US President Donald Trump has been clear on one central issue: The Muslim Brotherhood is not a benign political movement but a transnational Islamist ideology that undermines states from within. His administration consistently rejected the idea that “political Islam” is harmless, arguing instead that the Brotherhood provides the ideological ecosystem from which movements like Hamas draw legitimacy. Trump pushed to designate the Brotherhood as a terrorist organization and backed regional allies that moved to dismantle its networks.
That position is strategically coherent. It also sits uneasily alongside a close partnership with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
Erdogan and the Brotherhood connection
Erdogan is not a passive bystander in the Muslim Brotherhood story. He is its most influential state sponsor.
After the fall of Mohamed Morsi in Egypt, Erdogan openly portrayed the Brotherhood as the legitimate voice of Muslim democracy and condemned governments that cracked down on it as illegitimate. Exiled Brotherhood figures found refuge in Turkey, Islamist media outlets broadcast from Istanbul across the Arab world, and Ankara, often alongside Qatari financing, became the movement’s political and logistical hub after it was rejected elsewhere.
Washington’s opposite approach
Washington, meanwhile, moved in the opposite direction. Senior US officials under Trump argued that the distinction between violent jihadism and political Islamism was misleading. The Brotherhood, they said, advances its goals patiently – by penetrating institutions, shaping public discourse, and eroding sovereignty from within. Supporting allies against Brotherhood influence was framed as counter-extremism, not repression.
Erdogan’s broader imperial vision
This divergence matters because Erdogan’s embrace of the Brotherhood is not an isolated ideology. It is part of a broader imperial vision.
Erdogan has consistently framed Turkey as a power with responsibilities beyond its borders. Northern Syria is treated as strategic depth. Kurdish autonomy is dismantled. Turkish military footprints are normalized abroad. Influence in the Eastern Mediterranean is asserted as an entitlement. Political Islam functions here as soft power – the connective tissue that turns military reach into durable influence.
Israel’s security perspective
From Israel’s perspective, this is not an abstract concern. Israeli defense policy is built on preventing hostile or ideologically driven actors from entrenching themselves near its borders, especially under diplomatic cover. A Turkey that shelters Muslim Brotherhood networks, provides political backing to Hamas-linked elements, and embeds itself in Syria is not seen in Jerusalem as a stabilizer, but neither is it automatically viewed as an enemy.
The US-Israel relationship is strong and resilient. Differences in threat assessment are not a rupture; they are a test.
The question is not if Washington and Jerusalem can manage it, but whether they will manage it with eyes wide open.
The coming collision
Because one day, Washington will have to reconcile Trump’s ban on the Muslim Brotherhood with Erdogan’s role as its most powerful patron. When that day comes, the question will not be about intent. It will be about leverage. Who will insist that ideology matters more than convenience? And who will finally decide that tolerating Turkey’s ambitions and its Brotherhood patronage comes at too high a cost?
The collision is not inevitable, but it is looming. The collision between principle and power is coming. Trump will have to choose which side of history he is on.
Liron Rose is a major (res.) in IDF Intelligence, a tech entrepreneur, investor, and creator and host of the podcast HaYanshuf (The Owl).
Amit Shabi is a former analyst in Unit 8200, an investment professional, the author of several finance books, and a competitive chess player.