Just a short time ago, meddling in the internal affairs of other nations,
sending warships on provocative patrol routes and threatening regional neighbors
with war were actions which solely characterized the Iranian regime’s pursuit of
regional domination.
Amid the sweeping changes brought about by the Arab
Spring, Turkey has found a window of opportunity to demonstrate its competency
and capability for assuming a lead role in the Middle East, effectively
abandoning its previous “Zero Problems” foreign policy in the
process.
The “Zero Problems” approach was spearheaded by Turkish Foreign
Minister Ahmet Davutoglu when the Justice and Development Party (AKP) first came
to power in 2002. The term refers to Turkey’s pledge to maintain peaceful
relations with its neighbors, as long as they respect Turkey’s interests in
return. For many years, Syria seemed to be the major benefactor of this policy,
even though the two nations almost went to war in the early 1990s over Syrian
President Bashar Assad’s alleged support of Kurdish separatists. Under the “Zero
Problems” policy, Syria became one of Turkey’s primary trading partners, and at
one point the two nations were conducting joint cabinet meetings.
Turkey
extended this policy to Israel following the 2005 Gaza Strip evacuation, after
which ties between the two nations were lauded by both sides as “the best they
had ever been,” and included significant economic and military
cooperation.
As far as Israel is concerned, the “Zero Problems” attitude
largely ended when Turkey’s complicity in the 2010 “flotilla” incident became
evident after activists from the Turkish IHH organization ambushed IDF troops
aboard the
Mavi Marmara.
After Israel rejected Turkey’s ultimatum for an
apology following the leaking of the UN’s Palmer Report, relations between the
two nations have sunk to their lowest point since the Knesset passed the
Jerusalem unification law in 1981. In the aftermath of the Palmer Report, Turkey
has sought to punish Israel by reducing diplomatic ties and military
cooperation, while Erdogan himself has used every platform possible to
de-legitimize Israel on the world stage.
Given recent events, it seems
Turkey’s aggressive policy towards Israel is not an isolated occurrence, but
rather part of a broad strategy aimed at achieving regional hegemony. The events
of the Arab Spring, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and a weakened Iran have
left a window of opportunity for this once-dormant power to reemerge as the
leader of the Middle East.
Turkey’s recent actions in opposing the Assad
regime signal perhaps the most extreme example of its abandonment of the “Zero
Problems” policy. Assad’s brutal crackdown on pro-reform demonstrators has
embarrassed the Erdogan administration, which had previously invested tireless
efforts in achieving a strong relationship with Syria. This turnaround came to a
peak on September 24 when the Turkish navy seized an arms shipment destined for
Syria and subsequently announced an arms embargo on the embattled Alawite regime
and Iranian ally.
These actions came after Erdogan had consistently
warned of his nation’s willingness to use its navy in a more aggressive fashion,
offering to escort future aid flotillas to Gaza while threatening Cyprus over
its intention to explore the eastern Mediterranean for natural
resources.
In addition, Turkey has stepped up its use of soft power by
attempting to influence the political processes of nations which have recently
undergone “Arab Spring” revolutions, namely Tunisia and Egypt. In Tunisia,
Erdogan has established close ties with the Ennahda party, a previously outlawed
faction which is said to have ties to the Muslim Brotherhood and now openly
proclaims itself to be similar to Turkey’s AKP. On September 13, Erdogan made a
high profile visit to Egypt in what may have been the most visible demonstration
of Turkey’s strategy to assert its influence. Erdogan’s overall success in Egypt
is questionable, since he did not follow through on his intention to visit
Gaza.
Furthermore, his speech in Cairo on the importance of a secular
state drew criticism from Islamists in the country.
The fact that Erdogan
did not make good on his pledge to visit Gaza prompted some commentators to
assert that his recent campaign of threats against Israel was nothing more than
rhetoric. Additionally, the Israeli government continues to maintain that
Erdogan’s fury is nothing more than a storm which can be expected to pass
without inflicting real, lasting damage.
So what can be made of Turkey’s
recent actions, or inaction? The fact of the matter is that Erdogan has found a
window of opportunity in the Arab Spring to restore Turkey to regional hegemony
at a time when it only serves to help his party’s standing at home. Turkey is
currently facing a number of considerable challenges to its internal stability,
including economic, security and political threats.
Since July 15,
Kurdish militant groups such as the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) have renewed
their attacks both in the southeastern provinces of the country, as well as in
Turkish urban centers. In Ankara and Istanbul, minority Kurds have begun
protesting, while their political leaders have only recently ended a monthslong
boycott on all parliamentary proceedings. In addition, Erdogan and his AKP party
are looking to use the political strength gained from the last election to
promote controversial constitutional reforms, while wresting control of the
country from the oncepowerful Turkish military.
Just as these internal
divides seemed to have boiled over, the Arab Spring and the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict have opened up a comfortable window of opportunity for Erdogan to unify
his country on external issues, striving to increase his country’s prestige as a
regional leader without any nation to challenge it.
Turkey’s Sunni rival,
Egypt, has been struggling to restore order since the fall of Mubarak, and Iran,
another non-Arab regional power, has been increasingly crippled by international
sanctions, while internal divisions with the ayatollahs have rendered Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad a lame-duck president. Lastly, Israel’s increasing isolation over
the Palestinian issue has not only weakened its regional influence, but provided
Erdogan with a popular issue for which he can lead the Arab world in
opposing.
Given his recent actions, it can be assumed that Erdogan will
continue to flex his political muscle as long as his AKP party stands to
benefit. Erdogan has much to lose from a naval confrontation with either Israel
or Cyprus, as doing so would invite the wrath of the American Congress, which
could compromise critical military cooperation between the two nations. His
last-minute backtrack on his decision to visit Gaza signifies his ability to
make pragmatic decisions and put his ego aside. Erdogan likely understood that
such a visit would have bolstered Hamas and drawn the ire of Egypt and Saudi
Arabia, both major players whose complacency needs to remain
unhindered.
While Turkey is clearly looking to take a leadership role in
the Middle East, it would be incorrect to compare its motivation to that of the
Iranian regime. Despite his party’s Islamic roots, Erdogan is not seeking to
“Islamize” the region, nor restore the old Ottoman Empire. What can be said with
a high degree of certainty is that Turkey has staked its claim as the
gate-keeper to the Middle East, abandoning indefinitely any aspiration to be a
part of Europe. Instead of acting as a subservient nation begging to join the
European Union, Erdogan has used his new foreign policy to send a message to the
world: Turkey is a strong, Muslim, Middle Eastern nation, which now has the
final word on any and all action taking place within its realm.
The
writer is an Argov Fellow for Leadership and Diplomacy at the IDC Herzliya. He
works for Max-Security Solutions, a risk consulting firm based in Tel Aviv, and
is the cofounder of the Friend-a-Soldier dialogue project and
www.Israelicentrism.com