Will Egypt cross the rubicon in Libya?

Libya for Egypt has been, from time immemorial, a vital interest.

A member of Libya's internationally recognised government forces carries a weapon in Ain Zara, Tripoli, Libya October 14, 2019. Picture taken October 14, 2019.  (photo credit: ISMAIL ZITOUNY/ REUTERS)
A member of Libya's internationally recognised government forces carries a weapon in Ain Zara, Tripoli, Libya October 14, 2019. Picture taken October 14, 2019.
(photo credit: ISMAIL ZITOUNY/ REUTERS)
The specter of a military confrontation between Egypt and Turkey on Libyan soil is tangible. The personal animosity of the leaders in both countries could play a role in triggering such conflagration. Egyptian President Abdel el-Sisi vehemently opposes any influence of Turkish President Recep Erdogan in the Middle East.
The close relations of Turkey with Egypt’s protagonist Hamas; the Turkish objective to bring an end to Bashar Assad’s Syrian regime; and the recent Turkish involvement in Libya all played a role in concretizing Sisi’s fear of a de facto Erdogan predominance in the region.
Libya for Egypt has been, from time immemorial, a vital interest. The agreement signed last November with Fayez Mustafa al-Sarraj, head of the Government of National Union (GNU) – which permits Turkey to expand its maritime border at the detriment of Greece, Cyprus and Egypt – is interpreted in Cairo as crossing a red line.
To protect it’s interests in Libya, Egypt supported Field Marshall Khalifa Haftar, who is fighting to capture the capital Tripoli and to reunite Libya. Russia sent thousands of mercenaries to help Haftar, and some Gulf states are supporting him financially.
Erdogan’s direct help to Sarraj, with weapons and with anti-Assad fighters, tilted the balance in favor of the GNU. The GNU forces reached the outskirts of the cities of Syrtre and Jufra, which demarcate the line separating the belligerents. Egypt is alarmed by this success and is seriously considering a military intervention.
If this occurs, it will be a direct confrontation with Turkey on Libyan soil. This would be a radical change in Egyptian strategy in the region. Although the Egyptian Army is classified as the seventh strongest army in the world, it has not engaged in any large traditional military operations since the Yom Kippur War in 1973.
Sisi is confronting serious challenges and doesn’t need an additional one in Libya. He is confronting Ethiopia, which is building the Renaissance Dam that will affect the flow of water to the Nile River. He is unable to eliminate Islamic terrorism in the Sinai. Relations with Sudan are tense. Hamas is a constant headache, and the economy and the coronavirus are not easing the situation for him.
It is therefore unlikely that the Egyptian president will initiate a military adventure in Libya, knowing the political and economic price he would have to pay. Even the smallest military defeat by Turkey would be traumatic to the Egyptian Army.
Both Egypt and Turkey are close allies of the United States. US President Donald Trump is not interested in a crisis on the eve of the presidential elections, and has asked both leaders to calm down, meaning Erdogan won this round.
Two elements might change Sisi’s position: one, a direct attack on Syrte and Jufra, which would compel him to intervene in order to save face; and two, a substantial strengthening of the Islamic radicalism in eastern Libya near the Egyptian border. If either one of these scenarios plays out, we will be in a new ball game.
The writer is a former Israeli ambassador to Egypt.