Despite the focus on the dramatic political change taking place in the Middle
East, Tehran’s barely hidden drive toward nuclear weapons remains justifiably
high on the international agenda. Iran’s nuclear efforts and lack of cooperation
with IAEA inspectors have led to international and unilateral sanctions,
innumerable diplomatic discussions, and a near-constant flow of op-eds. Much of
the debate, however, has examined Iran’s nuclear potential in binary terms;
either Iran will have nuclear weapons or it won’t.
The manufacture and
deployment of a nuclear weapon (”unacceptable,” according to President Obama)
would be an obvious violation of Iran’s obligations under the Nuclear
Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), and would subject the country to harsher
punitive measures than it currently faces.
Abandoning its nuclear weapons
efforts, though decreasingly likely, would include cessation of Iran’s entirely
superfluous uranium enrichment activities and compliance with the transparency
requirements of the NPT.
Rarely raised is a third possibility: that Iran
will pursue the “Japanese option” of becoming and remaining a nuclear threshold
state. Japan is widely acknowledged to have both the technological ability and
the stockpile of plutonium (the by-product of its peaceful nuclear energy
generation) required to produce over 1,000 nuclear weapons (by comparison, China
is estimated to have around 175). The saying goes that Japan is just a
“screw-turn” away from being a nuclear armed state, but for historical,
ideological and political reasons, as well as because of its comprehensive
defense agreement with the United States, it has chosen not to turn the screw.
Japan thus remains comfortably at the nuclear threshold, enjoying the legitimacy
conferred by nuclear transparency, while knowing that, if needed, nuclear
weapons are well within reach.
Iran, though currently far from
transparent, and with a record of nuclear obfuscation, might be pursuing a
technically similar path, opening some of its facilities to observers, while
developing the technology and infrastructure needed to field and deliver nuclear
weapons within months, but not planning to take that last step. The threshold is
not a single point; depending on a state’s progress to date, it includes a
variety of activities that could be completed in anywhere from days to months.
Regardless of whether Iran is at the threshold, a nuclear weapon could be little
more than a decision away.
IN SOME ways the nebulousness inherent in Iran
remaining a threshold state threatens to put the US as well as its Middle
Eastern allies in a tougher spot than would be the case if Iran unmistakably
developed nuclear weapons. Such a situation could nevertheless strengthen
domestic support for and enhance the regional and international prestige of the
Iranian regime, making efforts to influence or undermine it more
Iran could exploit its posture by pairing diplomatic demands
with explicit or implied threats that it will cross the threshold. Avoiding this
outcome is likely to cost the international community dearly in political,
economic, and other terms. The much-feared prospect would likely result in a
constellation of nuclear threshold states. It also would be more difficult to
build diplomatic support for further sanctions against an Iran thought to have
”responded” to previous pressure by stopping just short of developing nuclear
weapons. Iran therefore could glean many of the strategic benefits of nuclear
weapons without actually having them.
One could argue that Iran’s nuclear
development program has already made it a threshold state. However, an Iranian
decision to remain so for an extended period is likely to introduce increasing
uncertainty to an already unpredictable region, which could be dangerously
destabilizing. To avoid strategic surprise, states might feel increasingly
compelled to invest intelligence and early-warning resources toward
understanding where Iran is, as Saudi Arabia might be doing. As uncertainty
rises, these states might become decreasingly willing to take chances. Though
Iran undoubtedly sees deterrence value in its nuclear efforts, lingering at the
threshold could make ostensibly pre-emptive war more, rather than less,
IF BEING a threshold state is so treacherous, why is Japan’s
threshold status tolerated? Because Japan is fully compliant with its NPT
obligations, its facilities are regularly and fully inspected by the IAEA, and
it is governed by a democracy accountable to its citizens, its allies and the
Iran’s nuclear efforts, whether intended to
produce a bomb or to stop short of doing so, would be far less ominous and
arouse far less suspicion and opposition if the country’s regime did not have a
well-deserved reputation for menacing neighbors, financing and equipping
terrorist groups, and brutally suppressing internal opponents.
dangers posed by Iran as a threshold state and its record of NPT violation, it
is essential to ask if the US administration’s and its allies’ current approach
is sufficient. A more comprehensive stance would broaden its scope to define
explicitly and consistently what these states’ red lines are, and what the
penalties will be for crossing them, and ensure that these messages are
unambiguously conveyed to Tehran.
The consequences of too little, too
late, might prove catastrophic.
While the United States, Israel, Saudi
Arabia and other Middle Eastern states might not agree completely about the
threat posed by Iran as a nuclear threshold state, all can agree that the
uncertainty is itself threatening, more so every day.
The writers are
research fellows at the Institute for National Security Studies, Tel Aviv