Book Review: The Iran Wars

Journalist Jay Solomon, in a close look at the Iranian nuclear deal, finds the pact considerably lacking.

By GLENN C. ALTSCHULER
US Secretary of State John Kerry (L) meets with Iran's foreign minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, in Manhattan (photo credit: REUTERS)
US Secretary of State John Kerry (L) meets with Iran's foreign minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, in Manhattan
(photo credit: REUTERS)
Soon after he signed the nuclear agreement with Iran in July 2015, US Secretary of State John Kerry declared: “I have no doubt we avoided a war. None.”
Acknowledging that the deal did not overthrow Tehran’s clerical regime, change Iran’s policies toward Israel or its Arab neighbors or end the repression of the people of Iran, Joseph Cirincione, president of the Ploughshares Fund, celebrated the agreement because it “reverses and contains what most experts consider the greatest nuclear proliferation challenge in the world.”
Of course, the accord also attracted plenty of criticism.
“The White House bet the farm on reaching an accommodation with the Iranians,” a senior Israeli official indicated.
“But they never truly seemed to understand who they were dealing with.”
In The Iran Wars: Spy Games, Bank Battles, and the Secret Deals that Reshaped the Middle East, Jay Solomon, the chief foreign affairs correspondent of The Wall Street Journal, provides an in-depth examination of US-Iranian relations in the 21st century and the diplomatic maneuvering that resulted in the agreement. Sharply critical of the Obama administration, Solomon provides lots of ammunition for those who claim the deal rescued Iran from crippling economic sanctions; included concessions that allow Iran to build an industrial-scale nuclear program after a 10-year period of restraint; and has not had a salutary impact on Iran’s appalling behavior in the region.
Solomon argues that economic sanctions against Iran were imposed by Congress over the objections of the Obama administration, which supported a “more measured implementation” that would not result in a spike in energy prices or an end to talks on nuclear non-proliferation.
Unanimous votes in Congress, Solomon suggests, forced the president to freeze the assets held by Bank Markazi (Iran’s central bank) in the United States and sanction entities anywhere in the world for doing business with blacklisted Iranian firms. When the once-reluctant European Union joined the US in a ban on purchases of Iran’s oil, the financial war “proved singularly lethal,” wrecking the Iranian economy and leaving its government with a black hole of more than $200 billion on its balance sheet.
The sanctions clearly brought the Iranians to the negotiating table, but, Solomon argues, the Americans did not effectively use their leverage. As early as the interim deal, Kerry signaled that Tehran would be allowed to maintain significant components of their nuclear infrastructure, including centrifuges, the Arak reactor, and (over time) build or buy missiles to deliver warheads, while getting relief from sanctions.
The US backed off on attacking Syrian President Bashar Assad, Solomon suggests, when Iran threatened to break off talks if Syria’s sovereignty was violated.
Most important, Kerry abandoned dismantlement as a precondition for a final agreement, focusing instead on extending the time Iran needed to produce fuel for a bomb – and increasing access for international inspectors. According to Solomon, Kerry’s behavior fed perceptions that he wanted the agreement far more than the Iranians.
Solomon acknowledges that in 2016 Iran made good on its pledge to scale back its nuclear program, taking centrifuges off line and getting rid of fissile material.
He insists, however, that compliance was undercut by “aggression elsewhere,” ranging from testing ballistic missiles “inscribed with threats against Israel on their nose cones” to joint operations with Russia in Syria.
Solomon’s critique of the Obama administration is, at times, compelling.
But it is worth noting that although he aspires to “inject a healthy amount of honesty and skepticism into what has become a highly polarized debate,” Solomon does not always “chart a balanced path.” He does not adequately evaluate the concessions made by Iran, the constraints American negotiators faced, the alternatives available to them, or the value of “buying time.”
Short of a complete dismantling of the nuclear program, for example, it is not clear what terms, if any, would have been acceptable to Solomon. Does Solomon think if Kerry had waited for the economic noose to further tighten around the Iranians’ necks before agreeing to negotiations, Europe would have diluted or dropped the sanctions it had imposed? He does not specify, moreover, what the US or Israel could or should have done to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear capacity in the absence of an agreement. Nor does he indicate whether he believes it was (or is) feasible – or wise – for the United States or Israel to take out Iran’s nuclear facilities.
The jury’s still out, it seems to me, on whether the historic, high-risk Vienna agreement will help calm “the world’s most combustible region” or fuel the flames of a Sunni-Shiite, Saudi-Iranian conflict. Solomon is surely right, however, that the Iran wars are “entering a new chapter.”
Glenn C. Altschuler is the Thomas and Dorothy Litwin Professor of American Studies at Cornell University.