Wars are fought with soldiers and missiles. But in the modern world they are also fought with something less visible and often more decisive: narrative.
Israel has repeatedly proven that it knows how to win wars on the battlefield. The question is whether it can also win the framing war – the battle over how a conflict is understood while it is still unfolding.
That battle is already underway.
As Israel confronts Hezbollah in Lebanon while the United States and Israel jointly confront Iran, a dangerous strategic separation is emerging in how these conflicts are being described. Militarily, the campaigns are connected. Politically and in media narratives, however, they are increasingly treated as separate wars.
If that separation hardens, Israel risks repeating a pattern it knows all too well: winning the battlefield but losing the narrative.
History offers a warning. During the 1982 First Lebanon War, Israel entered Lebanon to remove the threat posed by the PLO to its northern border. The strategic objective was clear to Israeli planners. But the global narrative that came to define the war had little to do with that objective.
The Sabra and Shatila massacres – carried out by Lebanese Christian militias – became the defining symbol of the conflict in the international imagination. Israel did not carry out the killings, yet it became the focal point of global outrage.
The lesson was harsh but unmistakable: in Lebanon’s fragmented political environment, events that occur within the orbit of Israeli military operations will ultimately be attributed to Israel in the court of global opinion. That structural vulnerability remains today.
Lebanon is not a conventional nation-state operating with centralized authority. It is a loosely tied political system in which sectarian factions, militias, and foreign-backed armed organizations operate simultaneously. Hezbollah is the most powerful of these actors – by far Iran’s most lethal and successful proxy.
But Hezbollah does not exist in isolation. Christian militias, Sunni factions, local armed groups, and other political actors all operate within Lebanon’s fractured system. In such an environment, the possibility that allied or independent militias may act with barbaric violence during a conflict cannot be ignored.
If such events occur, Israel will once again face the danger of being blamed for Lebanon’s internal chaos. History suggests that it will.
Another reality must also be acknowledged. The culture and history of warfare in the Middle East often tolerate levels of violence that Western audiences find shocking. Civil wars in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen have produced devastation on a scale unfamiliar to Western publics.
At the same time, Israel’s enemies have repeatedly demonstrated a willingness to use tactics that deliberately place civilians in harm’s way. We saw this clearly in Gaza: terrorists operating from schools, hospitals, and dense civilian neighborhoods while holding their own population hostage to the battlefield.
These tactics were not invented on October 7.
They were used in Lebanon long before that day and remain embedded in Hezbollah’s operational doctrine. The goal is simple: to generate images of destruction that can be weaponized politically against Israel.
This is why the framing war matters so much.
From battlefield success to narrative risk
Hezbollah possesses thousands of rockets and missiles supplied by Iran, aimed directly at Israeli cities. No responsible government can allow such a threat to remain indefinitely.
Israel, therefore, has no choice but to act in order to remove the danger posed to its citizens in the North.
But if the conflict in Lebanon is not framed correctly, Israel could quickly find itself confronting a familiar nightmare: Lebanon becoming Gaza II – only worse.
Images of destruction dominate global media. International institutions such as the International Court of Justice revive accusations of war crimes. Diplomatic pressure intensifies. Meanwhile, the original strategic context – Iran’s proxy war against Israel – fades from view.
If that happens, Israel could once again find itself politically isolated at the very moment it is achieving military success.
That is why the framing of this war must change immediately.
Israel must make clear that the Lebanon conflict is not a separate war. It is an extension of the same war being fought against Iran.
President Donald Trump has framed the confrontation with Iran as part of a broader America First strategy aimed at confronting a dangerous axis of authoritarian powers that includes Iran, Russia, and China.
If Iran is part of that America First calculation, then Hezbollah – Iran’s most lethal proxy – must be understood in the same framework.
Lebanon is not a separate battlefield. It is another front in the same war.
Israel is not asking the United States to conduct military operations in Lebanon. Israel is fully capable of defending itself and has repeatedly demonstrated its willingness to do so. What Israel needs from Washington is something different. It needs America’s cooperation in the framing war.
Israel must say clearly to its closest ally: Yes, we are proud to stand with the United States. But in Lebanon we are not asking you to fight the physical war with us. What we need you to fight with us is the framing war.
Washington’s voice carries enormous weight in shaping global narratives. If the United States clearly states that Hezbollah is simply Iran’s forward military arm, then the logic of Israel’s actions becomes inseparable from the broader campaign against Iranian aggression.
Fortunately, the foundation for such cooperation already exists.
Trump has repeatedly praised Israel for standing shoulder to shoulder with the United States in confronting shared threats. At the same time, he has expressed frustration with long-term European partners who have refused to participate or provide requested support in this confrontation but later will seek to benefit from the outcomes.
Israel has demonstrated the opposite posture. It is willing to fight. It is willing to bleed. It is willing to stand alongside the United States when the stakes are high. Now is the moment to translate that political goodwill into strategic cooperation.
Israel should say openly: We are proud to be America’s partner. But we need your help explaining to the world what this war actually is.
At the same time, Israel must avoid another narrative trap now circulating in parts of American political discourse.
Some voices have suggested that Israel manipulated or pressured the United States into confrontation with Iran. Former Trump counterterrorism top official Joe Kent even stated in his resignation letter that Israel effectively tricked Washington into the war with Iran.
Such accusations are both false and dangerous.
Israel must make clear that it is not dragging the United States into conflict.
Rather, it is confronting the same strategic adversary that Washington has already identified: an Iranian regime whose ballistic missile programs, nuclear ambitions, and proxy networks threaten regional and global stability. Trump himself has made clear that his strategic initiative is far broader than Iran alone. His administration’s effort is aimed at reshaping the global balance of power involving China, Russia, and Iran.
Israel understands that the United States must weigh its own strategic priorities within that larger framework. Israel cannot dictate what America First means for Washington. But it can support those objectives.
By dismantling Hezbollah’s military infrastructure, Israel helps reduce the ballistic missile threat emanating from Iran’s proxy network. It helps weaken the architecture of Iranian aggression. It helps create the conditions for a less belligerent Iran in the future.
In that sense, Israel’s campaign against Hezbollah serves not only its own security interests but also the strategic goals articulated by Washington.
Time, however, is not on its side.
Narratives solidify quickly in modern conflicts. Once the world decides that a war is something else – a humanitarian crisis, a local border dispute, or an occupation – reversing that perception becomes extraordinarily difficult.
The window for shaping the global understanding of the Lebanon war is therefore measured not in months but in days and weeks.
Israel has proven beyond doubt that it knows how to win military wars.
What remains to be seen is whether it can also win the framing war that determines how those victories are ultimately understood.
This time, Israel has no choice.
The author is an experienced global strategist for the public and private sectors. globalstrategist2020@gmail.com.