In a way, the Gaza plan is proceeding as if it is real. In recent days, the US has announced nominations and appointments to a “Board of Peace” and a technocratic government, and uber-envoy Steve Witkoff has heralded the beginning of “Phase II” of the 20-point plan that ended the war. At the same time, there is widespread skepticism that Hamas will ever disarm, even though disarmament is the plan’s central condition. This cognitive dissonance leaves Hamas room to believe it can preserve power through ambiguity. That must end.
Hamas’s strategy is transparent. It hopes to replicate Hezbollah’s model in Lebanon: allowing a nominal civilian government to manage daily life while retaining real authority through weapons. This would freeze the Gaza process entirely: No serious reconstruction funding would flow, and Palestinians now trapped in ruined interior zones and tent cities would remain there indefinitely. Hamas may understand this and simply not care. Palestinians themselves must understand it – with laser focus.
Nothing prevents the international community from clarifying the choice immediately. Despite global anger over Israel’s conduct of the war, there is now rare agreement on one point: no serious government supports Hamas remaining armed in Gaza. There is consensus that weapons must be surrendered to a legitimate Palestinian authority, and that reconstruction cannot begin under a militia that will divert materials for tunnels, seize aid, and prepare the next war. Yet this consensus remains unhelpfully muted, particularly among Arab states.
The United States should organize a single, unmistakable global event. Not a technical conference, but a summit. The US president, the leadership of the European Union, the Arab League, and the Palestinian Authority should attend. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the UAE, Turkey, and Qatar must be represented at the highest level. The designated leadership of the technocratic Gaza administration must appear as well.
Israel, however, should not attend. This is not a negotiation with Israel but a public message to Hamas and to the Palestinian people: everything is ready for Gaza’s reconstruction. The administrative framework exists, the stabilization architecture is being prepared, and a vast treasure awaits. But nothing will move unless Hamas formally disarms and ends its existence as an armed militia in Gaza. Until then, only minimal humanitarian aid to prevent starvation and disease will be allowed.
Public ultimatums historically work
Public ultimatums are rare because they are risky. But when they work, they work precisely because they remove ambiguity and collapse space for maneuvering. History offers repeated examples.
- In 1962, US president John F. Kennedy went on television, announced a blockade of Cuba, and warned of escalation. The ultimatum worked because it was unmistakable.
- In 1991, Saddam Hussein was given a public deadline to leave Kuwait, endorsed by the UN and Arab states alike. He ignored it and paid the price, but no one could claim confusion.
- In 1995, at Dayton, Ohio, the Balkan wars ended because the United States made clear that endless maneuvering was over and enforcement would follow.
- In 1999, NATO demanded that Slobodan Milosevic withdraw from Kosovo and accept international administration; he tested the demand, was bombed, and yielded.
- Even outside war, the same logic applied to apartheid South Africa: dismantle the system or remain isolated. It was public, sharp as a knife, and decisive.
Gaza should be no different
Gaza should be no different. The Trump administration declared that Hamas accepted the framework that ended the war. Hamas did not publicly deny it. The war stopped. Now acceptance must become real. The fact that jihadist movements rarely surrender their weapons is not a serious argument against demanding that this one do so.
Hamas should be given a public deadline, perhaps one week, to declare that it is prepared to cooperate with the United States, the Arab League, the Palestinian Authority, and the technocratic government in surrendering its weapons, dismantling its militia infrastructure, and transferring authority. If it accepts, the process advances. If it refuses, the process changes.
How? Here is one possible path: Humanitarian corridors would be established from Hamas-controlled zones into internationally supervised areas on the perimeter of Gaza, now controlled by Israel. The IDF would remain, but minimally. Temporary housing, infrastructure, and services would be created.
Civilians would be offered safety and the beginnings of normal life outside of Hamas’s grip. Movement would be voluntary but real, screened for weapons, and designed to separate civilians from fighters. Palestinians who wish to leave Gaza and can organize doing so would be allowed to, with the full right to a future return. Hundreds of thousands likely would.
If Hamas blocks movement or threatens civilians, it will have publicly demonstrated what it is: an armed organization holding its own population hostage to preserve its weapons. At that point, no one will be able to maintain the fiction of “resistance.” What they have been doing will be exposed as coercive rule.
Palestinian opinion must be measured
The announcement must include real money. Arab states should publicly commit at least $50 billion to Gaza’s reconstruction, placed in escrow and immediately available once disarmament begins. Palestinians must see the choice in concrete terms: surrender weapons and rebuild society, or preserve weapons and remain in ruin.
Then Palestinian public opinion must be measured. Polling organizations should survey Gaza, the West Bank, and the broader Palestinian public with a simple question: do you want Hamas to surrender its weapons so reconstruction can begin, or do you prefer continued armed rule and its consequences? If Khalil Shikaki, the most respected Palestinian pollster, can participate, so much the better.
Hamas must confront Palestinian opinion directly. If Gazans want reconstruction, Hamas will face pressure from the only force it somewhat fears: its own people. If Palestinians reject it, then the world will honestly be shown that outcome as well.
This is not theoretical. There are already indications, including recent reporting in The Jerusalem Post, that local Hamas figures are seeking exit strategies. This suggests that pressure is working.
Qatar’s role is indispensable. It is both a US ally and Hamas’s principal external sponsor. Those roles must be reconciled. Qatar cannot privately reassure Washington while shielding Hamas from consequences. The same applies to Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. This must be an Arab and international demand, not an Israeli one.
Palestinians should also be reminded of a central fact: under the Gaza framework, Israel is obligated, conditional on long-overdue reforms in the Palestinian Authority, to begin a process leading toward Palestinian statehood. That future is precisely what Hamas blocks. Armed rule is not protecting Palestinian aspirations; it is extinguishing them.
Vagueness has been Hamas’s greatest shield. This monstrous organization thrives in fog. The question now is clear: Will Gaza be rebuilt as a civilian society, or preserved as a militarized ruin? The international community must stop pretending that ambiguity is constructive. If Trump is such a showman, let him finally put on a useful show.
The writer is the former Cairo-based Middle East editor and London-based Europe/Africa editor of the Associated Press, former chairman of the Foreign Press Association in Jerusalem, and the author of two books. Follow him at danperry.substack.com.