The launch of direct Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations earlier this month after 15 months of relentless
groundwork marks the third attempt in a decade to resolve the outstanding core
issues pertaining to a two-state solution.
Many on both sides question
whether Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and President Mahmoud Abbas have
sufficient will or ability to make the necessary sacrifices – the main factor in
determining whether this round of peacemaking will fare better than its
predecessors at Camp David and Annapolis.
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importance of the moment in its domestic, bilateral, and wider regional
contexts, as well as the consequences of failure.
Yet they have entered
negotiations amid an atmosphere of mistrust and facing significant
challenges.
Although both are currently stable at the helm, they will
have to overcome strong ideological inhibitions and political opposition from
within their own constituencies – not to mention resistance from extremists –
before they can bridge substantial bilateral gaps on sensitive core
issues.
Completing a full year of negotiations – the ambitious target for
reaching a framework agreement – and achieving a breakthrough will
require
navigating major obstacles.
On the ground, optimism regarding the West
Bank’s relative stability, economic growth, and unprecedented security
coordination is overshadowed by Abbas’s inability to deliver
Hamas-controlled
Gaza into a practical peace agreement.
Moreover, spoilers are anxious to
derail the process, as shown when Hamas killed four Israelis and wounded
two
others in a pair of West Bank terrorist attacks just as the talks were
being
launched.
Settlement construction moratorium Israel’s 10-month moratorium
on West Bank housing construction expires in two weeks.
Netanyahu has
already announced that he will not extend it – he is concerned about
being
trapped in a measure that has engendered strong opposition in his own
government
and party, and that could break him politically if sustained over
time.
Abbas, facing his own domestic pressures and feeling insecure
without assurances regarding settlement activity and the territorial
endgame,
countered diplomatically – in a letter to Quartet leaders – and
publicly, by
threatening to withdraw from negotiations if Israel resumes
construction.
Consequently, talks could break down one month after launching, which
would make
their near-term resurrection extremely difficult, if not impossible.
The
moratorium froze the issuing of new housing permits in the West Bank and
barred
the implementation of old permits for projects that had not yet broken
ground.
New permits are subject to approval by the defense minister and are more
easily
controlled, but building under old permits would not require further
government
approval if the current moratorium expires, unless a new restrictive
order is
enacted.
Over time, thousands of old permits have accumulated, and there
is no telling how many would be implemented when the moratorium expires.
Traditionally, such projects are subject to financial considerations.
Yet
given the settlement movement’s announced intention of speedily renewing
construction, one can expect a considerable number of housing starts at
month's
end if the government stands pat – enough to spark a crisis in the peace
process.
Some Israeli officials have suggested approving a limited number
of permits in the major settlement blocs that all parties assume will
remain
under Israeli control in any future peace agreement, but this is
unlikely to
satisfy Abbas.
In any case, the government will probably postpone its
decision until the last moment.
Accordingly, finding an acceptable
solution to the moratorium quandary, one that properly balances both
parties’
constraints, will require an assertive and creative American role. In
establishing ground rules for the talks, Washington should set a high
threshold
that makes it difficult for the parties to leave the table.
Terms of
reference and agenda When inviting the parties to direct negotiations,
Washington abstained from issuing terms of reference. The Palestinian
Authority
demanded that the baseline for talks be the 1967 lines with agreed
swaps, which
Israel rejected as an unwarranted precondition that would establish a
single-issue endgame (i.e., on territory) before negotiations even
began.
Washington sidestepped this demand, referring to the PA’s
preferred baseline as “the Palestinian goal.”
Consequently, the
Palestinians embraced Quartet statements closer to their position as
terms of
reference, while Israel related only to Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton’s
invitation to resume direct talks without preconditions.
This seemingly
technical issue is likely to become a substantive one. The PA has
prioritized
the territorial endgame as a prerequisite for compromise on other core
issues.
But security is the first priority for the Israeli government, which
will not
yield major territorial concessions until it is sure that the resultant
Palestinian state would be effectively demilitarized and
nonthreatening.
Comprehensive vs rolling agreement To bypass such an
impasse, past negotiations were based on the principle that “nothing is
agreed
until everything is agreed.”
This allowed the parties to sequence their
negotiations (e.g., the “radioactive” issue of Jerusalem was delayed in
the
Annapolis process) and expose some flexibilities. Yet it also proved to
be an
obstacle when the parties failed to bridge gaps on all core issues: “all
or
nothing” resulted in nothing and prevented incremental steps forward.
It
is time to adopt a less rigid formula that allows for progress even if
the
parties cannot reach a comprehensive agreement.
Such an approach is
preferable, at least as a fallback, to the despair of gridlock and the
chaos of
failure. This approach could also help compensate for Hamas-ruled Gaza’s
absence
from the process.
For this to work, the United States would have to play
a leading role, reassuring the Palestinians about the continuity of the
process,
the aims of the talks, and settlement construction, while providing
Israel with
a safety net regarding its vital security interests.
The regional aspect
Although the moderate Arab states encouraged Abbas to enter direct
talks, it is
not clear to what extent they are willing to contribute to the
process.
Active Arab support is important.
Absent a comprehensive
regional peace architecture involving Syria and Lebanon, Arab
governments should
buttress Israeli-Palestinian talks by providing cover for painful
Palestinian
compromises and incentives for Israeli ones, demonstrating to Israelis
the
regional benefits of peacemaking.
Egypt and Jordan could also help
establish security arrangements, while the Gulf states could provide
economic
backing. It is also time to revisit a Madrid-like multilateral
cooperation
framework.
The US role All previous negotiations were conducted
bilaterally – despite varying degrees of US involvement at certain
stages,
American negotiators were present in the negotiating room, with rare
exceptions,
only during summit gatherings.
This time, however, Palestinians are
pushing for a more active American role in the negotiations, with the
hope that
the Obama administration, committed as it to Palestinian statehood, will
ultimately deliver – or, in case of failure, not blame the PA. This is
why the
Palestinians preferred proximity talks to direct ones.
For its part,
Washington seems poised to have US officials in the room, even though
much of
the negotiating is supposed to be conducted directly by Abbas and
Netanyahu. The
parties will have to find the right balance between relying on the
United States
and maintaining true bilateral negotiations as would-be partners for
peace.
And regardless of actual US participation in the negotiating room,
they should keep Washington informed so that it can help minimize and
bridge
gaps as needed.
Thinking about success and failure The stakes are high,
and a third failure within a decade would be a catastrophe for all
involved. It
would deal a devastating blow to the twostate concept and energize
radicals
throughout the region – particularly Iran and its affiliates who reject
peace
and espouse jihadism.
Unfortunately, most of the past 15 months were
spent simply getting to the table.
Now is the time to focus on what will
be required to succeed.
In light of this, the parties should approach
this round of peacemaking carefully.
Before addressing the core issues,
they should thoroughly discuss a number of other items: the nature of
the
top-down process; its guiding principles; how it converges with the
bottom-up
process of state-building led by PA Prime Minister Salam Fayyad; proper
sequencing of issues; confidence-building measures; alternatives to
deadlock;
creating a public atmosphere conducive to peace; and the regional Arab
role.
In statesmanship it is always advisable to contemplate a Plan B in
case Plan A is derailed. Currently, only the PA seems to be doing so via
its
West Bank state-building process, coupled with fostering the idea of
seeking UN
recognition of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 lines. The one-year
target
for the peace talks coincides with Fayyad’s timeframe for completing the
essential phase of the state-building process.
While the state-building
process should be encouraged by all, the United States would do well, at
this
stage, to dispel Palestinian hopes of adding a unilateral diplomatic
layer to
the negotiations; falling in love with Plan B might minimize the chances
of
success for Plan A.
The writer, a retired brigadiergeneral, is The
Washington Institute's Milton Fine International Fellow, based in
Israel.
He participated in all Israeli- Palestinian peace talks since
1993. From May 2009 until March 2010, he served as special emissary for
the
Israeli prime minister and defense minister in efforts to relaunch the
peace
process.