Saving the Egyptian revolution

The young rebels have created a new political language in which terms like freedom and social justice are loaded with new meaning

Morsi Protestors521 (photo credit: ASMAA WAGUIH/REUTERS)
Morsi Protestors521
(photo credit: ASMAA WAGUIH/REUTERS)
Does the ouster of President Mohammed Morsi mean that Egypt is in the throes of a military coup? In my view, the answer is no.
The way the army intervened and the plan it announced to resolve the crisis show that it is not interested in a military takeover. True, the military will continue to play a vital role: the army, police and internal security services will oversee implementation of the transitional “road map” and take firm action to impose law and order. But running the affairs of state even during the transitional period will not be entrusted to men in uniform.
Although the army’s intervention sealed the fate of the Morsi presidency, the process leading to his ouster was sparked by the young civilians who launched the tamarud, or rebellion campaign. These activists come from all walks of Egyptian life and are the same people who initiated the uprising against the Mubarak regime in 2011. In the subsequent presidential election in June the following year, most of them voted for Morsi, an Islamist candidate, even though they are not identified with the religious camp. But as soon as they felt Morsi was incorrigibly betraying the goals of the revolution, they raised the banner of rebellion once again.
These young people are behind the political and social forces that are reshaping Egyptian politics. They lack political experience and do not have efficient organizational structures at their disposal. Their power stems largely from a new political awareness coupled with access to the new media. They have created a new political language in which terms like freedom and social justice are loaded with new meaning.
Soon after Mubarak’s overthrow, millions of Egyptians who do not identify with the Muslim Brotherhood or the Salafist camp felt the achievements of the revolution slipping through their fingers.
They opposed the road map drafted by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) in conjunction with the Muslim Brotherhood.
After the Islamist victories in the parliamentary and presidential elections, things only got worse.
Very quickly a huge discrepancy between Morsi’s inclusive rhetoric and divisive policies emerged. He charged Hisham Kandil with the task of forming a government based on people identified with the religious camp. This factionalism was compounded by a declining economy and worsening personal security. There were shortages everywhere, especially of gas and diesel fuel. The cost of living and inflation levels skyrocketed. The value of local currency and the Cairo stock exchange tumbled. Foreign aid, mainly from Qatar, helped only marginally. Egypt’s credit rating fell and it failed to raise other loans.
In opposition circles the argument gained currency that Morsi was failing to deal with the domestic problems because he was committed to a Muslim Brotherhood agenda.
The issue of Islamization of the state and society rapidly became the heart of the dispute between the president’s supporters and opponents. Morsi’s critics complained of the way he intervened in the drafting of the new constitution, of his arbitrary arrogation of special powers, and of the hundreds of senior appointments in the administration and the civil service he showered on people identified with the Islamist camp.
Morsi and his supporters retorted, quite rightly, that the weighty economic and personal security issues could not be solved overnight. But their responses to charges of “Brotherhoodization” of the state were far less compelling. They insisted that they had won free and fair elections and that their policies therefore reflected the will of the majority. But democracy does not mean despotism by the majority. The widespread opposition to the Islamization of Egypt’s governing institutions highlights the problem. Indeed, opposition to the process of Islamization was the glue that bound the various anti-Morsi forces.
The “National Salvation Front,” a coalition of several secular parties led by prominent figures like Mohammed ElBaradei, Hamdeen Sabahi and Amr Mousa, emerged as a vociferous critic of the regime, but found it difficult to put together an agreed and effective program of action. The public anger it had helped to stir found a more promising outlet in the tamarud protest campaign launched in late April.
The campaign’s success surpassed all expectations. Within two months, the energetic young organizers managed to collect more than 20 million signatures calling for early presidential elections.
They also organized mass street demonstrations against Morsi on June 30, the first anniversary of his presidency.
The overwhelming public response had a decisive knock-on effect. The tamarud leaders declared the establishment of the “30th of June Front” and presented a road map for running state affairs the day after Morsi’s ouster.
For now the 2012 constitution has been suspended and Morsi’s powers transferred to Adly Mansour, head of the Supreme Constitutional Court, who was sworn in as president. The new government will include members from all the various sectors. A special committee will propose constitutional amendments and laws for new parliamentary and presidential elections, expected to take place within the next few months – after which power will be transferred to the elected civilian leadership. Although this road map seems to have many loopholes, it has wide popular support.
Clearly Morsi’s ouster after only a year in office was a heavy blow to political Islam in Egypt – especially to the Muslim Brotherhood. Shortly after the Free Officers’ Revolution in July 1952 (which eventually brought Abdul Nasser to power), the regime embarked on a brutal campaign against the Muslim Brothers.
The movement was outlawed and thousands of its activists detained for long periods. This time the security forces have carried out preemptive arrests of senior members of the Muslim Brotherhood and closed down some Islamist TV channels.
But it is too early to assess the long-term effects of the current corrective revolution on the functioning of the movements and groups that constitute political Islam in Egypt. The Salafist al-Nour and Abdel Moneim Aboul Fatouh’s Strong Egypt parties favor integration into the new political order, whereas the Muslim Brotherhood, outraged at what it sees as an unlawful military coup, is calling for an uncompromising struggle to restore Morsi to the presidency.
On the other hand, the liberal civilian camp will want to build on the momentum begun with Morsi’s ouster. The fact that they were involved in the consultations with the military suggests that they intend to play a significant role in the transitional period and beyond. Statements by spokesmen for the young tamarud group show that they too are trying to avoid past mistakes. The transitional plan states that their representatives will be incorporated in running state institutions. They are also working on the establishment of new political groupings, including parties that promote their national agenda.
Morsi’s overthrow sends out two significant messages: Free and fair elections are not everything; and democracy does not mean despotism of the majority. There is a virtual consensus in Egyptian civil society over the goals of the revolution that first erupted in January 2011. And the civil and institutional forces that overthrew presidents Mubarak and Morsi are determined to work to achieve them.
But the power struggle between the Islamists and their rivals divides Egyptian society in a way that is unprecedented.
Controlling it will constitute a supreme test for the leaderships on both sides, as well as for Egypt’s security forces and its newly installed transitional president, Adly Mansour.
The campaign to get the Egyptian revolution back on track is approaching another major milestone on the long and difficult road to a new and stable order. 
Prof. Yoram Meital is chairman of the Chaim Herzog Center for Middle East Studies and Diplomacy at Ben-Gurion University