The road to hell is paved with good intentions – Aphorism attributed to Saint
Bernard of Clairvaux (1090-1153) We cannot conclude from the good intentions of
a statesman that his foreign policies will be either morally praiseworthy or
politically successful....How often have statesmen been motivated by the
desire to improve the world, and ended by making it worse? And how often have
they sought one goal, and ended by achieving something they neither expected nor
desired? – Hans Morgenthau (1904-1980), on political realism The sweeping
victory of the Islamist parties in the election in Egypt is – somewhat belatedly
– beginning to concentrate minds. Israel is being forced to confront the stark
possibility that in the foreseeable future, it may be left with no peace, no
Sinai... and eventually, no demilitarization.
Inevitably, this
unpalatable prospect will force a national reassessment of the process – and the
personalities – that brought this ominous situation about, of the prudence of
the decisions taken at the time and of the beforethe- fact predictability of its
potentially perilous outcome.
Inevitably, too, this will focus attention
on Menachem Begin and his role in precipitating Israel’s evacuation of the
strategic expanses of the Sinai Peninsula in return for a peace treaty with
Egypt, then Israel’s principle adversary.
A brief history The deal,
brokered by US president Jimmy Carter, was concluded in 1979 after two years of
intense negotiation following Egyptian president Anwar Sadat’s historic 1977
address to the Knesset. It was greeted with great international acclaim – except
in the Arab world where it was long regarded as an act of treachery – and the
award of Nobel peace prizes to the Egyptian and Israeli leaders.
The
intended strategic substance of pact was mutual recognition of each state by the
other, and the cessation of the state of war that had existed since the 1948 War
of Independence.
Israel undertook a complete withdrawal from Sinai, held
by it since the 1967 Six Day War, while Egypt agreed to the demilitarization of
the peninsula. The agreement also provided for the free passage of Israeli ships
through the Suez Canal, recognition of the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba
as international waterways, and massive US economic and military to Egypt, whose
military has since received almost $40 billion from Washington, allowing it to
to modernize and revamp its aging Soviet equipment.
Stark asymmetry
Whichever way you slice it, the treaty was afflicted by a stark structural
asymmetry in the undertakings of the contracting parties: On the one hand,
Israel was called on to relinquish vast physical assets of great strategic and
economic value, which could only be retrieved – if at all – by a massive outlay
of blood and treasure.
In return for the receipt of these assets – plus
generous US financial support – all that was demanded of Egypt was paper
promises, which could be violated whenever it deemed it expedient or the profit
worth the pain.
This asymmetry was perhaps most aptly articulated by
Sadat himself, when in a 1980 interview with The New York Times, he remarked
bluntly, “Poor Menachem... I got back... the Sinai and the Alma oil fields, and
what has Menachem got? A piece of paper.”
From the outset then, the
durability of the peace agreement hinged not only on Cairo’s continuing
willingness to honor its commitments, but also its continuing ability to do –
despite domestic opposition. This clearly applies – and applied then – not only
to the Sadat regime, but to any successors who might accede to power – be it by
the bullet or by the ballot.
Predictable perils There is – and was – no
need for the benefit of hindsight to grasp this pivotal feature of the
agreement. It was distinctly discernible as an inherent element of the treaty
from the get-go. It was always a precarious arrangement — its abrogation,
whether sudden or in stages, always a plausible possibility.
Indeed, it
would seem that Sadat himself was keenly conscious of the fragility of the
treaty and how future Egyptian regimes may well feel unbound by its terms. In a
1975 interview he openly stated: “The effort of our generation is to return to
the 1967 borders.
Afterward the next generation will carry the
responsibility.”
Yet within the Israeli public discourse, any suggestion
that the potential long-term strategic dangers might outweigh the undeniable
short/intermediate-term benefits, were dismissed as the demented raving of
extremist warmongers. Anyone who dared caution that the situation now emerging
in Egypt and along our southern border, might in fact emerge, was scorned either
as a deranged scaremonger or a uniformed ignoramus.
Consequently, there
was no serious public discussion of how to respond to an intentional violation
of the agreement, or an unintentional collapse of Cairo’s ability to uphold it.
And in the absence of a clear and credible comprehension of what penalties such
violations would incur, only a giant leap of faith in Arab altruism could induce
the belief that these scenarios were implausible.
However, beyond the
mindless malice and myopia of political debate in Israel, questions must be
raised as to the judgment and foresight of the Israeli leadership that consented
to forgo the tangible fruits of military victory for the ephemeral promise of
political peace.
As Begin was the overwhelmingly dominant figure involved
in Israel’s acquiescence to the treaty terms, it is likely such a reevaluation
would, as an unintended side effect, damage his standing in the national
pantheon.
‘The road to hell...’ The objective would be to enhance
awareness of the non-static nature of Israel’s political environment, and to
develop deeper understanding of how the nation should manage long-term risk in
the dynamic instabilities of the Middle East. But more specifically – and more
important – it is imperative to avoid creating similar situations of strategic
danger through similar strategic misunderstandings of the dynamics in play on
Israel’s other fronts with the Palestinians, the Syrians and the
Jordanians.
There can, of course, be no doubt as to the totality of
Begin’s commitment to Israel and to its security, or as to fever of his devotion
to Zionism and its ideals. Indeed for many, he was the epitome of the leader
whose absolute dedication to his country and his people was never subordinated
to, or sidetracked by, the pursuit of partisan interest, private gain or
personal prestige.
However, pure motives and noble intentions are no
guarantee of effective statesmanship or strategic acumen.
Indeed, as Hans
Morgenthau, one of the most influential figures in the study of modern
international politics, remarked: “Chamberlain’s politics of appeasement were,
as far as we can judge, inspired by good motives; he was probably less motivated
by considerations of personal power than were many other British prime
ministers, and he sought to preserve peace and to assure the happiness of all
concerned. Yet his policies helped to make the Second World War inevitable, and
to bring untold miseries to millions.”
While any comparison between the
two men is wildly inappropriate, the bloodcurdling frenzy of the lynch mob that
stormed the Israeli Embassy in Cairo in September may prove that Begin’s
declaration of “No more war, no more bloodshed, peace forever” was no less
premature and naïve than Neville Chamberlain’s “Peace in our time.”
Grim
prospects The three decades of non-belligerency (a more accurate word than
“peace” to characterize Israeli-Egyptian relations since 1979) conferred
significant benefits on Israel.
Regrettably, however, it seems unlikely
that they will be permanent or that they will justify the perilous storm brewing
on the horizon.
With the Sinai Peninsula swiftly descending into a
lawless “no-go” region under the control of the most ruthless extremists on
earth, Israel is facing an emerging lose-lose strategic predicament, which may
soon force it to choose between the following unpalatable options: • Allowing
Sinai to degenerate into an Afghanistan-like haven for radical jihadi
organizations and savage criminal gangs; • Allowing a Muslim
Brotherhood-controlled – at least indirectly – Egypt to remilitarize the area,
ostensibly to reestablish law and order, and a gradual return to the status quo
ante that prevailed prior to the 1979 accord; • Reasserting Israeli control over
Sinai – at least partially – effectively repudiating the peace
agreement.
Whichever alternative Israel opts for, it will render the
peace treaty worthless, and totally devalue what until recently was considered a
stroke of inspired statesmanship. More poignantly, it will render the enormous
sacrifices of the 1967 and 1973 wars almost pointless, and the dangers, which so
many gave their lives or limbs to avert, may well be reinstated with a
vengeance.
Deep conceptual defects But the Israel-Egypt peace treaty was
defective and dysfunctional not only because events happened to turn out the way
they did. It was deeply flawed on a more profound and predictable level, in
terms of the political theory and the conceptions that comprised its political
rationale.
These were (a) demilitarization vis-à-vis the Egyptians and
(b) autonomy vis-à-vis the Palestinians.
Neither of these could be
expected to endure much beyond a generation — except under the irresponsible
assumption of wildly optimistic and unrealistic conditions, which clearly ought
not to have been presumed to prevail.
Given the limits of space, I shall
confine the discussion to demilitarization and defer the debate of the futility
of autonomy for a later opportunity.
Demilitarization is a severe
constraint on a nation’s sovereignty – stripping it of the freedom to deploy
coercive means of its choice within designated portions of its territory, in
deference to the interests/demands of some alien state(s).
As such, its
continuation is dependent on the compliance of the demilitarizing
party.
Indeed, as soon as it has the will and the ability to terminate
it, it may well do so – as the case of the demilitarization – and later
remilitarization – by Germany of the Rhineland, in violation of both the
Versailles and Locarno treaties, demonstrates.
It would be – and should
have been considered – a reckless gamble to assume that such a situation might
not arise in Egypt – not only because, as we have seen, Sadat himself had
alluded to this possibility, but because other sources warned of the danger as
well.
For example, Maj.-Gen. George Keegan, a US Air Force intelligence
officer, warned in a 1977 Jerusalem Post interview that “the feudal leadership
in the Arab world strikingly remains committed, messianically, to the
extermination of Israel as a nation and as a people,” but in the face of
repeated military defeats, “they are beginning to use the strategy of the
indirect approach” of diplomatic deception.
In retrospect Almost half a
decade before the Arab Spring, Daniel Pipes, in a commendably incisive analysis
titled “Rethinking the Egypt- Israel ‘Peace’ Treaty,” warned: “In retrospect, it
becomes apparent that multiple fallacies and wishful predictions fueled
Arab-Israeli diplomacy:
• Once signed, agreements signed by unelected Arab
leaders would convince the masses to give up their ambitions to eliminate
Israel.
• These agreements would be permanent, with no backsliding, much
less duplicity.
• Other Arab states would inevitably follow
suit.
• War can be concluded through negotiations rather than by one side
giving up.
“The time has come to recognize the Egypt- Israel treaty –
usually portrayed as the glory and ornament of Arab-Israel diplomacy – as the
failure it has been, and to draw the appropriate lessons in order not to repeat
its mistakes.”
It would be perilous folly to ignore this sober
warning.
Israel cannot afford the same grand “Beginesque” naiveté in its
future dealings with the Syrians, with the Palestinians, and with the
Jordanians. Mistakes may well be irretrievable.