Olmert's Last Hurrah (Extract)

In an effort to push the peace process forward, lame-duck Prime Minister Ehud Olmert has leaked his proposals to solve the Israel-Palestine imbroglio

By LESLIE SUSSER
11olmert88 (photo credit: )
11olmert88
(photo credit: )
Extract from an article in Issue 11, September 15, 2008 of The Jerusalem Report. To subscribe to The Jerusalem Report click here. In the dying days of his two and a half year reign as prime minister, Ehud Olmert is making a concerted push for a peace deal with the Palestinians. In August, the prime minister, who has agreed to step down after a new leader of his Kadima party is elected in September, agreed to release 200 Palestinian prisoners, sent a trusted emissary to convince Palestinian President Mahmud Abbas that now is the time for a deal, and leaked details of a far-reaching proposal on all the core issues: territory, security, refugees and even Jerusalem. Although the Palestinians were not enamored of the Olmert leak - which they dismissed as a collection of "half-truths" - both sides agree that intensive and serious talks are taking place between Olmert and Abbas, and even more so between Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni and former Palestinian Prime Minister Ahmed Qurei, who have been poring over maps and are reportedly already deep into the drafting of a final peace deal. In a late August appearance before the Foreign Press Association in Jerusalem, Livni confirmed that the drafting process had begun and intimated that the parties had gone beyond "vague ideas of percentages" of the West Bank to be transferred to Palestinian sovereignty, and were intent on delineating precise borders on a map, "so that the day after agreement, there will be no misunderstanding." International forces are also helping: U.S. Generals James Jones and Keith Dayton are respectively working with the parties on the security arrangements and training Palestinian forces to maintain law and order after an Israeli pullback. Former British Prime Minister Tony Blair is helping build the economic infrastructure for a future Palestinian state. In addition, eight Israeli-Palestinian technical committees are meeting on an almost weekly basis on a wide range of issues from taxes to border controls, water and infrastructure. In August, Olmert dispatched his close friend, American businessman S. Daniel Abraham, dovish author of the book "Peace Is Possible," to Ramallah several times to convince Abbas to go for an early closure. Yet despite the feverish activity, both sides acknowledge that there are still wide gaps on key issues. Heads of the technical committees complain that although Livni and Qurei seem to be making progress, they have yet to receive formal instructions on how to proceed. Moreover, to prevent the Palestinians from simply pocketing Israeli concessions, Olmert insists that "nothing is agreed until everything is agreed," making measured, incremental progress more difficult. But by far the biggest obstacle to a genuine resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the radical Hamas's control of Gaza. Even if everything were agreed, very little could be implemented with Hamas, which refuses to recognize Israel, calling the shots. Indeed, the question many skeptical Israelis ask is: What is the point of a so-called "shelf agreement" that stands little chance of implementation any time soon? According to Olmert's leaked proposal, in a final peace deal with Israel, the Palestinians would get 93 percent of the West Bank, while Israel would retain the large blocks of Jewish settlement in the remaining 7 percent. The Palestinians would get an area equivalent to 5.5 percent of the West Bank in Israeli land close to the Gaza Strip in compensation, and a land corridor connecting Gaza and the West Bank would count as another 1.5 percent in compensation, giving the Palestinians, all in all, the equivalent of 100 percent of the West Bank, all of Gaza and a land link joining the two as part of a single Palestinian state. The Palestinians propose a much smaller land swap - about 2 percent - and reject the idea of the West Bank-Gaza corridor being included as part of the compensation package. They would allow Israel to retain only a few settlements with narrow access roads to and from the 1967 border. Because of what it looks like on the map, the Israelis derisively call this proposal "balloons and strings." Olmert also leaked details of a proposal on security arrangements between Israel and the future Palestinian state. It entails: • A demilitarized Palestinian state without tanks, artillery, missiles or planes • A ban on the Palestinian state concluding military alliances • Israeli warning stations on the Samarian hills • A temporary IDF presence in the Jordan Valley • An Israeli presence at border crossings • Israeli control of the air space over Gaza and the West Bank • Israeli access to the main east-west axes in West Bank Israel, the Palestinians and the Americans under General Jones have exchanged papers on security arrangements, including international mechanisms for verification. There is also reportedly provision for Jordanian participation in a plan for a phased Israeli withdrawal from the Jordan Valley. But there are some wide gaps: For example, Israeli security experts strongly oppose Palestinian demands for civilian airports in the Jerusalem and Jenin areas. Not to speak of Palestinian opposition to many of the key principles in the Olmert proposal - like full demilitarization and Israeli control of Palestinian air space. On refugees, the Olmert proposal categorically rules out the "right of return." Palestinian refugees would be entitled to return to the Palestinian state in unlimited numbers, but not to Israel proper. Still, there is a small concessionary loophole in the Olmert proposal: 1,500-2,000 Palestinians would be allowed to return to Israel proper every year for ten years for "humanitarian reasons." In other words, Israel could, at its discretion, allow the return over ten years of 15,000 to 20,000 refugees. The Palestinians talk about 100,000 refugees, a figure once mentioned by David Ben-Gurion. Although Olmert insists that Jerusalem has not been on the negotiating agenda - the ultra-Orthodox Shas party has threatened to topple the government if it is so much as discussed - he does include a temporary solution for the city in his proposal. The final document would include reference to "a joint mechanism with a fixed timetable" for resolving the Jerusalem issue. Olmert aides refuse to elaborate, but say there would be elements in the joint mechanism "attractive to the Palestinians." Nevertheless, despite the declared embargo on dealing with the Jerusalem issue, there is speculation that the sides have already agreed on some of the parameters: Jewish neighborhoods go to Israel, Arab neighborhoods to Palestine; both countries seat their capital in a part of the city under their sovereignty; a joint Israeli-Palestinian regime in the "holy basin" - that includes the Temple Mount, the al-Aqsa Mosque and the Western Wall - is set up for a fixed period during which a permanent solution is sought. The Olmert leak aside, both sides have shown exceptional discipline in keeping the negotiations secret. "We are under oath not to leak," says Saeb Erekat one of the chief Palestinian negotiators, as he refuses to comment on the substance of the Olmert proposals. But he insists that all the core issues, including Jerusalem, are on the table, and he characterizes the Olmert package as "basically half-truths," intended to influence the domestic leadership struggles in Israel. Indeed, the importance of the Olmert package seems to be less in the details than in the delineation of the contours of an Israeli-Palestinian deal, as part of a concerted effort to prepare public opinion in Israel for a breakthrough. Olmert aides have been playing up the emerging joint document as a historic breakthrough and pointing to the advantages for Israel. "It would be the first time that the official leaderships of Israel and the Palestinians will have articulated a vision of final status," says Olmert spokesman Mark Regev. "And we believe it would become a galvanizing point for all the moderates and offer an alternative to the Hamas- Hizballah-Tehran paradigm. What is more, it would be endorsed by the Americans, the Europeans, the United Nations and perhaps even by the Arab League," he declares. In Regev's view, not only would the deal win wide international support and boost the moderates in the Arab world, it would also resolve the vexed problem of Israeli settlement in the West Bank. "If we are successful in delineating to a great degree of specificity where the final borders will be, then obviously we will continue to build in the settlements on our side and not in those on the Palestinian side," he explains. In other words, Israel would immediately on signing the deal regard settlements on its side of the border as part of Israel proper, with no extrinsic development restrictions, and those on the Palestinian side as living on borrowed time and slated for evacuation. Extract from an article in Issue 11, September 15, 2008 of The Jerusalem Report. To subscribe to The Jerusalem Report click here.