The demographic threat

While we must take demographics seriously if Israel is to remain the national homeland of the Jewish people, the solutions offered by Israel's right-wing are not only naïve and dangerous, they also overlook the only effective strategy regarding the Arab sector: invest and integrate.

uzi dayan points map 298 (photo credit: Ariel Jerozolimski)
uzi dayan points map 298
(photo credit: Ariel Jerozolimski)
The International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) recently held its annual conference in Herzliya on combating terrorism. As is inevitably the case during any such conference that concerns itself with Israel's security, a number of speakers referred to the "demographic threat"—short-hand for the concern that eventually Jews will become a minority. Sometimes, this concern refers to the Land of Israel (the area from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea). Other times, speakers focus solely on the State of Israel proper, meaning they express concern about the growing proportion of Arab-Israelis.
Of the many, many things that perturb me about these discussions, one is how right-wing thinkers themselves—who lambaste left-wing "naïve optimism" regarding the potential for a negotiated two-state solution—embark upon reckless flights of fancy regarding Jordan. Far worse, however, is when it comes to the growing percentage of Arab-Israelis, right-wing ideologues ruefully ignore the only real effective policy option: vastly increasing the educational and professional opportunities available for Arabs, and particularly Arab women.
Let's first consider the larger "River to Sea" issue: For many in Israel's political left and center, the fear of losing a Jewish majority is a key factor propelling them to pursue a negotiated two-state settlement with the Palestinians. With three-quarters of all Palestinians who live between the river and the sea residing in the West Bank and Gaza, such a solution would ensure that Israel retains a Jewish majority for decades to come.
The biggest problem with the two-state solution, of course, is that the Palestinians are still not yet ripe to make the enormous political compromises that a final status deal would entail. While Israeli public opinion has shifted substantially to the left compared to 20 years ago (now accepting a Palestinian state, agreeing to uproot settlements, and willing to consider giving up parts of Jerusalem), the same cannot be said for Palestinian public opinion, which has barely budged since Oslo was signed in 1993. In the words of one United States Institute for Peace report:
Palestinians […] have yet to come to grips with the idea that Israel will not fully and completely retreat to the 1967 borders. The notion that an actual massive return of refugees to Israel proper will never happen, at least not in the way it has been idealized, is completely missing from the Palestinian discourse.
Even the dovish Palestinian President, Mahmoud Abbas, cannot bring himself to state publicly that such a deal is impossible without limiting a Palestinian right of return to the future Palestinian state. Not abandon the right of return, mind you, just limit it. And still, uttering this truth remains the quickest way for a Palestinian politician to commit political suicide.
With the Palestinians still refusing to soften their bargaining positions, it comes as no surprise that so many Israelis are trying to seek out some new, creative option. One such speaker at the ICT conference, Maj. General (res.) Uzi Dayan, suggested that with Oslo essentially dead, the solution to this demographic problem would be for Jordan to annex the West Bank and Gaza as provinces in their country.
It is important to point out that thinkers like Dayan have very different motivations than those who simply call for Jordan itself to be the Palestinian state. This latter group consists of those who want to hold on to all of the Land of Israel, and think that transfer of Palestinians to Jordan is the best solution. Dayan's position, on the other hand, would require massive territorial concessions in the West Bank—Israel would just be making those concessions to Jordan instead of to the Palestinians themselves.
The problem is that any "Jordanian option" is even less realistic than a negotiated two-state solution. What these "clear-eyed" thinkers overlook is that Jordanian East Bankers (those who were not Palestinian refugees in 1948) are no less concerned with demographics than we are. They realize fully that democracy is knocking at their door, and as Prof. Asher Zusser points out, demographically, East Bankers and Jordanian-Palestinians are now roughly equal in size. So why would any East Banker-run government be willing to take on millions of additional Palestinians?
The problem is that such talk is not merely naïve wishful thinking—its effect is to undercut the Jordanian monarchy's trust in Israel as a true ally with parallel strategic interests. And indeed, two weeks ago we witnessed the result of repeatedly raising the "Jordanian option" in our discourse, as King Abdullah II fired back by casting doubt on Israel's own long-term prospects.
Finally, a word to those who raise the alarm regarding the high Arab-Israeli birth-rates. For all the endless chatter about this issue, it is enormously frustrating that the truly optimal policy option is never raised. Study after study on fertility rates around the world have pointed to the singular importance of educational opportunities for women. In short, the more women focus on obtaining higher education, the longer they delay getting married and having children. The longer women delay having children, the fewer they will have. Likewise, the more education is rewarded, the more pressure parents face to have smaller families so that they can make large investments in the education of each and every child.
The inevitable conclusion is that the best way to bring down Arab-Israeli growth rates is to vastly increase the amount of public investment in the Arab sector. Specifically, the government of Israel should undertake a long laundry-list of policies whose aim would be to increase the educational and occupational opportunities for our Arabs citizens. And a core component of such policies must be to make a concerted effort to integrate Arab-Israelis more fully into the work force.
Of course, such integration should be a priority in its own right. But given the long years of neglect by successive governments, perhaps we might actually make it a priority if we realize that investing heavily in Arab communities is actually "good for the Jews" too. 
The writer is the former Deputy Director of the Global Research in International Affairs Center (GLORIA) in Herzliya.