Peace of the wicked: Mohammad Javad Zarif reframes the Iranian threat - opinion

In moments of major change, the most dangerous projects do not come as threats; they come in language that appears rational and appealing.

The issue is not in the declared provisions, but in the logic behind them. The article does not propose a settlement; it reframes the question itself – from containing the threat to coexisting with it. What should be eliminated becomes something to be managed. This may seem like a subtle shift in wording, but it is decisive in outcome.

Zarif builds his argument on a deeper claim: that Iran is a victim rather than an instigator. This collapses under broader scrutiny. A state that has spent decades building proxy networks across multiple countries, fueling conflicts and destabilizing the region, cannot credibly present itself as the aggrieved party. Reducing the conflict to a single moment ignores its cumulative nature.

The argument further weakens when examined in light of Zarif’s own admissions. In a leaked 2021 recording, he acknowledged that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps undermined his diplomatic efforts and that “the field” dictated policy over diplomacy. In effect, Iran operates through two centers: one negotiates, the other escalates. The immediate question is obvious – who guarantees that one will not override the other?

This pattern is not new. The 1979 hostage crisis at the US Embassy in Tehran established a model of using crises as bargaining tools. That model has since been reproduced through proxies, indirect operations, and plausible deniability paired with strategic gain.

At the core of Zarif’s argument is the idea that Iran has endured, and that endurance justifies a stronger negotiating position. But endurance is not superiority. A prolonged conflict reflects mutual attrition, not dominance that entitles one side to impose terms. Treating Iran’s capabilities – nuclear or otherwise – as untouchable realities only reinforces the core problem rather than resolving it.

The same logic applies to the nuclear file. A pledge not to pursue nuclear weapons in exchange for full sanctions relief merely repackages an existing obligation. More critically, it ignores the missile and drone programs – the real instruments of deterrence and coercion – operated independently by the Revolutionary Guards. Limiting negotiations to the nuclear issue while excluding these tools is not an oversight; it is deliberate.

Implicit in this argument is a message to Gulf states: that reliance on the United States is insufficient, and that security must be pursued through accommodation with Iran. This framing exploits real concerns but offers a worse alternative. Stability does not come from replacing one partnership with a source of threat, but from diversifying alliances that reinforce deterrence and balance.

Iran’s record further undermines any notion of credible guarantees. Its support for armed proxies, including those involved in the October 7, 2023, attacks on Israeli civilians, and its links to operations such as the 1994 Buenos Aires bombing, demonstrate a pattern of cross-border activity that contradicts any claim of stabilizing intent. This is not background – it is central to understanding the proposal.

Any viable settlement must rest on three fundamentals: Gulf security anchored in sovereign frameworks supported by credible international partnerships; institutional protection of maritime routes like Hormuz through coordinated military and intelligence mechanisms; and any agreement must address not only the nuclear file, but also missiles, proxies, and transnational networks under enforceable verification.

The question, therefore, is no longer whether Tehran’s promises can be trusted. The real question is: if a stable alternative already exists through clear strategic partnerships, what justifies accepting a framework that restores the source of the threat as its guarantor?