In late 1978, US president Jimmy Carter faced a situation in Iran that looked
strikingly similar to what President Barack Obama is dealing with today in
Egypt. Massive demonstrations were being held in the streets of Teheran, calling
for the ouster of the shah, who had been America’s key ally in the Persian Gulf.
The White House did not know quite what to do: back the shah or seek his
replacement.
The State Department recommended that a broad based
coalition of Iranian politicians be formed to take power. There was also a group
of American academics and even some officials who thought the US should reach
out to Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who was living in exile outside of
Paris.
Many of these experts advised a confused administration that
Khomeini was someone the US could work with. The US ambassador to Iran, William
Sullivan, wrote that Khomeini would work well with younger officers in the
shah’s army. There was also Richard Falk of Princeton University who wrote an
article in
The New York Times on February 16, 1979 entitled “Trusting Khomeini.”
It argued that he was surrounded by moderate politicians who had a “notable
record of concern for human rights.”
The shah’s defense minister saw how
the US was preparing to seek the shah’s removal and concluded that Washington
“took the shah by the tail, and threw him into exile like a dead
rat.”
THERE ARE several similarities between US policy in 1979 toward
Iran and its policy in 2011 toward Egypt. First, the Obama administration
appears to be pursuing a policy of leaving all options open. Like Carter,
Obama’s team has been indecisive in this crisis. Washington is not calling for
Hosni Mubarak to resign, but it is not backing him and his government either. In
fact, Obama’s tone toward Mubarak sounded surprisingly harsh, and even
insulting. Obama disclosed in a press conference on January 28 that after
hearing Mubarak’s speech to the Egyptian people, he told him over the phone that
“he had a responsibility to give meaning to those words.” Obama insisted that
the Egyptian leadership “take concrete steps” and not limit itself to rhetorical
promises.
But it was White House press secretary Robert Gibbs who went
beyond Obama by issuing what sounded like an implicit threat to Egypt. At a
press briefing, he stated that the Egyptian government had to address the
“legitimate grievances” of the people “immediately.”
A journalist then
popped the question to Gibbs: “You say that these legitimate grievances have to
be addressed. I’m wondering.
Or what?” Gibbs came back: “We will be
reviewing our assistance posture based on events that take place in the coming
days.”
In other words, precisely when the Egyptian government had its
back to the wall with the worst protests in recent history, the White House
press secretary threatened the Mubarak with a cut in US foreign aid.
The
US position did not go far enough to win the support of the Egyptian protesters,
but by disgracing Mubarak the administration made statements that will alienate
any future government based on Mubarak’s men. Moreover, what kind of signal did
Gibbs’s threat about cutting aid send to King Abdullah of Jordan or to President
Ali Abdullah Saleh of Yemen, as well as to other allies in the Persian Gulf? Did
it mean that as soon as an Arab leader gets into trouble, he starts to get
disowned? A second similarity between the two crises is the US reliance on
individuals whom they hope will create stability and will not be exploited by
more extremist forces. In 1979, ambassador Sullivan recommended that the Carter
administration work with Mehdi Bazargan, who Khomeini wanted as prime minister,
instead of Shaphur Bakhtiar whom the shah appointed to take
over.
Bazargan’s foreign minister, Ibrahim Yazdi, was a US citizen who
reassured influential Americans about Khomeini. Within eight months, Khomeini
threw out Bazargan and Yazdi, once he no longer needed them, and appointed a new
government that more reflected the Islamic revolution.
TODAY, MANY in the
West call for making Mohamed ElBaradei, the former head of the International
Islamic Energy Agency, an interim president to replace Mubarak. ElBaradei is
supported by the Muslim Brotherhood and appears to be the ideal instrument for
it to reassure Western powers that it is safe to get rid of Mubarak. The danger
is that he has no popular support, having lived outside of Egypt for many years.
He would be a weak interim figure who could easily be toppled by the Muslim
Brotherhood.
For that reason in the streets of Cairo, there have been
reports that Muslim Brotherhood activists refer to ElBaradei and people like him
as “donkeys of the revolution” – someone it can ride in on and then cast aside.
It should be remembered that the Brotherhood is the best organized party in
Egypt and has massive backing. It could easily get rid of ElBaradei once it is
more securely in power.
Perhaps the most dangerous analogy between Iran
in 1979 and Egypt in 2011 is how the dangers of a new radical Islamic regime are
understood. As noted earlier, many academics and officials tried to argue that
Khomeini could be a partner for the US. The New York Times reported earlier this
week that at a meeting with Middle East experts convened by the National
Security Council on Monday, White House staff members “made clear that they did
not rule out engagement with the Muslim Brotherhood as part of an orderly
process.”
This should not have come as a surprise. There have been
significant voices in the US foreign policy community making the same argument
for years, including a small but vocal group of former intelligence analysts.
Additionally, the powerful quarterly Foreign Affairs, published an article in
2007 called “The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood.” In the Middle East, there is
little naivete about the Muslim Brotherhood. It is understood that it remains
committed to militancy – not to moderation. Indeed, the current supreme guide of
the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Muhammad Badi, gave a sermon in September 2010
stating that Muslims “need to understand that the improvement and change that
the Muslim nation seeks can only be attained through jihad and sacrifice and by
raising a jihadi generation that pursues death, just as the enemies pursue
life.”
Many commentators note that most of the leaders of the main
terrorist organizations are graduates of the Muslim Brotherhood, from al-Qaida
members like Ayman al-Zawahiri and Khalid Sheikh Muhammad to Khaled Mashaal of
Hamas.
The readiness of Western governments to risk the rise of the
Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt will depend on how well they understand the true
global implications of it coming to power, and not making the same mistake that
was made in 1979.