Critical Currents: Political transitions and change

The diplomatic pause that's about to go into effect must come with an implementation freeze as well.

By NAOMI CHAZAN
naomi chazan 88 (photo credit: )
naomi chazan 88
(photo credit: )
Periods of elections are noted for their policy paralysis. For the next few months, Israel will be totally preoccupied with the intricacies of leadership transition (along with the United States and possibly also the Palestinian Authority). During this political time-out, it's likely that no major initiatives will be launched and few weighty decisions will be made. But when planned change cannot take place, lots of things can - and unquestionably will - happen. No more so than in the highly contentious sphere of Israeli-Palestinian relations. In this, as perhaps in other pressing matters, inaction may lead to palpable alterations which will make the task of any future incumbents even more difficult than it is today. To avert such a retrogressive possibility, every effort must be made to halt an irreversible dynamic of change. The diplomatic situation on the eve of the impending early national elections is particularly ambiguous. On the one hand, the political mainstream has embraced the two-state solution. Even Ehud Olmert and Tzipi Livni, albeit belatedly, have begun to articulate its implication not only for borders and security, but also for refugees and Jerusalem. On the other hand, the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations launched a year ago in Annapolis have effectively stalled, in no small measure due to the political incapacitation of its key interlocutors. There is a close connection between the possibility of reaching a permanent agreement and the political ability to implement its provisions. UNTIL A binding accord is reached, the groundwork for a viable two-state option is gradually being eroded. The physical prerequisites for the realization of this paradigm have been systematically compromised for decades. They are on the verge of being completely undermined by the ongoing construction of the separation barrier and the imposition of multiple roadblocks which deny any prospect of territorial contiguity - an undeniable condition for sovereignty. Continued settlement expansion presents further obstacles. The constant mushrooming of new outposts, accompanied by the vigilante behavior of Jewish extremists, has made the likelihood of a fair agreement even more remote. The psychological mindset for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside Israel is also being tested to the limit. As Palestinian life has become more unbearable, escapism and despondency have increasingly become the norm. Israelis, too, are losing their belief in the workability of a political settlement, despite a growing agreement on its contours. In many respects, this absence of faith is also affecting the international community, whose critical involvement in the resolution of the conflict has been lagging. These deleterious trends have been in motion for quite some time. They can only be reversed by a concerted, proactive effort by all parties concerned - something not likely to happen while the country is in the midst of yet another electoral season. Without due vigilance, this particularly sensitive hiatus, therefore, may yet prove to be a prescription for unharnessed change. OFFICIAL POLICY immobility can lead to several problematic, not to say potentially disastrous, outcomes. The first is the consolidation not only of the physical, but also of the economic and social separation of Palestinians from Israelis. Palestinian access to Jerusalem, already limited, could be further circumscribed and movement between the already disjointed enclaves on the West Bank even more confined than it is today. The cementing of such a stark division under the cover of elections might yield an even greater breakdown of order and unleash more violence, not only in the Palestinian territories, but also within Israel. A second, not unrelated scenario involves the total separation of Gaza from the West Bank, along with a renewed Israeli effort to link the former more closely to Egypt and the latter to Jordan. Such initiatives have fallen on deaf ears in Cairo and Amman; they might gain resonance in the Israeli public in the course of the forthcoming elections. Such rhetoric, however unrealistic, will inflict further damage on the enabling climate necessary for a lasting political settlement. Either of these (hardly mutually exclusive) eventualities could hasten a third, openly destructive, result. The intensification of armed confrontation, together with irregular wars involving non-state actors, could yet ignite the entire region. Equally alarming, it may spread into the heart of the country - as the recent events in Acre demonstrate - in a slow and deadly process of implosion. Increasingly, a fourth possibility, the one-state scenario, has gained traction as a palliative to these unsavory prospects. The concept of a single state in its democratic, binational form does not, however, constitute a practical option at this juncture. In truth, as presented it threatens to actually perpetuate and deepen the occupation. Any or all of these alternatives will gather momentum in the absence of positive movement toward a two-state solution, which remains the best among this list of worrisome scenarios. It offers the only real channel for comprehensive peace and stability in line with the Arab League initiative. An independent Palestine existing side by side with Israel is the single most significant guarantee of a sustainable future for both peoples and for the region as a whole. In the very charged atmosphere that characterizes elections here, consequently, special attention has to be paid now to preventing any change on the ground. The diplomatic pause that is about to go into effect must be accompanied by an implementation freeze as well. This is the brief of the international community during the political transition. It is also the most critical task facing civil society today. Those who want to leave the door open for the resumption of negotiations come next spring, when the political landscape will be clearer, must enter a pact to preserve the present situation, however unsatisfactory, and agree on the mechanisms for its enforcement. Otherwise, within several months, no realistic options will exist at all.