Axios claims that “one reason for the renewed fighting seems to be different interpretations of the memorandum of understanding (MoU).”
The New York Times Iran correspondent Yeganeh Torbati wrote that “the ambiguities in the language that US negotiators agreed to with Iran appear to be coming back to haunt them.”
These explanations are naive. They assume the Islamic Republic will negotiate as a Western government would, despite 47 years of religiously sanctioned dissimulation, deception, and manipulation.
When the MoU requires Iran to “make arrangements using its best efforts for the safe passage of commercial vessels,” leaving both “arrangements” and “best efforts” undefined, the responsibility for failure lies with American negotiators.
If Iran refused to accept clear, binary language, the United States should have walked away.
Instead, Iran succeeded in reframing the strategic narrative by persuading US negotiators to accept vague language throughout the agreement.
Rather than requiring Tehran to guarantee or ensure freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, the memorandum merely commits Iran to use its “best efforts,” effectively granting Tehran equal standing in a dispute over an international waterway.
Ambiguous language appears throughout the agreement, almost always to Iran’s advantage, postponing rather than resolving disputes over nuclear activities, ballistic missiles, proxy forces, enforcement mechanisms, and human rights.
For example, Iran agrees to maintain the “status quo” on nuclear issues without defining what that status quo actually is. Phrases such as “mutually agreed mechanism” are equally meaningless, while American obligations are explicit.
The Treasury Department is required to issue immediate waivers covering oil exports, banking, insurance, shipping, and petroleum transactions while making frozen Iranian assets fully usable.
In return, Iran is not required to dismantle a single centrifuge, limit centrifuge production, or halt nuclear research with clear weapons applications.
The confusion is further highlighted by the stark differences between the MoU negotiated by Vice President JD Vance, US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff, and Jared Kushner, and the separate understandings reached by Secretary of State Marco Rubio with Gulf Cooperation Council nations in Manama.
The Vance-led agreement reportedly omitted Iran’s ballistic missile and drone programs, support for terrorist proxies, and Hezbollah’s disarmament.
By contrast, Rubio’s statement included all of these issues and specifically called for the “free, unconditional, and unrestricted navigation” of the Strait of Hormuz, language notably absent from the memorandum.
A strategic failure of deterrence
Rubio possesses significant Middle East experience and should play the leading role in shaping America’s Iran strategy. Successful diplomacy requires not only negotiating skill but also a realistic understanding of the Islamic Republic’s ideological and strategic worldview.
The administration’s reliance on Qatar, Turkey, and Pakistan as intermediaries also raises serious questions. Neither Doha, Ankara, nor Islamabad can reasonably be considered an impartial broker.
They maintain close relationships with Tehran while supporting or aligning with Muslim Brotherhood ideology. Their strategic interests do not consistently align with those of the United States.
If Iran threatens commercial shipping in the strait, the appropriate response is not prolonged negotiations over whether an international waterway should remain open.
The response should be restoring freedom of navigation, by force if necessary. Allowing Tehran to negotiate over access to a global maritime chokepoint establishes a dangerous precedent.
That precendent extends well beyond the Middle East. China could conclude that coercive pressure around Taiwan may eventually produce negotiations on Beijing’s terms.
Other hostile states or Islamist non-state actors could attempt to close strategic waterways, from the Bab al-Mandab Strait to the Strait of Malacca, calculating that the West will respond with diplomacy rather than decisive action.
By shifting the conversation from deterrence to negotiation, Iran may conclude that Washington is unlikely to respond to future provocations with overwhelming force.
Instead, Tehran can reasonably expect calibrated, proportional, tit-for-tat responses designed primarily to preserve the diplomatic process.
That perception is itself an Iranian strategic victory.
Vance’s repeated emphasis on diplomacy reinforces the impression that maintaining negotiations has become a higher priority than restoring deterrence.
If Tehran believes the United States will avoid decisive military action for fear of disrupting talks, it has every incentive to continue testing American resolve through incremental violations.
That is why the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is willing to continue inciting America and has stated that US retaliation to Iranian provocations “will result in the complete halt of all diplomatic processes,” believing that the US will return to negotiations after “proportionate” American responses.
As the Bahraini foreign affairs minister said about the strikes against the Gulf states – they are a “systemic pattern of repeated aggression.”
Effective deterrence requires overwhelming consequences for attacks on commercial shipping. A ceasefire sustained only by Washington’s reluctance to enforce its red lines ultimately advances Tehran’s long-term strategy.
By offering sanctions relief in exchange for largely unenforceable promises on Iran’s nuclear program, ballistic missiles, proxy networks, and human rights, the administration risks turning tactical military success into a strategic diplomatic concession.
Some defenders of the administration argue that, once domestic political pressures ease, particularly after the midterm elections, Washington will adopt a tougher approach if Iran violates its commitments.
A more likely outcome is the repeated extension of the ceasefire despite continuing Iranian provocations, gradually normalizing behavior that would once have been considered unacceptable.
The longer negotiations continue without meaningful Iranian concessions, the greater the risk that diplomacy becomes the objective rather than the means.
Iranian negotiators, heirs to one of the world’s oldest diplomatic traditions, have consistently demonstrated patience and tactical sophistication.
American negotiators should enter such talks with humility, deep regional expertise, and a clear understanding that preserving negotiations cannot become an end in itself.
The stakes extend far beyond the Persian Gulf. America’s response will be closely watched in Beijing, Moscow, and other capitals.
If Washington appears unwilling to enforce freedom of navigation against a regional power, larger revisionist states may draw conclusions that increase the likelihood of broader conflict.
What happens in the Middle East rarely stays in the Middle East.
The one caveat is that, with an unconventional US president, he may at any time determine that enough is enough. Let’s hope so.
The writer is the director of MEPIN, the Middle East Political Information Network; the senior security editor of The Jerusalem Report; and regularly briefs foreign policy advisors and members of Congress and the State Department.