In every previous war Israel did its best to fight up to the last moment, up to the cease-fires that were forced on it. That is what David Ben-Gurion did in the War of Independence; what Moshe Dayan as chief of staff did in the Sinai Campaign of 1956; and what Yitzhak Rabin as chief of staff and Dayan as minister of defense did in 1967.
The purpose of cease-fire agreements dictated by the superpowers was usually to rob Israel of its achievements in war before the enemy could be totally defeated.
I SAW this happening again on the sixth day of the first week of the first war in Lebanon - in June 1982. I flew, together with Ariel Sharon, from Lebanon (I was serving as his media adviser at the time) to a meeting at prime minister Menachem Begin's residence, where his ministers had gathered. Ronald Reagan demanded had demanded an immediate cease-fire, since the IDF had almost reached the gates of Beirut.
For the next nine weeks Sharon and Begin waged both the war and the diplomacy, until the goals of Operation Peace for Galilee were achieved - a halt to Katyusha fire on Galilee, the shattering of the PLO reign of terror in Lebanon, and the expulsion of Yasser Arafat from Beirut.
Perhaps now Begin's and Sharon's political opponents may be willing to appreciate the leadership displayed by these two men, who refused to agree to a cease-fire until the IDF had finished what it came to do in Lebanon.
How pathetic, in comparison, that today some cabinet ministers appear like beggars on the street - pledging that they will allow the IDF to advance north to the Litani River, "only if no diplomatic solution can be found."
IT IS legitimate to level criticism at the IDF for mistakes that have come to light in the way the war is being waged. But one thing is clear: Our soldiers are demonstrating great sacrifice and capability during this cruel war, while over a million Israeli civilians are courageously withstanding the daily barrages of rockets that have turned the home-front into the front line.
It is clear to anyone with eyes in his head that the politicians giving the IDF its orders are at least two or three sizes smaller than the kind of leadership needed to wage this war until a decisive outcome is reached. Many people fear, with some apparent justification, that the politicians may not be giving the IDF the right orders.
It is not enough to throw the responsibility on the army by saying, "We gave the IDF the authorization to do whatever it has proposed."
The question is, what instructions