Could Trump’s push for Abraham Accords undermine long-term peace? - analysis

The pressure to join the Abraham Accords is new messaging from Washington. The original accords in September 2020 were sealed in Washington and were a major achievement of the first Trump administration.

They came about after years of quiet and growing ties between Israel and the UAE and Bahrain. Saudi Arabia likely gave the green light. It was seen as a major test.

When the accords were signed, there was an outpouring of warmth. There was talk about how this was real peace between Israel and Arab states – not the cold peace between Israel and Egypt and Jordan.

The accords were supposed to pave the way to many new initiatives, including green technology, financial tech, and cooperation, as the UAE was expected to help “scale up” the “Start-Up Nation.”

People flocked to the Gulf from Israel. There was coexistence, and Jewish life was spotlighted. This sprint quickly petered out, however, and the Gulf states were war wary and wanted to move slower. They were also watching to see if Israel’s policies changed.

The Gulf doesn’t like pressure. Monarchies can take time, and they have the wealth, clout, and history to wait and see. For instance, the Abraham Accords partners pushed back in 2021 when they felt Jerusalem was trying to use them in Israeli electoral politics.

When Israel elected a more right-wing government in 2022, the Gulf states were concerned, and no new Abraham Accord partners emerged. Talk of normalization with Saudi Arabia was put on the back burner.

The Biden administration had not appeared eager to give the Trump administration credit for the accords. Initiatives such as the I2U2 concept of Israel, the UAE, US, and India appeared to fade in favor of IMEC, the India-Middle East Corridor. The Negev Forum faded from view, and an initiative called N7 emerged.

Talk of regional integration and stability was badly harmed by the October 7 massacre and the Israel-Hamas War.

Over the past year, countries such as Saudi Arabia have appeared even more critical of Israel. They don’t like the trajectory of aggression. For instance, Riyadh helped the new Syrian government develop its ties with Washington.

Israel began bombing the new Syrian government when it came into power. Jerusalem didn’t appear to have expectations for peaceful ties with Damascus. Instead, Israeli officials threatened Syria’s president.

This did not go over well in Riyadh. Saudi Arabia  and other states were patching things up with Ankara and Doha. The Qatar crisis of 2017 was long gone. Riyadh had even been working with China and Iran on better ties.

As such, pro-Israel commentators began to talk about how Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey now represented a “Sunni” threat. Articles appeared, suggesting that Turkey is the “new Iran.”

Riyadh could read Israeli media. This didn’t seem like the road to the Abraham Accords expansion that it had imagined in 2021-2022.

The Trump administration is now being more open in its pressure. It is also asking countries that already have peace with Israel to join the accords, including Egypt, Jordan, and Turkey.

“The Arab position on normalizing ties with Israel has long rested on the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative, introduced by the late King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia and adopted unanimously,” Amman-based journalist and political commentator Osama Al-Sharif wrote. “The Saudi position, in particular, has been clear and consistent for years: Normalization with Israel must be linked to a credible path to Palestinian statehood.”

“In November 2025, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman said Riyadh ‘wants to be part of the Abraham Accords,’ but only with a ‘clear path’ to a two-state solution,” he wrote. “Saudi officials have repeatedly tied any normalization to an independent Palestinian state with 1967 borders and East Jerusalem as its capital.”

Saudi Arabia is an important state and a leader in the Islamic world. It will want to get something in return for any progress toward the accords.

Pressure might backfire. There is already a lot of talk in the Gulf that expresses concerns about the Israel-US relationship and the US decision to join Israeli airstrikes against Iran.

The Gulf states feel they were pushed onto the front line of a war without being consulted. They might feel that as a result of that, they are now being pressured again into joining the Abraham Accords. They might think Israel is being rewarded by the US for pushing for war with Iran.

These countries don’t want to argue with the Trump administration, but they can read online the trajectory that emerged toward the push for them to join the accords.

Some US politicians have pushed for this. The Gulf states are wary of being dragged into domestic political fights. They have already seen the outcome of these fights, going back to the dispute over the Qatar crisis and the negative coverage that used to exist, targeting Saudi Arabia’s crown prince. They know how toxic domestic battles have become in the US.

Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Qatar, and Turkey expect that their close ties with the White House will remain removed from Israel issues. That means they believe that while ties between the US and Israel have grown to unprecedented levels in recent years in terms of the US-Israel alliance, they also expect that the US will listen to what other countries are saying.

The first Abraham Accords in 2020 came about because of quiet, emerging ties and trends and a real sense that the countries wanted to move forward. The Trump administration helped provide the support to get the deal over the finish line.

When the Trump administration has been effective in its doctrine, it is through this consensus and using American power to bring people together and move the ball forward.

This means that the administration is best at deal-making when everyone wins. It doesn’t usually get deals when sides feel pressure and threats and feel they are losing.

The ceasefire deal in Gaza, for instance, was accomplished by bringing together Qatar, Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and other countries. Threats or pressure did not secure the deal.

The model for the Abraham Accords should be positive to achieve results. Countries that feel they are forced to make a deal with Israel or end up with more conflict with Iran will feel between a rock and a hard place.

They may recalibrate their long-term policies, and even if the US gets something in the short term, the long term likely will not be positive.