The High Court of Justice on Monday heard a petition challenging the state’s handling of discharged soldiers and reservists who died by suicide after their military service, in cases where their deaths may have been connected to their service in the Israel-Hamas War.
The hearing, held before Justices David Mintz, Gila Canfy-Steinitz, and Yechiel Kasher, ended without an immediate ruling. After a short consultation, Mintz said that the court would consider the arguments and issue a decision later.
The petition, filed in January by the Jerusalem Institute of Justice and Forum Yahalomey Krav, an advocacy organization for war-related post-trauma, is directed against Defense Minister Israel Katz and IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Eyal Zamir. It asks the court to halt implementation of the recommendations of a committee headed by former IDF Manpower Directorate chief Maj.-Gen. (res.) Moti Almoz.
At the heart of the case is a painful legal and moral gap: when a soldier is killed while in active service, the path to military burial and recognition as an IDF fallen soldier is clear. But when a soldier or reservist returns from war, is discharged or no longer under an active call-up order, and later dies by suicide, allegedly because of trauma from that service, the state says the legal answer is not the same.
The justices made clear during the hearing that they did not dispute the basic premise that mental injury from military service can be just as severe as physical injury.
“There is no difference between physical injury and mental injury,” Canfy-Steinitz said, while noting that some cases were clearer than others and that the court was dealing with more complex circumstances, where the causal link between service and death had to be examined.
Kasher similarly told the petitioners that they did not need to persuade the court that mental injury caused by military service could be consequential, or that such harm was “not inferior in any way” to physical injury.
Justices press petitioners on target of petition
But the justices repeatedly pressed the petitioners on the legal target of the petition, asking whether their claims were directed at the Almoz Committee or at the underlying laws that determine who is eligible for military burial and recognition.
Kasher said that, under the Military Cemeteries Law, the decisive question for burial is whether the deceased was an IDF fallen soldier at the time of death, and that if the petitioners wanted to attack the statute itself, “you can do that in another building.” He added that on recognition and benefits, the key issue remains two words: causal link.
The Almoz Committee was appointed to examine the response given to families of soldiers who died by suicide after service, in circumstances that may be connected to their military service. According to the state, the committee recommended an interim support track for families while the formal recognition process is examined, including IDF accompaniment, assistance in approaching the Defense Ministry, and the presence of military elements at a civilian funeral.
The petitioners argue that the committee created a lesser category of “died after service” instead of full recognition as IDF fallen soldiers, leaving families with symbols and accompaniment rather than the recognition they believe they are owed.
JIJ attorney Gai Akoka told the court that the families wanted the committee’s work limited in time and expanded to include bereaved families, arguing that the process should not leave families waiting indefinitely for answers. He asked the court to order the Almoz Committee to reconvene with family representatives and to require that decisions be issued within 60 days.
For the state, attorney Roy Shweika argued that the petition was framed around the Almoz Committee, which could not change the statutory criteria for burial or recognition. He said there was no discrimination between physically and mentally wounded soldiers, and that the committee had, in fact, created a unique response for mental-injury suicide cases during the interim period before a final recognition decision.
Canfy-Steinitz asked how many cases had been brought before the committee. Shweika said he did not know, adding that the state had referred to one case in its filing. Akoka interjected that there were 101 cases.
Bereaved families, PTSD veterans speak
The hearing also included emotional statements from bereaved families and post-traumatic veterans in the courtroom.
One family member said his son had been wounded after service and later died, asking: “Why is there this discrimination?”
Mintz responded: “There is a problem on the issue of mental injuries, unequivocally,” but said the question was what the court could do within this petition. He added that the petition could not solve the broader problem, which he described as general and rooted in existing legislation.
Another speaker argued that, if a soldier dies by suicide while in active service, the family is not required to prove the same kind of causal link, while a soldier who served hundreds of reserve days and later dies by suicide is treated differently. Mintz replied, “You are right,” while Kasher added, “True, but that is not the law.”
Kasher later said that, if there were a broader statistical reality in which the professional system almost never recognized such cases, that would be a separate and serious problem, possibly indicating an illegitimate approach. But he stressed that such a claim was not the petition brought to the court.
After the hearing, Akoka said the court had listened closely to the bereaved families and that the petitioners expected it to issue “a moral and value-based statement” requiring changes to the Almoz Committee.
The case now leaves the court with a question that is both legal and deeply human: whether the Almoz Committee is merely an interim attempt to soften the gap left by existing laws, or whether, as the petitioners argue, it entrenches that gap by leaving soldiers whose minds broke after battle outside of military recognition.