The central question now confronting Washington and Jerusalem is no longer whether Iran can be weakened militarily. It is whether the United States and Israel are prepared for what may come next: a prolonged war of attrition with the Iranian revolutionary regime.
How this war unfolds and how long it lasts will depend on the war aims of the United States and Israel. Is the ultimate objective regime collapse and the possibility of positive political change in Tehran? Is the goal to weaken the regime enough to create conditions for a future uprising by the Iranian people? Or is the aim more limited, degrading Iran’s nuclear and missile programs sufficiently for the president to declare victory and end the war?
Where those objectives land will determine whether this conflict lasts weeks, months, or far longer.
Whenever I appear on Iran International, the leading Iranian opposition media network, on Iraqi Kurdish television, or on English-language outlets, the same question inevitably arises: Is regime change President Trump’s goal, and is it a realistic possibility?
My answer is that America’s core objectives are clearer and narrower: degrading Iran’s ballistic and drone missile threat to US forces, energy supply routes, and regional allies; ending Tehran’s nuclear weapons program; and halting the flow of money to its terrorist proxies across the Middle East. Regime change is a far more complicated question.
Iran is a vast nation of more than 90 million people, with roughly half its population composed of ethnic minorities largely concentrated along the country’s periphery. For decades, anticipating eventual confrontation with adversaries, the regime dispersed its military infrastructure across the country, much of it deeply buried or embedded in civilian areas.
At the same time, Tehran sought to shield itself from attack by pursuing nuclear weapons while building an extensive ballistic missile arsenal capable of intimidating its neighbors and threatening American forces throughout the region.
Defeating Iran to the point of regime collapse would take months, not the weeks some have suggested. Even if the regime were to fall, a prolonged insurgency would likely follow, led by remnants of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Basij, a regime security militia numbering roughly one million. These forces combine ideological true believers with those who benefit economically from the regime’s survival.
Earlier in the conflict, some analysts believed Washington and Jerusalem differed on whether regime change should be the war’s ultimate objective. Yet Israeli officials now appear to be aligning their expectations more closely with Washington.
'Regime change is not and never was a military goal'
Israeli defense sources recently told The Jerusalem Post that “regime change is not and never was a military goal. Rather, the IDF hoped to create conditions that might make regime change possible.”
Israel has also reportedly adjusted its expectations to the political reality that when the president declares the war over, Israel will likely have little choice but to end major hostilities as well. A precedent already exists. During the June 2025 twelve-day war, President Trump ordered Israeli aircraft already en route to strike additional IRGC targets to turn around.
That precedent offers a glimpse of the more likely “day after”: the president declaring victory after significant degradation of Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile facilities, while telling the Iranian people that their country’s future ultimately lies in their own hands.
Ideally, this outcome would also include securing the roughly 400 kilograms of 60-percent-enriched uranium reportedly hidden deep within tunnels beneath the Isfahan nuclear facility.
Iran’s strategy, however, is different. Tehran’s goal is to prolong the conflict and transform it into a war of attrition, one designed to outlast what the regime expects will be Western impatience for prolonged conflict.
The regime is betting on an American public weary of “forever wars,” combined with the political pressure created by high energy prices during a difficult midterm election cycle.
Early in the conflict, the Trump administration reportedly believed Iran’s ethnic minorities might lead an uprising capable of toppling the regime. But Washington quickly pivoted away from supporting Kurdish separatists after recognizing that encouraging minority autonomy could fracture Iran territorially and spark civil war.
Unlike many Middle Eastern states whose borders were drawn by European powers after World War I, Iran is a historically rooted nation thousands of years old that has long incorporated multiple minority populations.
The internal dynamics are also more complicated than many assume. Some analysts expected minority groups to be the vanguard of regime change. Yet, according to Natalie Arbatman of the Hudson Institute, Iran’s largest minority, the Azeris, may constitute roughly one-third of the population and are deeply integrated into the state.
“Ethnic Azerbaijanis occupy senior positions across the clerical establishment, military, and bureaucracy. Even Iran’s current supreme leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, is of Azerbaijani descent. Rather than existing on the margins of the state, they are embedded within its governing structures.”
None of this means minorities or the Persian majority are satisfied with the regime in Tehran. But it does underscore how complex the hoped-for “day after” may be and how much patience and long-term commitment it could require from Washington and its allies.
More likely than not, within weeks, not months, large-scale military operations will begin to wind down. The regime may be severely weakened but not destroyed.
At that point, President Trump will face a critical strategic decision: whether to enter the next phase of the conflict, a sustained war of attrition designed to continue degrading the regime through limited military action, support for the Iranian people, and intensified economic pressure.
Meanwhile, The Wall Street Journal reported on March 11 that Iran is transporting as much or more oil through the Strait of Hormuz than it did before the war began. If that continues, the regime will maintain a critical financial lifeline by selling discounted oil to America’s primary geopolitical rival: China.
US forces cannot remain in the Middle East at current levels indefinitely. But the strategic choice is not simply between maintaining today’s posture or withdrawing entirely to prewar deployments.
Iran will play the long game, waiting months, hoping Washington’s attention shifts during an election year, and counting on US pressure to restrain Israel from further action. Meanwhile, Tehran will almost certainly test the waters by quietly rebuilding its ballistic missile and drone programs while intensifying repression at home to prevent another uprising.
If that scenario unfolds, several difficult questions will confront Washington.
Will the United States allow Israel to strike Iran unilaterally if Tehran begins rebuilding its military capabilities? Will the United States maintain a sufficient regional presence to reassure allies and deter Iranian escalation? And will Washington sustain the economic pressure needed to prevent the regime from recovering?
A war of attrition is Iran’s preferred strategy. Whether it succeeds will depend largely on Western patience and resolve.
If the United States is unwilling to sustain pressure beyond the initial military phase, Tehran will eventually rebuild its capabilities, and the region will once again face the same threats.
Iranian Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi may be calling on Iranians to await his signal. But revolutions in authoritarian regimes rarely occur on command. Until conditions inside Iran change dramatically, the decisive question remains whether the United States and Israel are prepared for the long contest that may still lie ahead.
The writer is the director of MEPIN, the Middle East Political Information Network, and the senior security editor of The Jerusalem Report. He regularly briefs members of Congress, their foreign policy advisers, the State Department, and think tanks.