Classified report finds flaws in running of Flotilla 13 commando unit

Flotilla 13 made headlines last week due to its raid on a ship carrying an Iranian shipment of weapons for Gaza terrorists.

March 12, 2014 12:12
1 minute read.

Navy in action during Iranian arms ship seizure. (photo credit: IDF)


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A classified State Comptroller’s Report on the Israel Navy’s flagship elite commando unit, Flotilla 13, found a variety of flaws in the way the military organizes and maintains the special force.

Flotilla 13 made headlines last week due to its raid on a cargo ship carrying an Iranian shipment of powerful Syrian- made rockets, destined for terror organizations in the Gaza Strip.

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The unit carries out special operations on a regular basis, on behalf of the navy and IDF General Staff.

During an examination carried out from July 2012 to April 2013, State Comptroller Joseph Shapira examined the unit’s preparations to provide an effective response to simultaneous challenges in its field of operation.

The check examined the unit’s activation of forces, training, combat readiness, qualification process, and its role in the IDF’s long-term military force buildup program.

It also examined how well the navy’s headquarters are designed to lead the buildup of the unit, and how well headquarters can support it with the necessary weapons and infrastructure.

The part played by the General Staff in the buildup of the unit’s ground capabilities was also looked at.

The report recommended the military move to repair a number of flaws in how it activates Flotilla 13, secures its members when needed, plans for future development and maintains personnel. A number of organizational problems, which cannot be published, were cited in the report.

In the interest of national security, the report’s specific findings will be kept classified following a decision by the Knesset’s State Control Committee.

In response the IDF said it welcomed the report, and is studying its content. It vowed to “learn the required lessons.”

The IDF Spokesman’s Office added, “This is a unit that operates day and night in covert and complex operations, of which one small part was revealed [last] week. The IDF has addressed in a detailed manner all of the shortcomings listed in the varied operations area of the Flotilla... and is working to amend them.”

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