In diplomatic terms, it was a mini-earthquake but in the positive sense: The “Trilateral Framework” agreement signed between Israel, Lebanon, and the US last Friday was enough to shake the cobwebs and rust off the “Good Fence” along the border but not enough to open the gate.
The “Good Fence” between Israel and Lebanon was erected in June 1976 during the days of the Lebanese Civil War. Although Lebanon and Israel were officially in a state of hostilities, Lebanese citizens used to cross into Israel for medical treatment, and every day workers would arrive at their jobs, mainly in agriculture, before returning to their homes in southern Lebanon in the evening.
The crossing near Metula came to symbolize the Good Fence and all it stood for. It was locked when Israeli forces carried out their hasty overnight withdrawal in May 2000 under prime minister Ehud Barak. His misguided policy resulted in the influx of Hezbollah terrorists along the border, at a devastating cost to both Israelis and local Lebanese opposed to the Shia terrorist organization.
Coming after the disastrous Memorandum of Understanding signed last month between the US and Iran – with the help of Pakistani and Qatari mediators – the Trilateral Framework created a breath of fresh air, or at least a sigh of relief.
Although the Trilateral Framework agreement, like the Iran MoU, also contains 14 points, the differences were stark and significant.
Throughout the talks, a major distinction was obvious: the room where the negotiations took place in Washington clearly displayed both the Israeli and the Lebanese flags. These are the two sovereign countries reaching an agreement. Under the Iranian MoU, terms affecting Lebanon and Israel were imposed on them from the outside, without either country being party to the deal.
The signing of the Israel-Lebanon framework was functional rather than festive. The photos of US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Israel’s Ambassador to the US Yechiel Leiter, and Lebanese Ambassador Nada Hamadeh Moawad did not show smiling faces – all three are aware of the challenges ahead – but they took the task seriously and didn’t cave in to the demands of Iran’s murderous regime, Hezbollah’s main financial backer and protector.
In fact, the major achievement of the Israel-Lebanon agreement might be that it sidelined Iran.
A secondary benefit, vive la difference, might be that it kept French President Emmanuel Macron out of the room. France has been determined to have a say in the future of its former colony Lebanon, so this could be taken as another sign of Lebanese independence, although it’s likely Paris will try to exert influence later in the process.
Also absent were the Palestinians – an important reminder that progress on a peace agreement can be made without it being tied to the Palestinian issue.
Both recent agreements were ultimately signed by US President Donald Trump, but the Trilateral Framework was a feather in the cap of Rubio – especially when contrasted to the white feather metaphorically waved by US Vice President JD Vance. The Iran MoU drawn up under Vance encourages and enriches the Islamic Republic in return for vaguely worded promises.
Both Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Lebanese President Joseph Aoun gave the framework their blessing. The main challenge will be the response of Hezbollah, which sits in the Lebanese government and has created a state within a state, holding Lebanon hostage. Hezbollah, like Hamas in Gaza, exploits “human shields,” with the inevitable cost involved. Hezbollah’s utter rejection of the agreement is a sign of the deal’s necessity, but points to its weaknesses.
The real test lies in implementation
The Israel-Lebanon framework calls for mutual recognition. Clause 8 appears to sum up its aims: “The two countries affirm that they share the objective of a secure, rebuilt Lebanon, under full Lebanese state sovereignty, in which no non-state armed group poses a threat to Israel, Lebanon, or citizens of either country. Furthermore, the two countries recognize that the restoration of security in South Lebanon through the deployment of the LAF [Lebanese Armed Forces], the safe return of its civilian population, and the security of Israel’s northern communities, are essential to long-term stability and peace.”
Other clauses are aimed at preventing Hezbollah from receiving funds for reconstruction; refraining from international legal and diplomatic action against the parties; and a “pledge to work towards the search for and return of remains and the release of detainees,” which possibly refers to the body of IAF navigator Ron Arad, shot down over Lebanon in 1986.
The agreement calls for Israeli withdrawal from two “pilot” areas but permits IDF presence in the security buffer zone where it currently operates. The LAF is meant to carry out the disarming of Hezbollah and prevent it from reestablishing its stranglehold along the border, with a US-supervised verification mechanism.
An effective verification system is vitally important. This is not the first time Israel and Lebanon have tried to reach agreements – and disarm Hezbollah. What happens in the room during negotiations is less important than what happens on the ground after an agreement is reached.
Lebanon, with its sectarian divisions and threats from Syria, Iran, and Turkey, needs to be able to withstand tremendous pressures both internal and external. It will need help to truly dismantle Hezbollah, and that can’t come from the UN forces, given that UNIFIL looked the other way as Hezbollah amassed missiles and dug terror tunnels under their noses and feet.
The First Lebanon War – it’s always a bad sign when you have to number wars – broke out in June 1982, an attempt to stop the Palestinian Katyusha rocket attacks and infiltrations that terrorized Israeli northern communities. The following month, Israel reached a deal with Lebanese Christian leader Bashir Gemayel, but he was assassinated by a Syrian agent before he could sign it.
The Second Lebanon War started 20 years ago this month with Hezbollah’s cross-border attack on Israeli soldiers in which eight soldiers were killed and two abducted. (Their bodies were returned in a prisoner release deal in 2008.) Hezbollah’s assault, accompanied by heavy rocket fire, came a month after Gilad Schalit was abducted to Gaza by Hamas via a terror tunnel amid the increasing attacks following Israel’s 2005 Disengagement from the Gaza Strip.
Lebanon II ended after just over a month with soon-to-be-broken promises under UN Resolution 1701 that the Lebanese government would deploy the LAF to ensure that terrorist groups would not operate south of the Litani River.
The Trilateral Framework is a giant step forward from then-prime minister Yair Lapid’s deal with Lebanon in October 2022, signed in the last days of his short term in office with outgoing Lebanese president Michel Aoun with US mediation.
That agreement carefully avoided signs of normalization, and the two parties didn’t even meet for a signing ceremony. There wasn’t much to celebrate. It was a futile attempt to stave off Hezbollah attacks by handing over maritime territory, including potential gas reserves, an expensive gamble that failed.
The real game changer came during the current war in 2024 when the bold pager campaign knocked out most of Hezbollah’s top cadre, swiftly followed by the targeted elimination of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and his assumed successor. Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam is as eager as Israel to get rid of the Hezbollah scourge.
Post-October 7, 2023, Israelis are understandably wary of fences that can be breached by terrorist hordes who invade to murder, rape, mutilate, and abduct, leaving scorched earth and decimated communities. Before the war, there used to be a regular flow of workers and people seeking medical treatment coming from Gaza into Israel – some of those workers were among the invaders that terrible day.
It’s becoming ever clearer that Hezbollah planned a similar strike from the north. Hezbollah built terror tunnels in Lebanon, like the one exposed this week, for the same reason that Hamas built them in Gaza: to attack Israeli communities.
True peace won’t be achieved without disarming and dismantling Hamas, Hezbollah, and, above all, their sponsor, Iran.
The announcement of the deal might have been sudden, but the implementation will be a process – a peace process that with good faith could lead to a good fence between good neighbors.