Israel’s concern over Gaza’s postwar trajectory has intensified with the emergence of two frameworks that many Israeli political leaders now view as interconnected and deeply problematic.
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One is a Palestinian technocratic governing committee tasked with administering Gaza’s internal affairs. The other is an international oversight panel, known as President Donald Trump’s Board of Peace, intended to supervise reconstruction, coordination, and political guarantees.
Israeli politicians argue that, taken together, the two bodies risk entrenching a new governing reality in Gaza without elections, without Israeli consent, and without clear proof that Hamas’ power structures have been dismantled.
The international oversight panel was announced following the acceptance of President Donald Trump’s plan, which formally ended the war after more than two years.
The framework brings together a wide and politically diverse group of international figures. On the American side, it includes US Secretary of State Marco Rubio alongside senior envoys and advisers such as Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, with former British Prime Minister Tony Blair involved in an advisory capacity.
The panel also involves senior regional and international figures, including Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Qatari Emir Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani, Jordan’s King Abdullah II, Egyptian intelligence chief Hassan Rashad, UAE Minister Reem Al-Hashimy, former UN officials Nickolay Mladenov and Sigrid Kaag, and Argentine President Javier Milei, who publicly confirmed he had been invited to take part in the initiative.
Figures named publicly are understood to represent only part of a broader diplomatic outreach, with additional leaders and officials invited as the framework continues to take shape.
While Washington has described the panel as supervisory rather than executive, Israeli leaders stress that its composition directly affects the legitimacy and durability of any governing structure it oversees. From their perspective, international supervision does not mitigate risk if the underlying authority remains contested or advances independently of Israel’s stated security and political red lines.
Prime Minister's Office formally distances Israel from Gaza Executive Board
The Prime Minister’s Office moved to formally distance Israel from the initiative, stating that the announcement regarding the composition of the Gaza Executive Board, which operates under the broader Board of Peace, “was not coordinated with Israel and runs contrary to its policy.” The statement highlighted Jerusalem’s position that key elements of the postwar framework were advanced without Israeli approval, reinforcing concerns that international arrangements are taking shape independently of Israel’s stated security and political red lines.
At the center of the controversy remains the Palestinian technocratic governing committee. Headed by Ali Shaath, the committee includes portfolios that mirror those of a sovereign government, among them interior, judiciary, religious affairs, land authority, municipal affairs, water, telecommunications, trade and economy, tribal affairs, education, health, housing, finance, agriculture, and social and women’s affairs. Israeli politicians argue that this scope goes far beyond humanitarian coordination or temporary civilian management and instead signals the formation of a de facto government in Gaza.
Opposition leader Yair Lapid described the current framework as the outcome of a strategic failure by the government. In a statement released this week, Lapid recalled that nearly a year earlier, he presented what he called the “Egypt plan” to the US administration and other international actors, proposing that Egypt assume responsibility for managing Gaza in close security coordination with Israel. “As we said all along: Egypt is preferable to Turkey and Qatar,” Lapid wrote, citing Egypt’s past governance of Gaza, its shared border with the Strip, its cooperation with Israel on security matters, and its long-standing fight against the Muslim Brotherhood.
Lapid said he discussed the proposal extensively with the US administration, the European Union, Gulf state leaders, and Egyptian officials themselves, adding that only one actor refused to engage with the plan: the Netanyahu government. According to Lapid, that refusal led directly to the current situation in which Turkey and Qatar were incorporated into the Trump-led framework.
He described both countries as ideological partners of Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood, warning that their involvement poses a direct risk to Israel’s security interests. Lapid added that a recently announced gas agreement with Egypt could still serve as a foundation for repositioning Cairo as the leading actor in Gaza’s reconstruction and demilitarization, urging the government not to miss what he called another historic opportunity.
Within the governing coalition, Likud lawmaker Moshe Saada focused his criticism squarely on the international oversight panel. “The State of Israel must not agree to the involvement of terror patron Qatar and Turkey, and its antisemitic foreign minister, Hakan Fidan, in President Trump’s peace council,” Saada wrote.
He warned that these countries “cannot be part of the day after in Gaza in any way” and cautioned against allowing Erdoğan to gain a foothold along Israel’s border. Saada praised Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for publicly stating that such involvement was unacceptable to Israel and called on him to stand firm despite international pressure.
National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir rejected both the technocratic committee and the international framework outright. “Gaza does not need any ‘administrative committee’ to oversee its ‘reconstruction,'” Ben-Gvir said, arguing that the Strip must instead be “cleansed of Hamas terrorists.” He called for the encouragement of what he described as massive voluntary emigration and urged the prime minister to instruct the Israel Defense Forces to prepare for a renewed military campaign “with overwhelming force” in order to achieve what he defined as the war’s central goal: the destruction of Hamas.
The disagreement moved beyond public statements and into the heart of Israel’s decision-making apparatus. During a recent meeting of the security cabinet, Ben-Gvir confronted Maj. Gen. David Zini over the advancement of civilian governance frameworks before Hamas had been fully defeated. Ben-Gvir reiterated that “Gaza does not need any ‘administrative committee’ to oversee its ‘reconstruction,’” insisting that Israel must be prepared to return to fighting “with overwhelming force” rather than transition toward civilian administration.
Zini warned that the absence of an organized civilian alternative would leave Gaza in prolonged chaos and force the Israel Defense Forces to shoulder indefinite responsibility for governing the Strip. He cautioned that without a structured administrative framework, Israel could find itself trapped in an open-ended military presence with no viable exit strategy. Ben-Gvir dismissed that warning, reiterating that any governing body established before Hamas’ destruction would simply reproduce the same threat under a different name.
Alongside the harsher criticism, some coalition figures sought to reassure that Israeli red lines were being enforced. Likud lawmaker Tally Gotliv, a member of the Israeli parliament’s Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, argued that fears of Turkish military involvement were unfounded and said the prime minister had already intervened decisively with Washington. “Just as there were those who once believed that Turkish armed forces would enter Gaza, the prime minister succeeded in moving President Trump away from that decision,” Gotliv told The Media Line. “This time as well, Turkish forces will not enter Gaza. I have no doubt about that.”
Gotliv emphasized that the core issue remained Hamas, not the architecture of international committees. “In Gaza, there is Hamas, a terrorist organization that is growing stronger,” she said. “It is dangerous not only to Israel, but in general, because it is an extremely brutal terror organization. Israel, therefore, has no choice but to insist on the obligation to dismantle Hamas’ weapons.” She added that, in her assessment, Hamas would not disarm voluntarily and that Israel would be the one to ensure it happens, reiterating her certainty that there would be no Turkish forces in Gaza.
Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich framed the dual-committee controversy as the outcome of what he described as a foundational policy failure. “The original sin is the prime minister’s refusal to take responsibility for Gaza, establish a military administration there, encourage migration and settlement, and thus guarantee Israel’s security for many years,” Smotrich wrote. That refusal, he argued, produced “strange constructions” to manage civilian life in Gaza that are neither Hamas nor the Palestinian Authority.
Smotrich said that even under the assumption that Israel would accept a non-Hamas civilian body, strict red lines must apply. “The countries that sustained Hamas cannot be the ones that replace it,” he wrote. “Those that supported it and continue to host it will not gain a foothold in Gaza. Period.” He added that the prime minister must uphold those red lines even if doing so requires managing a dispute with Washington and with President Trump’s envoys.
Taken together, the reactions from Lapid, Saada, Ben-Gvir, Gotliv, and Smotrich reveal both convergence and fracture. There is broad agreement that the Palestinian technocratic governing committee and the international oversight panel raise fundamental questions about who will wield power in Gaza and under what conditions. Yet the sharp divergence in proposed alternatives, ranging from Egyptian stewardship to renewed military control or prolonged Israeli administration, emphasizes how unresolved Gaza’s “day after” remains.
As both frameworks move from announcement toward implementation, Israel faces a narrowing margin for strategic maneuver. What is unfolding in Jerusalem is no longer a technical debate over committees, but a deeper struggle over timing, control, and political sequencing in the postwar arena.
What unsettles Israeli decision-makers is not only who sits on the various panels, but the possibility that Gaza is becoming the testing ground for a wider political experiment, one whose parameters are being set before Israel has clarified its own endgame. Israeli leaders warn that decisions taken now, even under the banner of reconstruction and oversight, could lock in realities that extend far beyond Gaza itself.
Whether the government can prevent Hamas’ reemergence, block the empowerment of hostile actors, and safeguard key alliances while retaining meaningful influence over Gaza’s future governance remains unanswered. The outcome of that tension is likely to shape not only Israel’s approach to Gaza, but its broader regional posture in the postwar period.