As the protests and government crackdown continue in Iran, it’s important to understand that no matter what happens, change is not going to happen overnight, and none of the options going forward look good.
Any actor hoping to help the protesters is going to need a long-term strategy before jumping in.
Firstly, an important disclaimer: the lack of clear, verifiable information makes it difficult to assess exactly where things stand in Iran, but some things are relatively clear.
The scale of the massacres, the fact that they’re ongoing, and their apparent full support from the entire elite – including reformist figures – indicate there haven’t been any notable defections from within the regime yet.
These types of massacres make an unarmed protest movement more or less unsustainable, leaving two options: either the security forces reach a point where they can no longer stomach the blood (there’s no sign of that yet) or the protesters are mowed down until there’s simply no one left willing to go outside.
Paths forward for Iran
With that in mind, there are a few different ways the situation could develop.
The first option is the most pessimistic: the crackdown succeeds, the protests sputter out as they always have, and the regime survives to see another day.
That doesn’t mean the regime is safe. If it isn’t willing to change its policies both foreign and domestic – and all signs indicate it has zero interest in doing so – a new wave of protests will only be a matter of time.
Maybe in a few years, maybe in a generation, but it will come.
The second option is a protracted conflict. In this situation, either the protests somehow keep going for months as they are, or they become armed, and this devolves into civil war.
Until recently, elites within the regime could have theoretically defected and joined the protesters, potentially maintaining parts of the existing structure through agreement with the protesters or with the US, similar to what has been happening in Venezuela.
However, the sheer scale of the massacre and the unified support for it from essentially the entire regime make that option appear untenable for now, although there are some theoretical factors that could change that.
Without an elite within the existing power structure to attach themselves to, protesters who don’t want to give up will be left with one option: war.
This would not be a quick battle. The protesters are largely unarmed and unorganized. They’ll be facing a united front without a similar organizing force on their side.
External influence and elite dynamics
Several factors could change this balance. The main short-term option is foreign interference, most likely from the US or Israel, but there are others who could help too.
This could involve military aid to protesters, strikes, or both, alongside diplomatic pressure, sanctions, and help bypassing the communications blackout.
Such intervention could help protesters keep going and eventually build a more unified force, though it risks losing support from Iranians who fear a foreign-led coup given the country’s history with imperialist intervention by the British, the Russians, and the Americans.
Any move like this carries significant risks alongside potential benefits, but the situation as it stands doesn’t leave many other options.
The protesters aren’t the only ones with foreign allies, though.
The regime could seek help from Russia (though Russia is unlikely to provide much), from its proxies (a more likely source), or even from China (which is also unlikely to get directly involved).
US involvement could increase the pressure on Russia or China to step in, even if indirectly. But even with American help, the regime isn’t going to fall quickly.
The Islamic regime is a massive machine with many branches and fail-safes. Taking out Khamenei won’t be enough; he is aging, is likely not making many decisions already, and has several potential replacements lined up.
Even removing his direct associates from the Guardian Council, judiciary, or Expediency Council may not be sufficient due to the sheer size and cohesiveness of these branches.
The branches that might have been expected to break from Khamenei, such as the traditional army, parts of the government, or even the IRGC, have only rallied more strongly around the flag over the past week.
Any effort to bring down the regime will take considerable time, until the elite are essentially destroyed or until a large enough group decides to switch sides, as happened in Syria after years of civil war.
There is always the possibility of unlikely alliances forming. With the threat of foreign intervention becoming real, some elites may try switching sides.
These potential figures could be staying relatively quiet in order to later claim they did so out of fear, giving themselves room for denial of complicity in the massacre.
The protesters might accept such claims if it means a more orderly transfer of power and an avoidance of the post-revolutionary chaos that has devastated other countries in the region.
Any civil war would involve a collection of different factions, both within the regime and among the protesters. This is especially true since the protesters lack centralized leadership and have many different visions of what Iran’s future should look like.
As foreign powers consider intervening, they need to keep all of this in mind. If they get involved without being ready to stick around for the long run, they’ll only cause more damage.
If the regime is destabilized without a clear and immediate replacement, the country could devolve into chaos. Syria after Assad was bad enough.
Iran is nearly nine times larger, possesses advanced weapons and a nuclear program, and borders extremely unstable countries like Iraq, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.
ISIS operates both in neighboring countries and within Iran itself. In the chaos, extremely dangerous weapons and information could fall into the hands of very bad actors.
The region is at a major turning point.
No one knows where this is headed or what government, if any different one, will emerge. These protests could end without regime change, even with US involvement.
Without a long-term strategy and coordinated response, that or worse remains a very real possibility.
The author worked for a number of years as a breaking news editor at The Jerusalem Post and is now a writer at Unpacked. He is studying political science and Middle Eastern studies at Bar-Ilan University.