Turkey’s shift

Cooling of ties was not sudden and unexpected, it has been going on for a decade, ever since Erdogan's Islamist party began its rise in 2002.

By JPOST EDITORIAL
Erdogan wins 311 (photo credit: REUTERS)
Erdogan wins 311
(photo credit: REUTERS)
Many Israelis are shocked anew by each of Premier Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s premeditated and steadily escalated assaults on what were highly symbiotic relations between Israel and Turkey.
The ramifications are drastic not only on the diplomatic front, but also on the economic plane, as Bank of Israel Gov. Stanley Fischer has emphasized. Especially hard hit are the military ties that once underpinned the “special relationship.”
Yet, although unsettling, none of the above is unprecedented. Indeed much of what we now witness is déjà vu, a replay of what happened in 1979 when the ayatollahs took over Iran.
Until then, an even warmer and more advantageous symbiosis flourished with the shah’s regime. It collapsed overnight and caused multifarious damage as severe as what the consistent series of Turkish blows have wrought incrementally.
Those Israelis who lament the slower-paced phased breakdown of the honeymoon with Turkey need to recall that it hasn’t been sweet for almost a decade, ever since Erdogan’s Islamist party’s electoral victory of 2002. That marked a strategic shift in Turkey’s agenda, and there was little Israel could do about it, short of acceding to Erdogan’s every whim.
Much as we may have wished that Ankara wouldn’t evolve into as lost a cause as Tehran, the Iranian precedent is instructive.
Israel’s chumminess with Tehran solidified over 20 years. Much of the military cooperation remained under wraps but it was significant. Iran became Israel’s major oil supplier, when other sources were unavailable.
All that dried up overnight, but Israel wasn’t brought to its knees. Important as specific relationships may be, none is indispensable.
This is something for us to keep in mind today. It would doubtlessly have been better not to lose the Turkish connection. But it’s hardly the end of the world – especially given the fact that no Israeli initiative could have halted the deterioration. It’s out of our hands.
Erdogan is ambitious and driven – no less than Mahmoud Ahmadinejad – regardless of differences in style.
He doesn’t bother disguising his aspirations to return his country to the glory days of the Ottoman sultanate and to become the regional and Islamic pivotal power.
To further such objectives, Erdogan must demonstrate leadership in striking out against the Arab/Muslim world’s bête noir – Israel.
This is much along the lines of the czarist pogrominstigating rallying call “beat the Jews and save Russia.”
Erdogan set out to rile Israel and the more we swallowed our pride, the greater his provocations. His latest move is to agitate via a confrontational Turkish naval presence not only in the Mediterranean but as far away as the Red Sea. Ironically he has named it Operation Barbarossa, the same moniker given by the Nazis to their World War II invasion of the USSR.
In this context there’s no escaping the conclusion that Erdogan has become another Mideast bully. His aggression isn’t only directed against Israel. Under his aegis, Turkey has managed to quarrel with nearly all its neighbors, including Iran.
Cyprus is threatened militarily. Greece, Bulgaria and Armenia are leery and the list goes on. Erdogan’s biggest fans are Gaza’s Hamas warlords. The more pugnacious he appears toward Israel, the more Erdogan secures his credentials as a Muslim stalwart.
Erdogan’s freezing of defense trade with Israel and downgrading of diplomatic ties are sure to influence civilian commerce as well. Turkey will lose out no less, perhaps even more, than Israel. Ankara plainly cuts off its nose to spite its face. It has already lost Israeli tourism. Now Turkish humiliation of Israeli air-travelers will keep businessmen away and eliminate Turkey as a favorite transit stop. But Turkey will discover that alternatives can be found.
Just as Israel found substitutes for Iranian oil, so substitute markets can be found for the lost Turkish ones.
We might shell out more for Japanese cars made in India than for Japanese cars from nearby Turkey, but that’s a smaller price to pay than taking existential risks and turning ourselves into Erdogan’s vassal state.


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Stanley Fischer