Western news coverage tends to depict Israel as the chief advocate for a hard
line against the Iranian nuclear program.
But the concerns of the Gulf
states, in particular Saudi Arabia, are of equal or greater
Since the foundation of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the US has
performed the role of protector for Riyadh. The departure of the British from
the Gulf area in the early 1970s meant that the small Gulf monarchies also came
to depend on the US for protection.
Washington has bases up and down the
Arab side of the Gulf.
But the mere presence of these bases no longer
bring a feeling of security. The Arab monarchs and emirs of the Gulf Cooperation
Council countries (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar and United Arab
Emirates) are watching with dismay as US President Barack Obama’s administration
seeks rapprochement with Tehran.
It is Saudi Arabia which is most
concerned. Riyadh is engaged in a struggle to contain and set back Iranian
expansion across the region.
The Wikileaks revelations in 2010 made clear
the extent of Saudi and Gulf concerns regarding Iran.
King Abdullah was
famously quoted as demanding that the US “cut off the head of the snake” by
launching military strikes against Iran’s nuclear program.
King Hamad bin
Isa al-Khalifa of Bahrain, according to the cables, also argued for Western
military action against the program.
Riyadh’s central concern is that the
US simply fails to grasp the extent and the seriousness of Iran’s regional
project. This, in their view, is part of a more general naivete – which has
produced failed US policy in key areas of the Middle East over the last three
The US decision to abandon Hosni Mubarak of Egypt was for the
Saudis an early indication of the problem. This has been compounded by the
failure to lend support to the military coup of Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, a
close ally of Riyadh. Washington’s failure to organize properly to frustrate the
Iranian effort to preserve President Bashar Assad in Syria is an additional
The Muslim Brotherhood victories of the Arab Spring
deeply worried the Saudis. But in the course of 2013, these have mostly been
In Tunisia, Egypt and the Syrian rebellion, the Muslim
Brotherhood is now eclipsed. Saudi money and machinations have played a central
role in this.
But Saudi money will not be enough to turn back the
For that, Riyadh needs more powerful allies. Hence the acute
fear that the Americans are no longer willing to play this role.
Saudis’ view of Iran gibes in all essential details with that of Israel. This
commonality was openly expressed by influential Saudi columnist Tariq Alhomayed,
in a recent interview with the Weekly Standard magazine: “Israel is the most
important player in the Middle East right now regarding Iran... They drew the
red line on Iran, and that makes everyone in the region happy.”
Saudis see Tehran’s nuclear ambition as part of a more general drive for
regional domination in two directions – westwards towards the Mediterranean, and
southwards towards the Gulf. This is a project which is already
To the west, Iran is in the process of turning Nouri
al-Maliki’s Iraq into a client, or at least a closely allied state. Iran is
fighting tooth and nail to keep its ally Assad in place in Damascus. His fall
would end the dream of a contiguous pro-Iranian line from western Afghanistan to
the Mediterranean Sea.
In the absence of the US, the Saudis have
themselves tried to do the heavy lifting of support for the Syrian insurgency.
It isn’t working.
Assad has consolidated his position in the course of
2013, and is now beginning to claw back territory from the rebels.
Gulf area, the Saudis have watched as Iran continues to back opposition
movements in Bahrain, Kuwait, north Yemen and in eastern Saudi Arabia
For the Saudis, as for Israel, a nuclear capacity would clear the
way for a massive increase in subversive activities of this kind.
nuclear Iran, they fear, would be able to entice or bully the small Gulf states
to come under its umbrella. This would then give Iran the ability to set or
influence global oil prices, and thus blackmail both neighboring countries and
Riyadh’s bond with the US is not about to break. The
Saudis have nowhere else to go; there is no other power currently able to
project military power into the Gulf.
The Obama administration,
meanwhile, is keen to assure the Saudis that its military presence is there to
stay, and their concerns are unfounded.
Simultaneously, however, the
Saudis see the Iranians winning in Syria and Iraq, engaging in subversion across
the Gulf, and moving full speed ahead toward a nuclear capacity – with their
traditional partners blithely reassuring them there is nothing to worry
The result? A recent BBC report suggested the Saudis have readied
a nuclear option for themselves, in the form of an agreement with Pakistan that
would supply nuclear weapons to Riyadh if Iran were to acquire a nuclear
There may be substance to these reports. Or they may be part
of a desperate PR campaign by the Saudis to seek to inform the US of the cost of
an Iran-Washington rapprochement.
Either way, they are testimony to just
how bad things have got between Washington and its closest Arab allies, as a
result of the lenient tone toward Iran, and the broader process of disengagement
from the region adopted by the current administration over the last three years.