The time and circumstances have presented Syrian President Bashar Assad with a
clear choice: Continue to convey an image of an impotent dictator sounding
eerily similar to the embattled, aging and ousted despots who have failed to
meet their people’s needs, blaming foreign conspiracies for their shortcomings,
or display bold leadership and use the opportunity to institute basic reforms
and turn toward the West. The notion that Assad would do the latter is perhaps
far-fetched, but the benefits Syria would reap and the effect on other countries
involved as a result would be of a magnitude that could change the geopolitical
landscape of the Middle East in an unprecedented way.
Assad’s March 30
address to his nation was disappointing. Prior to the speech, there had been
great anticipation that he would cancel the emergency law that has been in place
since 1963, as well as institute other reforms to gradually open Syrian society
in ways that would strengthen the country’s domestic and foreign
policies.
Instead, Assad accused the proverbial scapegoat for Syria’s
problems: a conspiracy led chiefly by Israel and the US to undermine Syrian
“stability.” Of course, there is no foreign conspiracy, and Assad knows it, and
if he continues to ignore the wave of protests that have arrived at his
doorstep, he will do so at his own peril. Certainly Syria’s people do not buy
Assad’s tall tale. Syria is known among the Arab states for the quality – and
quantity – of its intellectuals and academics. Syria’s youth are increasingly
demanding greater freedoms and access to the world. For these intellectuals and
young men and women, Assad’s j’accuse speech must have rightfully appeared as
outdated and hackneyed rhetoric. The Syrian people also know that, in the
current context, Assad’s ability to employ ruthlessness to maintain his regime
is limited.
The days of Hama, when Hafez Assad killed thousands in
leveling part of the city to clamp down on the Muslim Brotherhood in 1982, are
over.
The choice for Assad, however, is not between continuing his
iron-fist reign and undertaking political reforms.
Some argue that
lifting the emergency law and other reforms will undermine the regime. I don’t
buy it. There are plenty of steps Assad can take to promote the kind of gradual
reform that would address the basic demands of his people while maintaining the
stability and fabric of his regime. However, to do so successfully, he must
begin to reassess his relations with Iran, and its surrogates Hamas and
Hezbollah.
Assad’s alliance with these entities has proved successful in
recent years. He has captured the attention of the region – and the US – while
overcoming the suspicion and scrutiny of the investigation into the
assassination of former Lebanese prime minister Rafik Hariri, and has used
Syria’s ties with Iran and extremist groups to gain leverage over potential
future talks with the US and Israel.
But now the tide has turned in the
region, and to rely on this alliance would be to bet on the wrong
horse.
Iran is embattled with its own domestic unrest, and when push
comes to shove, neither Israel nor the US will allow Iran to become a regional
hegemon equipped with a nuclear weapon.
Meanwhile, Hezbollah’s allegiance
to Iran and increasing influence in Lebanon will soon grow beyond Syria’s
control. Even Hamas seeks a prolonged cease-fire with Israel and is in unity
talks with Fatah as the Palestinians look to the United Nations General Assembly
for recognition of their own state come September.
ASSAD SHOULD take heed
of the events in Tunisia and Egypt and the uprising that is sweeping the entire
Arab world.
Perhaps more than any other Arab leader, he might be able to
weather the storm of discontent, provided he resolves to adopt a strikingly new
strategy.
Why can he survive where others could not? He is young,
Western-oriented and educated, has access to vast intellectual resources in his
country, and – most importantly – he is in a pivotal position in the Middle
East. This last point is particularly compelling for the US. Rather than fight
against the wind of revolutionary change, Assad should go with it. In doing so,
he should follow the footsteps of Egyptian president Anwar Sadat. Sadat’s
abandonment of the Soviet Union in favor of the US was a bold and far-sighted
move. If Assad were to take a similar step, he could reap the benefits of the
return of the Golan Heights from Israel, a strengthened economy, and a more
influential position of stability and leadership at the nexus of the Arab world.
He doesn’t have to completely sever ties with Iran and unsavory extremist groups
in a flash. The moment Assad turns to the US, the USSyria relationship will
translate to diminishing ties with Iran as well as logistical and financial
support for Hamas and Hezbollah. Furthermore, he does not need to forsake Hamas
and Hezbollah. Syria’s continued relationship with them could place it in an
even more significant role with which to influence these groups.
DESPITE
THE Syrian crackdown, the US hasn’t even recalled its newly installed ambassador
for consultation. While the White House is still trying to undermine Iranian
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, it recognizes the potential Assad has to
fundamentally change the geopolitical dynamic, if he makes the right moves. The
US should now begin to tacitly convey that he should make the gradual reforms
needed.
In addition, if Assad begins to look West, the US must have the
will, and program in place, to support him. Throughout the region, the US has
shown that if its national security interests and the interests of its allies
(Bahrain and Saudi Arabia as a case in point) demand that a leader play a
critical role – like Syria could – in promoting those interests, it will work
with him – a byproduct of which would be to bolster the stability and position
of Syria in the region. America’s goals in its engagement with Syria are
well-known: to weaken Iran and its proxies Hamas and Hezbollah. For Assad to
advance these goals, he will need something substantial in return. Contrary to
the beliefs of many, the US has a great deal to offer: a new economic
relationship and US aid (along the lines of that provided Cairo following the
Egypt-Israel peace treaty), as well as a return of the Golan Heights upon
successful, US-facilitated and incentivized negotiations between Syria and
Israel.
What kind of legacy does Assad want to leave behind? The
45-year-old Syrian leader has a historic opportunity to oversee, and even lead,
the Arab world through a period of transformation.
However, to do so he
must stop acting like the old dictators in the region, and act more like the
kind of strong, forward- looking leader the protesters on the streets are
calling for. Furthermore, he must stop the violent confrontations on the
streets, which will greatly advance the prospect of his ouster and the
subsequent uncertainty that would replace him. Assad may be able to create a
model of change without relinquishing power as long as he does it sooner rather
than later. Otherwise, he will increasingly be on the defensive and lose
tremendous ground as time goes by.
Assad already knows what cards the US
is willing to play. The question now is: Can Assad rise to the occasion? Either
way, he must decide quickly, or he may soon find that he has no cards left at
all.
The writer is professor of international relations at the Center for
Global Affairs at NYU. He teaches international negotiation and Middle Eastern
studies.
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