Reports that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has been pressing US President Donald Trump to join a four-to-seven-day air campaign against Iran expose a fundamental weakness in Israel’s strategic thinking: the persistent substitution of tactical military action for a coherent endgame.

The proposal appears carefully calibrated to appeal to Trump’s well-known preference for quick, decisive solutions to seemingly intractable international crises.

Package the operation as a short, concentrated bombing campaign, promise a dramatic result, and present Tehran with an ultimatum it cannot survive. It is an attractive political proposition. It is also a potentially catastrophic strategic illusion.

The central problem is that a four-to-seven-day offensive cannot be treated as a self-contained military solution to a confrontation that has already demonstrated its extraordinary complexity.

Netanyahu appears to be selling Washington the promise of a quick fix to a problem that has repeatedly defied precisely that kind of thinking.

JONATHAN POLLARD, photographed this week in his Jerusalem home.
JONATHAN POLLARD, photographed this week in his Jerusalem home. (credit: MARC ISRAEL SELLEM)

First, the proposal directly contradicts Washington’s current strategy.

Trump’s preference for economic strangulation, reinforced by naval interdictions and maritime pressure, reflects a fundamentally different calculation.

Rather than immediately reopening the cycle of regional warfare, Washington has an opportunity to exploit Iran’s economic vulnerabilities, restrict its ability to generate revenue, and steadily increase the cost of the regime’s continued aggression.

The Gulf states, acutely conscious of their exposure to Iranian retaliation, have equally compelling reasons to avoid another regional conflagration.

Abandoning this strategy for a brief bombing offensive would risk sacrificing the leverage already accumulated in exchange for an uncertain military dividend.

It would also repeat the fundamental miscalculation made at the outset of the conflict in February, when expectations that devastating opening strikes would rapidly fracture or topple the Iranian regime proved misplaced.

Iran did not collapse. Its leadership did not simply capitulate. Its capacity for retaliation remained a central feature of the confrontation.

Why should anyone assume that another four days of bombing will produce a different strategic outcome?

Second, Netanyahu is dangerously underestimating the enemy’s capacity to absorb punishment and impose costs.

Iran has demonstrated two unmistakable characteristics: an extraordinary willingness to absorb military punishment and an equally extraordinary determination to make its neighbors pay for it.

A short air campaign cannot guarantee the permanent elimination of Iran’s military capabilities. Infrastructure can be repaired. Production facilities can be reconstructed. Missile and drone arsenals can be replenished.

Whatever damage is inflicted, the regime retains the capacity to retaliate, adapt, and prolong the confrontation.

The crucial question is therefore not whether Israel and the United States can inflict devastating damage. They plainly possess that capability. The question is whether they can translate that damage into a durable strategic outcome.

A limited offensive that leaves Iran’s political and military leadership intact, while triggering another wave of missile and drone attacks against Israel and the Gulf states, could leave the region considerably more dangerous than before.

That is not a victory. It is an invitation to the next round.

Third, Tehran understands Trump’s political vulnerabilities far better than Jerusalem appears willing to acknowledge.

Iran does not need to defeat the US militarily to undermine its strategy. It needs to make the economic and political consequences of confrontation sufficiently painful.

Disruptions to international shipping, attacks against energy infrastructure, and a spike in global oil prices would immediately reverberate through international markets.

The resulting inflationary pressure would become a domestic political liability for the White House, particularly at a time when American voters remain acutely sensitive to the cost of living.

Strategic gambling

Tehran understands that the road to weakening American resolve may run through the global energy market rather than the battlefield.

A regime facing a short bombing campaign has every incentive to widen the confrontation, not contain it. It can calculate that the longer-term political costs imposed on Washington may ultimately outweigh the immediate military damage inflicted upon Iran.

Netanyahu should understand that a four-day campaign does not necessarily give Trump a four-day war. It could give him a prolonged regional crisis, destabilized energy markets, endangered American interests, and an increasingly difficult domestic political problem.

This is the deeper failure of Israeli strategic thinking: confusing the ability to initiate military action with the ability to control its consequences.

For too long, Israel’s military and political leadership have appeared preoccupied with immediate tactical achievements, dramatic opening strikes, and the temporary destruction of enemy capabilities.

Yet the measure of a successful military campaign is not the number of targets destroyed or the impressive footage of precision strikes. It is the strategic reality left behind.

If Jerusalem genuinely believes military force is indispensable, it must first establish what the operation is intended to achieve, whether that objective is realistically attainable, and what comes afterward.

A sustained campaign aimed at fundamentally dismantling Iran’s capacity to wage war would be a different strategic proposition from a four-day demonstration of military superiority.

But such a campaign would carry enormous operational, political, and regional consequences and would require a credible plan for escalation, retaliation, and the eventual end of hostilities.

If those conditions cannot be met, the economic blockade should be allowed to do its work.

What Israel cannot afford is the worst of both worlds: abandoning economic pressure before it has achieved its purpose, launching a limited military offensive that cannot deliver a lasting strategic settlement, and then confronting an emboldened Iranian regime with renewed retaliatory capabilities.

Netanyahu must stop selling Washington the illusion that a complex strategic confrontation can be resolved through a neatly packaged bombing schedule.

Iran is not a four-day problem. And a four-day campaign is not a strategy.

The danger is that Israel could win every tactical engagement, inflict enormous damage, and still emerge strategically worse off, having exhausted American patience, endangered its regional partners, destabilized global energy markets, and given Tehran another opportunity to dictate the terms of the confrontation.

That is not decisive leadership. It is strategic gambling with Israel’s security and America’s credibility.

And the bill for that gamble will not arrive four days later. It could define the next decade.

The writer spent 30 years in American prisons after being convicted of spying for Israel. Now living in Jerusalem, he is an investor and cofounder of a handful of technology companies. He also writes and speaks about Israel’s need to be militarily self-sufficient.