The Palestinian Authority is not ideal. It is necessary for Gaza - opinion

Israel’s approval of a framework permitting an International Stabilization Force to enter Gaza represents progress, but the force has not deployed, Hamas has not disarmed, and the proposed Palestinian technocratic administration remains outside the territory.

Even if the technocratic government enters and administers Gaza, it would not ensure long-term stability. The National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG) has been established as a transitional technocratic body tasked with restoring public services, rebuilding civil institutions, and stabilizing daily life.

It should therefore be viewed as a bridge rather than a permanent government. Long-term stability will require an enduring Palestinian institution capable of maintaining order and delivering basic services.

The next Israeli government can no longer postpone the question of Gaza’s political future. It will need to identify a governing authority capable of replacing Hamas over the long term, and the most viable option is a reformed Palestinian Authority (PA).

Every alternative carries weaknesses. Renewed Hamas rule would recreate the conditions that enabled October 7. Indefinite Israeli military rule would impose enormous personnel, financial, and political costs on the Israel Defense Forces by requiring it to govern more than two million Palestinians. Reestablishing Israeli settlements would deepen that burden and make any eventual separation from Gaza more difficult.

An international or NCAG-led administration may serve a transitional role, but neither is likely to possess Palestinian legitimacy to govern indefinitely. Rule divided among local clans would risk fragmenting Gaza among competing power centers unable to provide services, enforce the law, or prevent armed groups from reemerging.

A reformed PA is therefore not a perfect solution, but it is the most viable option for replacing Hamas as Gaza’s governing authority. The Ramallah-based PA is deeply flawed. It suffers from corruption, authoritarian governance, institutional weakness, and policies that have eroded Israeli trust.

Of course, those institutions would require substantial reform and expansion before governing Gaza.

In its March 2025 report, “No Time to Lose: A Blueprint for Reforming the Palestinian Authority,” Israel Policy Forum outlines a comprehensive reform agenda covering governance and service delivery, institutional and political renewal, security-sector reform, and economic and fiscal reform.

For instance, the PA would need to decentralize responsibilities, increase financial transparency, strengthen public institutions, and implement democratic reforms to strengthen its legitimacy and modernize its security forces to prevent Hamas and other armed groups from reestablishing themselves.

These reforms would not begin from scratch. The PA already administers public institutions in parts of the West Bank, while the Palestinian Authority Security Forces have demonstrated some capacity to coordinate with the IDF and constrain armed activity. However, both its civil and security institutions would require substantial restructuring before they could rebuild services and establish authority across war-torn Gaza.

The transition should therefore be gradual. The NCAG could initially administer services and reconstruction with international assistance while vetted Palestinian police officers are trained and PA institutions undergo verifiable reforms.

As governance and security benchmarks are met, NCAG responsibilities could be incorporated into reformed PA ministries and security structures. This would avoid handing Gaza to an unprepared PA while preventing a transitional administration from becoming an indefinite international trusteeship.

Reform is also necessary to rebuild Israeli trust. The PA must fully reform its controversial prisoner-payment system, often described by critics as “pay for slay.” Before 2025, benefits to Palestinian prisoners and their families increased according to sentence length, which critics argued rewarded more serious violence.

Rather than accepting the PA’s claims at face value or dismissing the reform outright, the United States should establish an independent mechanism to verify the welfare program and monitor broader reform benchmarks. Verification should be accompanied by conditional incentives. Israel should encourage reform by offering a credible political horizon toward Palestinian self-determination and statehood, consistent with Trump’s plan.

The PA’s legitimacy crisis stems not only from corruption and authoritarianism but also from the perception that it functions as an arm of the Israeli occupation without advancing Palestinian national aspirations.

Israel should therefore support integrating the PA into regional diplomatic and economic initiatives that could lay the groundwork for a negotiated two-state outcome. Tying political progress to verified reforms would incentivize stronger Palestinian institutions while demonstrating that diplomacy and security cooperation can produce tangible results. A more legitimate PA would be better positioned to compete with Hamas and establish a sustainable governing arrangement in Gaza.

The question facing the next Israeli government is therefore not only whether the PA is ready to govern Gaza but whether Israel is willing to support the reforms necessary for it to eventually do so.

Israelis are rightfully skeptical, given the PA’s history of institutional failure and policies that have undermined trust. Yet no other existing Palestinian leadership has comparable potential to govern Gaza, replace Hamas, and provide Israel with a Palestinian security partner.

The alternative is not a perfect Palestinian government but renewed Hamas rule, indefinite Israeli control, or continued instability. The PA is not ideal; it is necessary.