After the war: A more coordinated, but still divided, Gulf - opinion

GCC politics have long oscillated between cooperation and fragmentation. The 2017-2021 Qatar crisis, in which relations between Qatar and the Arab League dramatically deteriorated, demonstrated how quickly intra-Gulf tensions can escalate. The recent war, however, has temporarily produced the opposite effect. Faced with a common threat, Gulf states have shown greater alignment in recent years.

This convergence is less a matter of shared identity than of strategic necessity. Iran’s willingness to target multiple Gulf states, including those that had maintained channels of dialogue, has reinforced a broader perception that geographic proximity alone carries risk. Efforts to hedge through selective engagement appear less insulating than previously assumed.

In this sense, the war has revived elements of the GCC’s founding logic. Established in 1981 in response to revolutionary Iran, the organization was conceived as a mechanism for managing shared vulnerabilities. Today, those vulnerabilities have evolved: threats are more diffuse, technologically sophisticated, and embedded in critical infrastructure.

In the war’s aftermath, discussions of collective security are likely to regain traction. Historically, the GCC has avoided formal military integration, favoring looser coordination in economic and political domains. Nevertheless, the scale and nature of recent attacks may prompt reconsideration.

More structured forms of cooperation, extending beyond the GCC to include external partners such as the US and, perhaps more quietly, Israel, are increasingly conceivable. Still, translating this impulse into institutional form will be difficult. Even during the conflict, coordination remained uneven, reflecting persistent mistrust and limited interoperability.

Differences in threat perception further complicate matters; for Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, Iran represents a primary strategic challenger; for Qatar and Oman, engagement with Tehran remains an enduring, if increasingly constrained, component of regional diplomacy. These distinctions are unlikely to disappear, even under heightened pressure.

The appearance of unity should not obscure structural divisions within the GCC. Relations between Saudi Arabia and the UAE, for instance, remain shaped by both cooperation and competition. While the war has encouraged closer coordination, underlying tensions over regional leadership, economic strategy, and geopolitical positioning have not dissipated.

Smaller states continue to pursue differentiated approaches. Qatar is likely to preserve its mediating role, balancing dialogue with Iran alongside strong ties to Washington. Oman will seek to maintain its position as a diplomatic intermediary, even as the space for neutrality narrows.

Kuwait’s cautious, consensus-oriented posture is expected to persist, while Bahrain will remain closely aligned with Saudi Arabia, shaped in part by its domestic and geopolitical sensitivities. These variations reflect not only strategic calculation but also domestic political contexts and economic structures.

One of the more significant shifts concerns hedging practices. Over the past decade, Gulf states sought to navigate uncertainty by diversifying partnerships, maintaining relations with Iran, deepening ties with China, and relying on US security guarantees.

The war has exposed the limits of this hedging approach. Iranian strikes on Gulf territory, even against states that had pursued de-escalation, have called into question the protective value of engagement. At the same time, reliance on external security providers appears more conditional than often assumed.

Rather than abandoning hedging altogether, Gulf states are likely to recalibrate it. Greater emphasis may be placed on regional coordination, redundancy in security arrangements, and the protection of critical infrastructure. Hedging, in this sense, becomes less about balancing external powers and more about managing systemic vulnerability.

Economic considerations further complicate the picture. The war has highlighted shared vulnerabilities in energy infrastructure, trade routes, and investor confidence. These pressures may encourage greater coordination, particularly in areas such as energy security and logistics.

The emerging pattern is neither unity nor fragmentation, but selective cooperation. Gulf states are likely to work together where interests clearly converge, especially in security and infrastructure, while continuing to compete in other domains.

This reflects a form of managed divergence. Rather than seeking full alignment, states appear to prioritize flexibility, recognizing both the benefits of coordination and the persistence of competing national agendas.

The war has reshaped the Gulf’s strategic landscape. It has exposed vulnerabilities, challenged assumptions, and accelerated a rethinking of both alliances and regional dynamics.

In its aftermath, the GCC is likely to become more coordinated and more attentive to collective security concerns. Nevertheless, it will not evolve into a cohesive bloc. Structural differences, competing ambitions, and distinct foreign policy traditions will continue to shape its trajectory.

The post-war Gulf will thus be defined by a tension that is unlikely to be resolved: a stronger inclination toward cooperation in the face of shared threats, alongside enduring divisions beneath the surface. Managing this balance, rather than eliminating it, will be central to the region’s stability in the years ahead.