, closely linked to
the Afghanistan Taliban, is intent on bringing down Pakistan’s government – a
goal shared by al-Qaida leaders in Pakistan.
Despite efforts on both
sides of the border, insurgents operate with relative freedom.
importance of safe havens to extremists is well understood by the Pakistani
military. One of its greatest fears is that NATO forces will withdraw
precipitously from Afghanistan, leaving a vacuum from which their own insurgency
could be supported and strengthened. That of course, leaves a prospect of a
nuclear-armed state falling into the hands of extremists.Questions
Surrounding a Prospective NATO Peacekeeping Deployment
It has been suggested
that an international force, perhaps a NATO force, should replace the IDF
presence in the West Bank.
While I would not exclude that idea in
principle, it raises a number of serious questions. First of all, where are the
NATO troops going to come from, and how long are they going to stay? Let us not
forget the difficulties that NATO still has in mustering forces for the war in
Afghanistan – and this is for a campaign that is NATO’s main effort, and its
only real, current, live operation.
Many of the troops there are
restricted by significant national caveats, including restricting deployments to
the safest areas.
Some nations are simply not prepared to put their
troops into undue danger. Unfortunately, undue danger goes hand in glove with
war and with the toughest peacekeeping operations, and the West Bank would fall
clearly into that category.
Some NATO nations can’t operate after dark,
and they leave the insurgents to control the night, with all the implications
There is a significant risk that in trying to develop and
maintain good relations with all parties, the peacekeepers would instead become
the enemy of both sides. Potential contributors to the international forces
would know that. What would happen to those prepared to take part when the going
got tough, as it inevitably would? Think of Lebanon in 1983, when suicide bomb
attacks killed 300 troops and led to the withdrawal of the French and American
peacekeeping forces. An extremist with global reach will not have forgotten
al-Qaida’s attack in Madrid 20 years later which led to the withdrawal of
Spanish forces from the Iraq campaign.
And let us not for a moment assume
that sinister yet powerful hands would not turn their attention to the
peacekeeping forces in the West Bank, especially if they showed signs of
succeeding in bringing lasting peace to the region. Iran has a track record of
stiffening the resolve of insurgent groups that show any sign of faltering in
their aggression against Israel, and a track record of attacking Western forces
using its proxies.
Just how sure could we be that the electorates in
contributing countries would allow their militaries to remain deployed in the
West Bank under these kinds of pressures, and how effective would NATO be as a
peacekeeping force in such demanding circumstances? The only previous success
that NATO is able to claim in this field – and it is by no means uncontroversial
– was in Kosovo, which was also a far less complex situation.
NATO is, of
course, not peacekeeping in Afghanistan, but we can get some insight from its
activities there. I’ve already mentioned the national caveats. Similar
difficulties apply to differing national rules of engagement and tactical
procedures, including a wide variety of constraints on air support.
a NATO mission be ready and able to take on insurgents, and if not, to what
extent would they then get in the way of a vital Israeli effort to do so? After
seven years in Afghanistan, how effectively has NATO taken control of the
insurgency there? In the sixmonth period up to March 2010 the number of attacks
against NATO forces increased by more than 80 percent over the same period in
the previous year, and in the same time frame, attacks on the civilian
population were up by over 70%. And how assiduous has NATO been in its civilian
reconstruction and governance efforts – a critical element of its role in
Afghanistan? Reconstruction has been notable for its relative inability to gain
traction and provide essential depth for the military element of the
In many ways peacekeeping is far tougher and
more challenging than fighting. It is one thing to act robustly against people
who are attacking you and your comrades. It is quite another to put your troops’
lives on the line when it is not them but others who are in danger.
forces have fought gallantly and effectively in Afghanistan. They’ve been brave
and they’ve taken many casualties, but Srebrenica cannot be forgotten. More than
8,000 civilians were massacred there in 1995 under the eyes of Dutch UN
To conclude, I would neither exclude the possibility of an
IDF withdrawal from the West Bank nor its replacement with a NATO force, but
before either can be seriously contemplated there are some fundamental questions
to be resolved. These issues are critical to NATO, the West as a whole and the
entire Middle East, because a failed NATO mission and a West Bank under
extremist control, flourishing ina security vacuum there, would encourage and
strengthen violent jihadists everywhere.
The writer is former commander
of British forces in Afghanistan.
This Jerusalem Issue Brief is based on
his presentation at a conference on “Israel’s Critical Security Needs for a
Viable Peace,” held in Jerusalem on June 2.