In the eyes of Sunni Arabs, the opinion of Russia has greatly dropped as a
result of its support for Syrian President Bashar Assad, though it still hopes
to play the role of a superpower in the region.
Over the past couple of
years, the Arab media has been brutally criticizing Russia for supporting Assad
as he kills thousands of his citizens, most of whom are Sunni.
Moscow has
sought to balance its position by demonstrating continued support for the
Palestinians and other Arab interests, seeking to outbid US support.
The
latest example from the Sunni Arab world came Monday in the Saudi-owned Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, in an article by Dr. Hamad al-Majid titled “Bashar addresses his
international gang,” which criticizes Assad and his international
supporters.
“Thus, in al-Assad’s latest speech he did not provide
anything new; his sole purpose was to reassure the rest of the gang in Tehran,
Moscow, Beijing, Baghdad and southern Lebanon that the ‘code of honor’ will be
observed until the end,” Majid wrote.
Notice that no Sunni powers are
listed as part of the gang, but regional members of the Shi’ite-dominated
powers.
Hence, Russia has gambled on Assad’s survival and its historic
ties with Syria over other countervailing interests.
Prof. Anna Geifman,
who teaches political science at Bar-Ilan University, and doctoral candidate
Yuri Teper, who is an expert on nationalism and politics in modern Russia, wrote
a recent thought-provoking study titled, “Russia’s Declining Influence in the
Middle East,” published by the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies. In it,
they argue that “Russian involvement in the Middle East is presently nothing
more than an attempt by Moscow to hold on to its deteriorating position on the
international stage.”
They go on to state that “Russia may try to fill a
vacuum should the US scale back its ties to the new Islamist governments in the
region.”
Moreover, despite the powerful rhetoric, Russia is concealing
“impotence and frustration, results of its de facto inability to affect regional
politics.”
The study states that Damascus has been its only real ally in
the region, maintaining “a close, though largely one-sided, relationship with
Syria, based primarily on supplying Damascus with weapons. Syria paid back with
promises of future economic preferences and provided the Russian navy with a
maritime supplies base in Artus, on the Mediterranean coast. It also fed Russian
hunger for a great-power status, contributing to the illusion of Moscow’s
regional influence.”
Russia has been playing both sides of the fence,
however, having closed a pipeline deal with Turkey, which “is the second-largest
consumer of Russian gas, after Germany.”
I asked Geifman and Teper about
their take on recent events in Syria and the Middle East in recent days and how
their theory of Russian foreign policy applies to what is going
on.
Regarding the recent reports of Russian ships in the eastern
Mediterranean, Yuri thinks that in reality Russia is simply making moves for
show.
Teper states: “The ships’ incursion has been planned in advance and
announced back in the summer of 2012. In my opinion, it is a big fuss over
nothing. It is based on an anachronistic view, with people still thinking of our
region in terms of balance of power during the Cold War. The Russian-Western
quarrel over Syria and the naval maneuvers do seem to fit the old pattern, but
it is only a superficial view.”
Geifman adds that many are buying into
the naval “incursion hysteria,” particularly the media, though the “real players
in the region – the Arabs, the Turks and the Iranians – are not so easily
convinced.”
Russia is still hanging on to its old super-power status in
the region, but “the old Middle East” is “gone,” Geifman continues. “We are
witnessing a brand-new game with new rules, where nothing is yet
certain. Importantly, the main players are no longer that big. Nor
do they quite know how to play the new game.”
“Russia’s regional
influence is no more than an illusion, and that of the US is significantly
weakened by the Arab Spring. Neither power can do much in the new Middle East;
neither can hope to gain a great deal at the present moment. Despite the
difference in rhetoric, both now wait to see what will happen in Syria,” she
says.
Russian pride thus seems to be the underlying motive at play since
it is unlikely it can, or will, do anything to try to change facts on the ground
itself. Its most “potent weapon – international diplomatic status and a position
in the UN Security Council” are used without really making any real difference
on the ground.
Geifman says that Moscow has no interest in wasting scarce
resources on an “unstable region” with an “uncertain future,” with no
possibilities for any significant “political or economic payoff.” Tepper says
that the super-power play can be used for domestic audiences and Putin’s
“well-controlled mass media” continues to use nationalistic patriotism to boost
his popularity.
Teper says the bottom line is that “no one should expect
the Russians to intervene in the civil war in Syria,” and that at most they will
evacuate Russians or secure the naval base in Tartus. He notes that it makes no
sense for the Russians to get involved now, when Assad is struggling to
survive.
Teper concludes that the key point for Russian foreign policy,
which is critical to understand, is “their decision-making is a notion of
national greatness – real or imaginary – which is a decisive aspect of their
national mythology and identity.”
|