We cannot miss this opportunity to open Hormuz permanently - opinion

The proposed 60-day ceasefire extension with Iran, structured as a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), appears to remain the administration’s preferred vehicle for achieving immediate relief in global energy markets. Lower oil prices would ultimately translate into lower gasoline prices in the United States, helping ease inflationary pressures that continue to burden American families as the midterm elections approach.

Trump’s strongest source of leverage in negotiations with Iran may be Lebanon. The more Israel degrades Hezbollah’s military capabilities, the greater the pressure on Tehran. Yet during the latest round of brinkmanship, Iran reportedly threatened to abandon negotiations, further restrict traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, and expand the conflict as far as the Bab al-Mandab Strait, unless Washington restrained Israeli operations in Lebanon.

This raises a critical question: Did Trump effectively concede to Iranian pressure by halting Israeli strikes on Beirut, or was this part of a coordinated strategy with Israel, avoiding escalation in Beirut while maintaining military pressure on Hezbollah in southern Lebanon?

Regardless of the answer, one fact should not be overlooked: Before February 28, the Strait of Hormuz was already open. Reopening Hormuz was never the central justification for America’s confrontation with Iran, a conflict that has now endured for 47 years.

At best, this 60-day pause in fighting may produce a gradual increase in commercial shipping and limited mine-clearing operations. What it does not address is the fundamental objective that brought the United States to this point: dismantling Iran’s nuclear weapons capability, removing its stockpile of enriched uranium, and permanently ending its ability to enrich uranium.

The belief that removing pressure will somehow make the Iranian regime more accommodating reflects political expediency rather than strategic realism. Decades of negotiations with Tehran have demonstrated that concessions are rarely reciprocated. Our adversaries do not lower their demands simply because we soften ours.

By now, it should be abundantly clear what a meaningful agreement must include: a complete end not only to uranium enrichment but also to plutonium pathways, ballistic missile development, and intercontinental ballistic missile programs capable of targeting the United States. To believe another 60 days will soften Iran’s position is a fool’s errand.

What is urgently needed, and what was reinforced during my meetings in Congress, is for the president to make a direct and passionate case to the American people, explaining exactly what is at stake if we fail to permanently secure and monitor the Strait of Hormuz.

The American public is deeply confused. Hyper-partisan rhetoric, combined with a president who often departs from prepared remarks and exaggerates, has obscured what are otherwise very reasonable American concerns regarding Iran’s nuclear program, ballistic missile development, and support for proxy organizations.

Time is on Iran’s side, and Tehran understands this well. Even if negotiations make marginal progress, the most likely outcome is yet another ceasefire extension or another MOU, pushing the issue closer to the midterm elections. Eventually, even an unconventional president may find it politically easier to kick the proverbial can down the road.

Some believe that after the midterms, the president, entering the final two years of his term, would have greater freedom to re-engage militarily if necessary. Among those who have consistently and forcefully warned about the dangers Iran poses to American national security is Mark Dubowitz of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, who believes this is a realistic possibility. Yet I remain skeptical that the president would ultimately choose that path.

Where does this leave us?

The following steps are necessary, although I fear the horse may already be out of the barn.

The president must clearly explain why Iran represents a direct national security threat to the United States, how success will be measured, and why failure is not an option.

America should not end its economic blockade prematurely. If anything, pressure should intensify.

Sanctions relief should come only after Iran verifiably accepts stringent conditions: the permanent dismantlement of its nuclear weapons infrastructure, intrusive inspections that include American participation, and strict limitations on ballistic missile production.

Only then should any broader reopening or normalization occur.

The United States can reopen and secure the Strait of Hormuz, particularly with allied support.

Europe will also have little choice but to participate because of its overwhelming dependence on stable global energy flows. However, the president must stop publicly disparaging European allies, even when some criticism may be justified.

The Iranian regime must fear something greater than American or Israeli missile strikes.

The United States should unapologetically declare its support for the Iranian people and begin building a long-term strategy to assist them through communications support, logistical coordination, cyber capabilities, and assistance to opposition networks. It is believed there is already a foundation in place for many of these actions, but they require an executive decision.

This must be a holistic effort that empowers the majority of Persians who seek freedom while also coordinating with minority communities that have long resisted regime oppression.

Iran will continue threatening the Strait of Hormuz for as long as the current regime remains in power, unless there is a permanent and credible international military presence in the region.

Ignoring this reality is not merely diplomatic negligence; it is national security negligence. We must deal with the Iranian regime as it is, not as we wish it to be.

Absent regime change, Tehran will remain patient, rebuild its capabilities, and eventually threaten Hormuz again, perhaps not immediately, but later, when a future American president, Republican or Democrat, may be less willing to act decisively.

The choice is ours, now.

This is a moment that demands strong leadership. The president deserves significant credit for creating the opportunity for meaningful change with Iran. We need to stop acting as though we are desperate for a deal when, in reality, Iran is weaker today than at any point since the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s.

We cannot mistake a weakened adversary’s desperate attacks on shipping lanes and Gulf allies for genuine strength.

The only question now is whether the president’s rhetoric on Iran will finally translate into sustained and tangible action. We will know in 60 days if the MOU is signed.