The US’s new war against Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi is the latest sign of
its steady regional decline. In media interviews over the weekend, US military
chief Adm. Michael Mullen was hard-pressed to explain either the goal of the
military strikes in Libya or their strategic rationale.
Mullen’s
difficulty explaining the purpose of this new war was indicative of the
increasing irrationality of US foreign policy.
Traditionally, states have
crafted their foreign policy to expand their wealth and bolster their national
security. In this context, US foreign policy in the Middle East has
traditionally been directed towards advancing three goals: Guaranteeing the free
flow of inexpensive petroleum products from the Middle East to global market;
strengthening regimes and governments that are in a position to advance this
core US goal at the expense of US enemies; and fighting against regional forces
like the pan-Arabists and the jihadists that advance a political program
inherently hostile to US power.
Other competing interests have
periodically interfered with US Middle East policy. And these have to greater or
lesser degrees impaired the US’s ability to formulate and implement rational
policies in the region.
These competing interests have included the
desire to placate somewhat friendly Arab regimes that are stressed by or
dominated by anti-US forces; a desire to foster good relations with Europe; and
a desire to win the support of the US media.
Under the Obama
administration, these competing interests have not merely influenced US policy
in the Middle East. They have dominated it. Core American interests have been
thrown to the wayside.
BEFORE CONSIDERING the deleterious impact this
descent into strategic dementia has had on US interests, it is necessary to
consider the motivations of the various sides to the foreign policy debate in
the US today.
All of the sides have contributed to the fact that US
Middle East policy is now firmly submerged in a morass of strategic
insanity.
The first side in the debate is the anti-imperialist camp,
represented by President Barack Obama himself. Since taking office, Obama has
made clear that he views the US as an imperialist power on the world stage. As a
result, the overarching goal of Obama’s foreign policy has been to end US global
hegemony.
Obama looks to the UN as a vehicle for tethering the US
superpower. He views US allies in the Middle East and around the world with
suspicion because he feels that as US allies, they are complicit with US
imperialism.
Given his view, Obama’s instincts dictate that he do nothing
to advance the US’s core interests in the Middle East. Consider his policies
towards Iran. The Iranian regime threatens all of the US’s core regional
interests.
And yet, Obama has refused to lift a finger against the
mullahs.
Operating under the assumption that US enemies are right to hate
America due to its global hegemony, when the mullahs stole the 2009 presidential
elections for Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and then violently repressed the pro-Western
opposition Green Movement, Obama sided with the mullahs.
Aside from its
imperative to lash out at Israel, Obama’s ideological predisposition would
permit him to happily sit on the sidelines and do nothing against US foe or
friend alike. But given Obama’s basic suspicion of US allies, to the extent he
has bowed to pressure to take action in the Middle East, he has always done so
to the detriment of US allies.
Obama’s treatment of ousted Egyptian
president Hosni Mubarak is case in point.
When the Muslim
Brotherhood-backed opposition protests began in late January, Obama was
perfectly happy to do nothing despite the US’s overwhelming national interest in
preserving Mubarak in power. But when faced with domestic pressure to intervene
against Mubarak, he did so with a vengeance.
Not only did Obama force
Mubarak to resign. He prevented Mubarak from resigning in September and so
ensured that the Brotherhood would dominate the transition period to the new
regime.
Obama’s most outspoken opponents in the US foreign policy debate
are the neoconservatives.
Like Obama, the neoconservatives are not
motivated to act by concern for the US’s core regional interests. What motivates
them is their belief that the US must always oppose tyranny.
In some
cases, like Iran and Iraq, the neoconservatives’ view was in consonance with US
strategic interests and so their policy recommendation of siding with regime
opponents against the regimes was rational.
The problem with the
neoconservative position is that it makes no distinction between liberal regime
opponents and illiberal regime opponents. It can see no difference between
pro-US despots and anti-US despots.
If there is noticeable opposition to
tyrants, then the US must support that opposition.
This view is what
informed the neoconservative bid to oust Mubarak last month and Gaddafi this
month.
The fracture between the Obama camp and the neoconservative camp
came to a head with Libya. Obama wished to sit on the sidelines and the
neoconservatives pushed for intervention.
To an even greater degree than
in Egypt, the debate was settled by the third US foreign policy camp – the
opportunists. Led today by Clinton, the opportunist camp supports whoever they
believe is going to make them most popular with the media and Europe.
In
the case of Libya, the opportunist interests dictated military intervention
against Gaddafi. Europe opposes Gaddafi because the French and the British bet
early on that his opponents were winning. France recognized the opposition as
the legitimate government two weeks ago.
Once Gaddafi’s counteroffensive
began, France and Britain realized they would be harmed politically and
economically if Gaddafi maintained power so they began calling for military
strikes to overthrow him.
As for the media, they were quick to
romanticize the amorphous “opposition” as freedom fighters.
Seeing the
direction of the wind, Clinton jumped on the European-media bandwagon and forced
Obama to agree to a military operation whose goal no one can define.
WHAT
THE US foreign policy fights regarding Egypt and Libya indicate is that
currently, a discussion about how events impact core US regional interests is
completely absent from the discussion. Consequently, it should surprise no one
that none of the policies the US is implementing in the region advance those
core interests in any way. Indeed, they are being severely damaged.
Under
Mubarak, Egypt advanced US interests in two main ways. First, by waging war
against the Muslim Brotherhood and opposing the rise of Iranian power in the
region, Mubarak weakened the regional forces that most threatened US interests.
Second, by managing the Suez Canal in conformance with international maritime
law, Egypt facilitated the smooth transport of petroleum products to global
markets and prevented Iran from operating in the Mediterranean Sea.
Since
Mubarak was ousted, the ruling military junta has taken actions that signal that
Egypt is no longer interested in behaving in a manner that advances US
interests.
Domestically, the junta has embarked on a course that all but
guarantees the Muslim Brotherhood’s rise to power in the fall.
Saturday’s
referendum on constitutional amendments was a huge victory for the Brotherhood
on two counts. First, it cemented Islamic law as the primary source of
legislation and so paved the way for the Brotherhood’s transformation of Egypt
into an Islamic state. Under Mubarak, that constitutional article meant nothing.
Under the Brotherhood, it means everything.
Second, it set the date for
parliamentary elections for September. Only the Brotherhood, and remnants of
Mubarak’s National Democratic Party will be ready to stand for election so soon.
The liberals have no chance of mounting a coherent campaign in just six
months.
In anticipation of the Brotherhood’s rise to power, the military
has begun realigning Egypt into the Iranian camp. This realignment is seen most
openly in Egypt’s new support for Hamas. Mubarak opposed Hamas because it is
part of the Brotherhood.
The junta supports it for the same reason. Newly
appointed Foreign Minister Nabil el-Araby has already called for the opening of
Egypt’s border with Hamasruled Gaza.
There can be little doubt Hamas’s
massive rocket barrage against Israel on Saturday was the product of its sense
that Egypt is now on its side.
As for the Suez Canal, the junta’s
behavior so far is a cause for alarm. Binding UN Security Council Resolution
1747 from 2007 bars Iran from shipping arms. Yet last month the junta thumbed
its nose at international law and permitted two Iranian naval ships to traverse
the canal without being inspected.
According to military sources, one of
the ships carried advanced armaments. These were illicitly transferred to the
German merchant ship Victoria at Syria’s Latakia port. Last week, IDF naval
commandos interdicted the Victoria with its Iranian weaponry en route to Gaza
via Alexandria.
Add to that Egypt’s decision to abrogate its contractual
obligation to supply Israel with natural gas and we see that the junta is
willing to suspend its commitment to international law in order to realign its
foreign policy with Iran.
ON EVERY level, a post-Mubarak Egypt threatens
the US core interests that Mubarak advanced.
Then there is Libya. One of
the most astounding aspects of the US debate on Libya in recent weeks has been
the scant attention paid to the nature of the rebels.
The rebels are
reportedly represented by the so-called National Transitional Council led by
several of Gaddafi’s former ministers.
But while these men – who are
themselves competing for the leadership mantle – are the face of the NTC, it is
unclear who stands behind them. Only nine of the NTC’s 31 members have been
identified.
Unfortunately, available data suggest that the rebels
championed as freedom fighters by the neoconservatives, the opportunists, the
Europeans and the Western media alike are not exactly liberal democrats. Indeed,
the data indicate that Gaddafi’s opponents are more aligned with al-Qaida than
with the US.
Under jihadist commander Abu Yahya Al- Libi, Libyan
jihadists staged anti-regime uprisings in the mid-1990s. Like today, those
uprisings’ central hubs were Benghazi and Darnah.
In 2007 Al-Libi merged
his forces into al- Qaida. On March 18, while denouncing the US, France and
Britain, Al-Libi called on his forces to overthrow Gaddafi.
A 2007 US
Military Academy study of information on al-Qaida forces in Iraq indicate that
by far, Eastern Libya made the largest per capita contribution to al-Qaida
forces in Iraq.
None of this proves that the US is now assisting an
al-Qaida takeover of Libya. But it certainly indicates that the forces being
assisted by the US in Libya are probably no more sympathetic to US interests
than Gaddafi is. At a minimum, the data indicate the US has no compelling
national interest in helping the rebels in overthrow Gaddafi.
The
significance of the US’s descent into strategic irrationality bodes ill not just
for US allies, but for America itself. Until the US foreign policy community is
again able to recognize and work to advance the US’s core interests in the
Middle East, America’s policies will threaten both its allies and
itself.
caroline@carolineglick.com