Preparing for peace in a cold climate

Pro-peace civil societies on both sides need to redraft the fundamental concepts for future cooperation

Police and Arabs 311 (photo credit: Israel Police)
Police and Arabs 311
(photo credit: Israel Police)
I remember the pattern distinctly. As a member of the joint Israeli-Palestinian committee responsible for supervising the implementation of the Oslo Interim Agreement, we used to meet periodically to discuss progress. Of all the items on the agenda, the committee never got down to talking about “people to people” (P2P), for which I was responsible on the Israeli side.
We never had a chance to report on the advances made in this exciting field of connecting ordinary Palestinians and Israelis. The principals on both sides prioritized dealing with the execution or failure to implement various security or civil administration-related items on the list – not P2P.
The P2P program was adopted in principle by the negotiating teams finalizing the Oslo Interim Agreement, which was signed on September 28, 1995, in Washington. Its vision reflected the nascent but vibrant activity carried out by NGOs on both sides of the divide, promoting “peace education” and “peace culture.”
The agreement states, “The two sides shall take steps to foster public debate and involvement, to remove barriers to interaction and to increase the people-topeople exchange and interaction within all areas of cooperation.” The negotiators had in mind a simple idea: A final status agreement will be hard to deliver unless the publics on both sides are prepared for it But how does one prepare a nation to accept painful compromises and risktaking? The core idea underlying the P2P agreement was that the two societies need to get to know each other, acknowledge their separate yet interrelated narratives, and accept the paradigm of the two-state solution. This would form the basis of any peace agreement entailing the “end of conflict” and the cessation of day-to-day hostility.
It was a tall order. The Israeli side feared being accused of using the Oslo Agreement to gain domestic political support. Similarly, the Palestinian side feared being blamed for fostering premature normalization of relations with the Israelis, with the core issues still to be settled through tough negotiations.
There were other spoilers too. On the one hand, Hamas objected vehemently to the Oslo peace process and tried to disrupt it by political boycott and terror. Furthermore, the hawkish Farouk Kadoumi faction of Fatah rejected any compromise with Israel.
In parallel, Syria and Lebanon campaigned against normalization in the regional context.
Nevertheless, the multilateral peace process and the Barcelona process were in full swing in the late 1990s. In both, Israel gained privileged access to the North African and Gulf states. As a result, diplomatic missions representing some of these states were established in Israel and the Palestinian territories. Israeli diplomats, traders and tourists visited in growing numbers and with growing confidence in both regions.
One could argue that had the Oslo Peace Process been allowed to advance at the right pace and in the right direction, we could have had peace and the State of Palestine in place for over a decade. Now, 20 years later, the peace camps in both societies look on with deep disappointment at the shattered debris. In the 2007-2008 Annapolis negotiations, a culture of peace, emanating from P2P efforts, was still on the drawing board. But the moment the second Netanyahu government took office in April 2009, the government-driven P2P came to a grinding halt.
Civil society, however, has not yet thrown in the towel. Here, the Peace NGOs Forum, loosely congregating around 100 pro-peace organizations on both sides of the divide, is still active in the P2P space.
On the Palestinian side, however, there has been a visible shift over the past two years. The younger generation in Palestine is calling for the termination of all efforts to promote P2P-oriented projects. Their antagonism, faint at first, is now loud and clear. Palestinian youngsters refuse to touch anything associated with Israel and Israelis.
In their view, 20 years of P2P failed to produce any agreement; nor did it stop the encroachment of settlements on Palestinian territory.
Official Palestine, in response to the growing grassroots resentment has taken to discussing an end to the occupation rather than peace as the overriding national objective. The political paradigm, “Land for Peace,” is losing its hold and is being replaced by an “end to occupation first” attitude.
One cannot really blame young Palestinians – and young Israelis, too, for that matter – for losing faith in the dysfunctional peace commitments. The traumatic second intifada delivered the most extreme form of terrorism – suicide attacks on Israeli civilians – and brought severe military reprisals to Palestinian doorsteps. It ended in almost irretrievable destruction of the Palestinian Authority, which was only reversed through international pressure and financial support.
The intifada also heavily undermined the peace camp in Israel and propelled political discourse strongly towards the hawkish side of the spectrum. Ultimately, however, it also showed that violence is counterproductive to the Palestinian struggle against occupation.
So what next? In order to increase its political leverage against Israel’s hold on the West Bank, the Palestinian leadership has resorted to a diplomatic offensive in the multilateral arena. After a botched attempt at the UN Security Council, Palestine successfully launched a diplomatic campaign in the UN General Assembly, which last year voted overwhelmingly in favor of recognition of Palestine as a non-member state. The Resolution reaffirmed the 1967 borders as the basis for a future territorial settlement between Israel and Palestine. And Palestine also positioned itself for access to the International Court of Justice (ICC), which could give it significant leverage in balancing Israel’s advantage on the ground.
In parallel, players in Palestinian civil society, with tacit support from Ramallah, resorted to a wide delegitimization campaign of the occupation. They found willing supporters on liberal campuses in North America, Europe and South Africa.
These initiatives receive tailwind support from anti-Israel and anti-Semitic circles. At the far end of the spectrum, one can find the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement. In some cases, the fine line between delegitimization of the occupation and delegitimization of Israel per se is blurred.
The Peace NGOs Forum defined its mission in 2006, inter alia, as “fostering trust and mutual understanding among the populations of the region.” Its objectives include working to “expand the Palestinian and Israeli peace constituencies and nurture a culture of reconciliation.”
However, in the eyes of the majority of Palestinians there is no room for reconciliation just yet. The prevailing mood suggests that the occupation needs to be addressed first, before reconciliation can be considered. This is the result of the 20 yearlong “cohabitation” of P2P projects while the end of the occupation was nowhere in sight.
Moreover, Hamas sanctifies Palestine in its entirety as waqf – holy Islamic endowment – not to be compromised, while the current leadership in Jerusalem accentuates the demand for Palestinian recognition of Israel as a Jewish state. Both positions contribute substantially to the political impasse. The competing narratives over who should be considered more indigenous to the contested piece of land with all the attendant political privileges have gained more traction than compromise over territory.
Therefore, pro-peace civil societies on both sides need to go back to the drawing board and redraft the fundamental concepts for future cooperation. We peace activists should jointly redefine the objectives in our endeavor to accelerate a peace dynamic.
In my view, we should jointly engage in “soft struggle’’ focusing on the termination of the occupation and the creation of preliminary conditions for our conflict to be resolved through a negotiated agreement based on the two-state paradigm, in line with UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.
The “soft struggle’’ should prioritize narrative over policy issues like territory, borders or refugees. It should address the fundamental question of the shared indigenous entitlement to the land. The “soft struggle” should involve an orientation, a strategy and a work plan aimed at removing ignorance of each other’s narrative, while simultaneously enhancing awareness and developing respect for the alternative narrative.
This should be the starting point for the dismantling of the occupation. We peace activists do not need more P2P projects.
Instead, we should concentrate on assisting our Palestinian partners with the development of effective instruments for direct public diplomacy, targeting Israeli society at large with messages of peace and mutual respect based on ending the occupation. 
Ilan Baruch, a retired career diplomat and former ambassador to South Africa, is a peace activist and a member of the dovish Meretz party