Among the Intelligence Directorate, Izz al-Din al-Haddad was defined as an extremely cautious person, bordering on paranoid. He was someone who did not sleep in the same place twice, who implemented decisions at the front lines of terrorist activity against Israel with obsessive attention to micro-tactics, and who survived for many years while in the crosshairs of the IDF and Shin Bet.
But last Friday, at 7:45 p.m., al-Haddad made the biggest and final mistake of his life.
He emerged above ground to an apartment in the heart of Gaza City to meet his family. He was certain the tentacles of Israeli intelligence would not reach him there. He was wrong.
Now, after the dramatic targeted killing of the man who had become the de facto commander of Hamas’s military wing and the organization’s leader in the Gaza Strip, Walla received an exclusive look into the military intelligence behind the operation.
A dramatic turning point came in the Gaza Strip even before the ceasefire agreement led by US President Donald Trump, reflected by a series of compromises to which Hamas’s leadership agreed.
The dramatic turning point in the Gaza Strip, as it was marked in the IDF Intelligence Directorate, was reflected in a series of compromises to which Hamas’s leadership agreed. This was even before the ceasefire agreement led by US President Donald Trump, and came as a direct result of the massive pressure the IDF exerted on the ground.
Massive military pressure exerted by the IDF on the ground matured into the return of all living hostages and hostage remains to Israel, alongside agreement on the principles of the American framework, which included the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip and the IDF’s withdrawal from deep inside Palestinian territory, subject to Hamas’s disarmament.
According to a Military Intelligence assessment, under the command of Maj. Gen. Shlomi Binder, Hamas was very weak at the time, with a shaky hold on Gaza. That is why it agreed to a shift that stood in complete contrast to the previous policy and plans of its senior leadership.
That is not the situation today. Hamas succeeded during the ceasefire period in expanding its base of support on the Palestinian street in Gaza, and has defined it as “stable.”
‘The Izz al-Din al-Haddad file’
At the same time, Military Intelligence emphasizes that the threat from the Gaza Strip has decreased dramatically, thanks to the IDF’s achievements and the insistence of Southern Command chief Maj. Gen. Yaniv Asor on maintaining those gains through targeted killings and proactive operations, with the assistance of Military Intelligence units and based on the deployment along the Yellow Line.
Therefore, when examining Hamas up until last Friday at 7:45 p.m., moments before the targeted killing, Military Intelligence saw al-Haddad as Hamas’s most important and central figure in terms of leadership, military affairs, diplomacy, governance, and familiarity with Israel.
To look inside al-Haddad’s file in Military Intelligence, Walla spoke this week with a 35-year-old officer holding a sensitive position in the Intelligence Directorate.
He began his IDF service as a combat soldier, advanced through the ranks, was discharged, and later returned to service because that was what felt “most meaningful, and what interested” him.
Along the way, he held positions in the Planning Directorate before moving to the Intelligence Directorate. In the past, he dealt with the northern arena. Over the past two years, among other things, he has researched and examined Hamas’s activity in depth across all arenas, not only in the Gaza Strip, but also in Judea and Samaria, Lebanon, Turkey, and elsewhere.
“Izz al-Din al-Haddad is from the generation of commanders who carried out the October 7 massacre. He filled all the most important roles that could be filled along his path, but certainly and certainly throughout the war. In the end, he was the Gaza brigade commander, which is the largest and most significant brigade in Hamas,” said the officer holding the sensitive position in Military Intelligence.
Referring to the narrative that formed around the arch-terrorist in Israeli public discourse, and to his attitude toward the hostages, the officer added, “in the end, it really came from a very, very utilitarian place. It must be understood that this was a very mission-oriented person, who took his role very seriously, and as someone who was truly entrusted to a large extent with this issue of the hostages. He saw them as a tool he needed to preserve for Hamas’s interests. Therefore, he also treated them accordingly, so that he could fulfill Hamas’s interests and excel in carrying out his role. He used them both to protect himself, and also to ensure that Hamas would get what it wanted.”
The manhunt for al-Haddad lasted many years. He was in the crosshairs of the IDF and Shin Bet many times, including since October 7. In Military Intelligence, this was defined as a “window for opportunities.”
Military Intelligence rejected the assessment that al-Haddad developed an illusion of immunity or felt too safe because of the ceasefire, and that complacency led to his “big mistake.”
The reality is more complex. The Intelligence Directorate clarified that other senior Hamas officials, who felt no sense of security and were extremely cautious, also ultimately made a critical mistake and were eliminated.
‘In the end, get to everyone’
Ultimately, what led to al-Haddad’s major mistake was his decision to meet his family in an above-ground apartment in the heart of Gaza City.
He believed it was secret and that the details would be kept far from the tentacles of Israeli intelligence. This was despite the fact that intelligence officials had defined him as “very cautious, bordering on paranoid.”
The officer holding the sensitive position added, “In the end, like, we get to everyone. It doesn’t matter how you turn it around.”
A profile that was placed on the desk of the head of Military Intelligence, Maj. Gen. Binder, defined al-Haddad as a high-level leader who was highly influential on several levels. He had a strong ability to divide his attention, was a micro-tactical manager “at the most extreme levels,” and, while doing so, also knew how to make people appreciate and respect him.
Military Intelligence further claimed that this was also how he saw himself: as a senior figure. He was always defined by Hamas’s senior leadership as highly dominant, and it was said that “it did not go to his head” at any stage.
His presence stood out even more in the training sessions that preceded October 7, when he went to oversee their progress together with Raad Saad, a senior figure in the military wing who was eliminated during the war, in what, in hindsight, turned out to be preparations for the massacre.
In addition, he was defined as deeply religious and deeply ideological, even compared with other figures in the organization.
He saw armed “resistance” as the central and only path against Israel. Even if he was prepared to make certain concessions, they were intended to preserve Hamas’s survival and ensure that it would continue to exist.
According to the officer holding the sensitive position, if al-Haddad could have, he would have carried out October 7 again with the same level of cruelty that he himself planned.
When al-Haddad took control of the military wing, he pushed with full force to advance clear processes throughout the Gaza Strip: rebuilding military and governing capabilities, preparing for an Israeli attack, and, as was his habit, drilling down to the smallest details.
He was dominant in his influence and did not for a moment abandon the connection between the political leadership, the broader policy and ideology, and the field.
His evil was reflected in his Military Intelligence file as a highly controlling figure, one who led and approved matters down to the smallest details, including massacres and violence against Palestinian merchants who did not comply with Hamas policy, shooting at clans in the Strip that challenged Hamas, executions in the streets in the name of deterrence, and the pursuit of figures suspected of collaborating.
For the security establishment, his targeted killing was not just another tactical operation, but a critical strategic move aimed at changing the balance of power in the Strip.
Military Intelligence’s updated assessments outline a deep leadership vacuum at the top of Hamas. As of now, there is no figure in the military wing who can enter the role smoothly. Even Mohammed Odeh, who was marked in Palestinian reports as a successor, would struggle to fill the vacuum.
Hamas predicted to continue challenging IDF in Gaza
At the same time, Military Intelligence assesses that Hamas will continue to challenge Israel in the Gaza Strip even after the targeted killing, and that the spirit of resistance will be preserved, even from within the tunnels, safe apartments, and under the heavy pressure exerted by the IDF.
“Hamas is an Islamic military resistance movement. It is deep in its DNA, and even if there is another commander who will be willing to take pragmatic considerations over a short period of time, and even if he is less dominant as a leader, in the end, the ideology is the same ideology,” said the officer holding the sensitive position in Military Intelligence.
The officer noted that within Hamas, there is a belief in the prophecy of Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, who was eliminated by the IDF, according to which the State of Israel will not exist in 2027.
According to Military Intelligence assessments, Hamas will make all kinds of changes and speak about justifications for the claim: why it did not happen in 2027, and will lead the public to 2028 or another year on the calendar.
But this was, and remains, a very deep belief that the Zionist entity and the “occupation,” as Hamas perceives it, “will disappear and be erased from the world.” This perception is reflected in Hamas’s charter, and its leaders say this from every possible platform even today.
Toward the end of the conversation, Walla asked the officer: If his friends outside military service asked him what the most significant impact of al-Haddad’s targeted killing was, what would he say in simple language?
This is what he answered: “Serious organizations need serious leadership, and I think that by getting rid of him, I think there are no other leaders of his stature at the top of Hamas today. I distill it to this, that I think there will be a challenge here in command of the military wing, and there may also be a delay in the processes it is trying to advance, and I think it is truly important that until Hamas disarms, in the end no one is immune, certainly not the commander of the military wing, and I think that has a lot of strategic value,” he clarified, and with that the officer ended the conversation.