The 2026 election is no ordinary round of voting in the seemingly endless cycle of political contests that has defined the past decade.
Israelis will head to the polls for the sixth time in seven years. Yet this time, many Israelis view the election as a national watershed. Following the profound shock of the October 7 catastrophe and the subsequent Israel-Hamas War, Israeli society approaches the ballot box burdened by difficult questions about the country’s future and identity.
Against this backdrop, one of the central questions surrounding the October 27 election is not simply whether Israelis will turn out to vote in record numbers, but which political camp will win the battle for voter mobilization and drive up the national turnout rate.
Turnout stood at 71% in the 2022 election, and some estimates suggest that it could rise significantly in 2026, reaching levels not seen since the 1999 election, when turnout stood at 79%.
Within the Center-Left camp, which has repeatedly failed to oust Netanyahu over the past two decades, the atmosphere resembles a general mobilization of the reserves.
In 2022, voters in the Center-Left camp appeared to display a degree of complacency, reflected in turnout rates that were broadly similar to those recorded in the 2021 election in cities associated with the camp: 63% in Tel Aviv, 69% in Givatayim, and 72% in Ramat Hasharon.
This time, however, the picture may be entirely different. The desire to replace the current right-wing government, combined with the fallout from the October 7 failure and tensions surrounding relations between secular and ultra-Orthodox Israelis, has generated a powerful impetus for political change.
voting seen as a civic duty
For the Center-Left camp, turning out to vote is increasingly viewed as a paramount civic duty. It is therefore conceivable that turnout in cities associated with the camp will rise significantly, approaching the levels recorded in the 2015 election, which featured a close contest between Likud and the Zionist Union, when participation reached 68% in Tel Aviv, 77% in Givatayim, and 77% in Ramat Hasharon.
By contrast, the traditional strongholds of the Right present a more complicated picture, characterized by a sharp internal struggle.
On the one hand, disappointment with the right-wing government over the October 7 failure could lead voters to punish it by staying home on election day, as appeared to happen in the 2021 election, when turnout in cities associated with the right-wing camp stood at 57% in Beersheba, 62% in Ashdod, and 57% in Netanya.
On the other hand, as election day approaches, the prospect of a Center-Left government coming to power may act as a powerful mobilizing force. This sense of being backed into a corner could prove to be a formidable driver of voter turnout, potentially restoring or even surpassing the high participation rates recorded in the 2015 election: 64% in Beersheba, 68% in Ashdod, and 64% in Netanya.
Meanwhile, among two other major sectors of Israeli society, the haredim (ultra-Orthodox) and Arab communities, the motivation to vote may be reaching a boiling point. In the haredi community, the deepening crisis over military conscription legislation and economic sanctions is perceived as an unprecedented existential threat.
This sense of being persecuted could prompt a sweeping rabbinical call to mobilize voters, pushing turnout in haredi population centers above 80%, particularly given that participation in these areas declined in the 2022 election.
In the Arab sector, rising crime rates and declining personal security, combined with the desire to bring down the right-wing government and the decision by Hadash-Ta’al and Balad to run together, provide powerful incentives for voters to turn out and make their voices heard. Turnout could rise from 53% in the 2022 election to 65%, matching the level recorded in 2020.
In conclusion, there is little doubt that the current election campaign is particularly compelling and consequential. Every political camp and sector of Israeli society has powerful internal incentives to turn out, vote, and exert a direct influence on the country’s future.
It is striking to recall how, in recent years, particularly during the Kaplan protests against the judicial reform, we repeatedly heard emphatic claims that Israel was on the brink of an abyss and was becoming a dictatorship.
Yet mass mobilization and the willingness of citizens from across society to fight for the country’s character through the ballot box offer compelling evidence that Israeli democracy remains alive, vibrant, combative, and resilient. Indeed, it is stronger than that of most Western democracies.
The writer is a lecturer and research fellow at the University of South Wales in the United Kingdom. He is the author of Collapse: The Israeli Labor Party, 1992-2024.