US President Donald Trump and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu have repeatedly suggested that the war with Iran could ultimately enable the Iranian people to overthrow their government. But neither Washington nor Jerusalem appears to have invested much effort in helping create a political alternative that could unite the opposition and encourage defections from within the regime.
Instead, the implicit assumption seems to be that once the Islamic Republic is sufficiently weakened by military pressure, Iranians will rise up and bring it down themselves. Given the regime’s organization and control of the security forces, that outcome is far from likely.
Wars aimed at regime change rarely succeed with bombs alone. They require a political alternative ready to take power.
History offers a clear lesson. Authoritarian regimes collapse only when citizens, elites, and enough members of the security forces believe that an alternative political order is both desirable and within reach.
Iran currently lacks one. That absence may determine whether the current crisis weakens the regime – or allows it to survive.
Building a credible alternative: the key to regime change
Dissatisfaction with the regime is widespread. Economic collapse, corruption, repression, and international isolation have triggered repeated waves of unrest, from the Green Movement in 2009 to the nationwide protests of 2019 and the “Woman, Life, Liberty” uprising in 2022. Millions of Iranians clearly want change.
But anger alone does not topple regimes.
Iran’s opposition remains fragmented, divided by ideology, geography, and decades of repression. Activists lack the leadership, organization, and political framework needed to transform popular frustration into a coherent movement capable of replacing the regime.
The real challenge is not mobilizing protest. It is building a political alternative that can attract support across Iranian society while persuading parts of the regime’s elite and security apparatus to defect.
Among expatriates, Reza Pahlavi – the son of Iran’s last shah – has spent years articulating a vision for the country’s future and retains real support among monarchists and parts of the diaspora. Yet his prospects remain uncertain. After decades abroad, he lacks a clear power base inside Iran, and activists remain deeply divided over the role of the monarchy in a future political system.
Potential leaders inside Iran face even greater constraints. Figures such as Mir Hossein Mousavi carry symbolic legitimacy among reformists, but he has been under house arrest for 15 years. Decades of repression have dismantled organized political opposition. Potential leaders operate under surveillance, house arrest, or exile, leaving them unable to build organizations capable of challenging the regime.
The result is a fragmented opposition with no leadership capable of uniting activists inside the country with networks abroad.
With no unified leadership emerging either inside Iran or abroad, some observers search for other possible levers of change. Some analysts argue that Iran’s ethnic minorities – particularly the Kurds – might provide a lever for destabilizing the regime.
But relying heavily on minority movements risks triggering a nationalist backlash among Persian Iranians or fueling sectarian fragmentation after the regime falls. Such groups could contribute to a broader coalition, but cannot substitute for one.
Israel’s intelligence services may also have cultivated networks inside Iran capable of weakening the regime from within. Such networks may well exist. But even a dramatic defection by a handful of insiders would fall short unless it triggered broader fractures within Iran’s military and security establishment.
One possible model is a transitional leadership council representing several key constituencies – political activists, economic elites, religious figures, civil-society leaders, and elements of the security establishment. Such a body would initially operate outside the country while maintaining deep connections to influential networks inside Iran.
Similar arrangements have helped manage other regime transitions, from Poland in 1989 to Tunisia after the Arab Spring. Where they succeed, they typically combine three elements: broad elite representation, credible guarantees for insiders willing to defect, and a clear path toward elections or constitutional reform.
The council’s role would not be to predetermine Iran’s future political system but to coordinate opposition forces and manage the transition’s early stages. To succeed, it would need a clear platform: protection of basic rights, economic stabilization, a credible political process, and – critically – assurances that regime insiders who defect will not face automatic persecution or economic ruin.
Those guarantees would need to be specific, believable, and widely communicated so insiders conclude that defection is safer than loyalty.
Without a clear alternative, many Iranians – including political and economic elites, security officials, and ordinary citizens – will hesitate to support change because of the risks of instability or civil war.
Parts of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the Basij, and the regular military are unlikely to stand aside even if some officers defect. An alternative capable of winning trust is therefore essential not only to promote change but also to ensure it unfolds without widespread violence.
Any transitional leadership council would need to do more than rally disparate opposition groups. It would also have to coordinate them against inevitable resistance from regime loyalists.
Recent violence offers a preview of what could follow even if parts of the regime defect. Establishing a structure capable of organizing defectors, coordinating regional actors such as Kurdish forces, helping citizens organize self-defense, and directing outside support would make a transition far more likely.
None of this guarantees success. But history suggests that building an alternative capable of inspiring confidence and organizing opposition forces offers the best chance of success.
If Washington and Jerusalem hope to see political change in Tehran, weakening the regime is only the first step. The harder task is ensuring that something credible is ready to replace it.
Without it, the Islamic Republic may survive – or be replaced by something even more extreme.
The writer teaches political risk at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies and writes about and works on fragile states and political transitions.