Analysis: When terrorists are Israeli, Shin Bet's hands are tied

The chances of ideas on how to curb the new terror wave in Jerusalem being implemented are not high.

By YAAKOV KATZ
bulldozer pigua 224 88 (photo credit: Ariel Jerozolimski [file])
bulldozer pigua 224 88
(photo credit: Ariel Jerozolimski [file])
The Shin Bet's ideas of how to curb the new terror wave in Jerusalem could have an effect, officials said Wednesday, but the chances that they will be implemented any time soon are not high. The problem with terror from east Jerusalem is that the suspected terrorists have blue Israeli identity cards, enabling them full access to Jerusalem, not to mention the rest of the country. This status impedes the security agency's ability to effectively counter terrorism. Here is one example: In the West Bank, where Emergency Regulations from 1945 are still in effect, Israel has the right to hold a Palestinian terror suspect for 96 hours before bringing him before a judge. An Israeli citizen, however, needs to be brought before a judge within 24 hours of arrest. The time difference is significant. When working against terrorist cells, the Shin Bet does not always have clear-cut information, and therefore uses the 96 hours to interrogate the suspect. Not much can be achieved, however, in just 24 hours. Then there is the West Bank security barrier. The Shuafat refugee camp, for example, is considered part of Jerusalem but is on the Palestinian side of the barrier. This creates a number of problems for the defense establishment. On the one hand, the camp is open to the West Bank to the north and has seen an influx of Palestinians migrating from Samaria in recent years. This influx of West Bank Palestinians creates ties between terrorists and east Jerusalem Arabs who, despite living on the other side of the barrier, have free access to Israel through the crossings, just like Israelis coming from Ma'aleh Adumim. One could ask why the border police don't check all of the Arabs leaving Shuafat. The reason, officials explained Wednesday, is twofold: First, such inspections would create endless traffic jams from Ma'aleh Adumim to Jerusalem, and second, because the people from Shuafat are, after all, Israelis. With their blue identity cards, east Jerusalem Arabs can cross into Israel freely and, according to the Shin Bet, a majority of the Palestinians who illegally infiltrate Israel these days enter through crossings, like the one outside Shuafat, often inside the cars of east Jerusalemites. These problems are shared by other Jerusalem neighborhoods - Jbel Mukaber, Anata, Sur Bahir and Isawiya. One of the Shin Bet's recommendations is to increase the presence of the Jerusalem municipality and of police in Shuafat. While the camp is part of Jerusalem, it is run by the United Nations even though close to 50 percent of its 87,000 residents are not listed as refugees. The lack of a police or municipal presence in these areas contributes to the low level of deterrence Israel has in the face of the growing terror wave. The route of the barrier, the Shin Bet said, also contributed to a feeling of "separation" between Israel and villages such as Shuafat, which have now taken on characteristics of the West Bank. Security officials admitted Wednesday that it was almost impossible to stop lone attackers from east Jerusalem, who have no links to a terror "infrastructure." Such an infrastructure is normally used by the Shin Bet to learn of attack plans, since when several people are involved, they talk to one another on the phone, they need supplies, and eventually someone slips. This is not the case with people like Kassem al-Mugrabi, who learned Monday night that he could not marry his cousin and then decided to ram his car into a group of soldiers crossing Jaffa Road.