As Iran and its proxies take a beating from American and Israeli forces, observers are questioning whether Turkey is waiting in the wings to emerge as the region’s next “bogeyman.” The answer is likely yes, albeit in its own form.
Turkey is not Iran, but depicting Turkey as a nuisance or simply “complicated” only emboldens a maturing adversarial regime with an established track record of undermining its Western allies.
The claim that Turkey lacks Iran’s ideological rigidity or nuclear ambition is true, but largely irrelevant. The real question is whether Turkey is actively undermining US, NATO, and regional security interests. There is little doubt that Ankara is doing just that, and doing so more brazenly with the passage of time.
One does not need to reach far into the past to find examples. As recently as March 9, Turkey positioned six American-made F-16 fighter jets on the occupied part of Cyprus. The move was a significant escalation in the militarization of contested territory, not to mention a possible violation of US law. The half-dozen combat aircraft were also a visible act of intimidation directed at Israel, which lies less than 300 miles from Cyprus.
Turkey is leveraging its regional position not to reinforce its Western alliances but to provoke the United States and its partners. Turkey leads efforts to broker a ceasefire in the war against the Islamic Republic of Iran, not because it primarily desires to usher in regional peace, but because a weakened Iranian regime will serve Ankara’s ambition to emerge as a regional hegemon. This is not out of character. Nowhere is this tendency clearer than in Turkey’s relationship with Hamas, which predates the current conflict. Ankara’s support for Hamas is not merely limited to rhetorical praise.
Turkey’s patronage of Hamas should not be portrayed as a matter of disagreement with the West, or an understandable relationship of a Muslim-majority country with the “Palestinian cause.” It should be seen for what it is: a NATO country advocating on behalf of a US-designated terrorist organization that undermines the security interests of the transatlantic alliance.
Turkey's relationship with Hamas
Hamas, as an Iranian proxy, has served Ankara’s interests in undermining Israel’s security interests, something which Turkey would like to see intact after the end of the current war.
In 2011, Hamas established a presence in Turkey at the invitation of the Turkish government. In the years that followed, Ankara openly liaised with Hamas officials and granted citizenship to the group’s late political chief, Ismail Haniyeh, and his deputy, Saleh al-Arouri.
Turkey facilitated the flow of money and materiel through the country’s financial infrastructure, emboldening Hamas to carry out the October 7 massacre.
Turkey openly lends the use of its territory to Hamas, allowing the entity to plan terrorist attacks, recruit, and fundraise. To this day, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan does not consider Hamas a terrorist organization. This is not the behavior of a “difficult ally” with which the United States simply has its disagreements.
Accounts that relegate Turkey’s support for Hamas to a footnote underestimate just how entrenched that support is, and how much it stands to grow in the future.
It is true, as analysts observe, that Turkey and Iran are not alike by any direct comparison. Turkey is a NATO member and a candidate for membership in the European Union. Its support for Hamas is perhaps the only point of clear overlap with the Islamic Republic.
However, it is also true that no two adversaries look the same. It’s precisely Turkey’s foot in the West that makes Turkey its own potent variety of adversary.
No other NATO ally simultaneously demands Western defense integration while enabling adversaries of that same alliance. Turkey’s purchase of the Russian-made S-400 missile defense system encapsulates this perspective perfectly.
By insisting on purchasing the Russian system, Turkey came close to endangering the stealth capabilities of the US F-35 joint strike fighter, which Ankara was set to acquire. The reason Turkey’s possession of both the S-400 and the F-35 would have been dangerous is that the two systems, operated in regular proximity to each other or networked together, would enable Moscow to gain valuable intelligence – obtained from Erdogan or from Russians inside Turkey – helpful for shooting down F-35s flown by Americans or US allies.
Action to remove Turkey from the F-35 program and the imposition of US sanctions prevented such scenarios from coming to life.
However, Erdogan did not backtrack after this debacle. He actively delayed NATO’s expansion, holding up Finland’s and Sweden’s accession by nearly 18 months to extort F-16 fighter jets out of Washington.
Throughout Russia’s war on Ukraine, Turkey did sell Ukraine combat drones, but only while also turning a blind eye to the sale of dual-use goods that benefit Russia’s defense industrial base. Ankara also provided a permissive environment for illicit Russian financial flows and, to date, has refused to participate in implementing international sanctions against Moscow.
Such actions are not benign efforts by a state attempting to avoid the ire of Russia, but of one that is actively undermining NATO’s collective defense while profiting from dealings with its Russian adversary at the same time.
Rhetoric labeling Turkey as the new Iran should not be interpreted as a one-to-one comparison of what Turkey represents. It is an expression intended to convey Ankara’s emergence as an adversarial hegemon to succeed Iran.
To be sure, identifying a new regional hegemon may have electoral benefits, particularly for Israeli leaders. Politicians often thrive when there’s an enemy to rally around. However, politicians can just as readily cement their legacies by leveraging positive opportunities. For example, the Abraham Accords will go down as one of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s – and President Donald Trump’s – defining achievements.
The Accords were not driven by fear of a regional bogeyman, but by economic opportunity and a genuine desire for the Middle East to prosper.
Trade and investment between Israel and its Gulf partners grew significantly after the Accords were signed.
The careers of Israeli leaders, in other words, do not hinge on the ascent of a new Iran. There are other trends to capitalize on, which means that warnings about Turkey should be taken as more than mere bluster.
Moreover, while analysts correctly identify Turkey’s ideological intent as dissimilar to Iran’s, they ignore the logical outcomes of Turkey’s behavior.
Turkey lacks a Quds force and a nuclear program, but it maintains a growing military and presence in the Horn of Africa, Syria, and Qatar.
Ankara is seeking to expand its influence and potentially enforce new sovereign maritime borders in the eastern Mediterranean, challenging the established borders of Cyprus and Greece. Comparing Iran and Turkey should not be theological – it should be strategic. And strategically, Turkey is increasingly revisionist.
The greater danger is not mislabeling Turkey as Iran. It is continuing to treat Turkey as a normal ally when it no longer behaves like one. Turkey is not the “new Iran” in a literal sense – but it is no longer a reliable NATO ally. The danger lies not in exaggerating Ankara’s ambitions, but in continuing to excuse them while they erode the very alliance structures that have long sustained Western security.
Sinan Ciddi is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, where Natalie Ecanow is a senior research analyst.